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A C K N OW L E D G M E N T S  
Composing Research began, in truth, when I was a curious undergrad-
uate guided and mentored by Dr. Judith Kilborn in the Write Place at
St. Cloud State University. Eventually, the mixture of inquiry and text
along the way resulted in a dissertation, inspired in part by Dr. James
Treloar, (a former English teacher and) current statistics professor at
Ball State University, though the notion would surprise him, I’m sure.
That dissertation—critically read by readers like Linda Hanson and
Patti White and carefully guided, hammered, discussed, debated,
chewed, and ultimately, I hope, enjoyed by my advisor and disserta-
tion director Paul Ranieri—is now in book form. To all of these
inspiring teachers and colleagues, I express gratitude and a wish to be
“half as good” as they are, half as inspiring. . . .
A special thanks to Eileen Oliver and Greg Siering for their partic-
ipation in the studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Without their
willing cooperation, much of the demonstration needed in this work
would have been impossible.
Thanks also to a special colleague and friend, Carmen Siering, for
her support in all things, and to my family for their constant love and
encouragement.

I N T R O D U C T I O N
The history of composition studies is one of conflict and struggle. As
a field relatively new to the academy, we have struggled to be valued,
debated our very roots, and created tension among ourselves as
researchers and teachers. The current debate between quantitative
and qualitative researchers in composition has been discussed before.
In that respect, this work is not new because it emerges from the
firmly-established rift between humanists and scientists, between
ethnographers and experimentalists.
But how we have debated about research methods is of greater
concern here than that we have debated: in other words, the rhetoric
of our own scholarship forms the foundation for this work. This
foundation allows for more than merely another review of tensions
among the field’s researchers and allows us to address instead the false
distinctions among competing epistemologies as composition schol-
ars have defined them, reasons other than the epistemological for our
new attention to personal narrative, the narrative potential of numer-
ical evidence, and the notion of context as it is understood (and mis-
understood) by our researchers.
At risk in any work that attempts to dissolve dichotomies is the
tendency to create new dichotomies instead. For that reason, context
is a pivotal, fluid term on which this work hinges: In what contexts do
we construct arguments about our research? In what contexts do we
conduct research in the first place? Which contexts demand certain
research methods more than other methods? In what ways does the
current research debate in composition decontextualize the problems
we debate?
Throughout my work on this project, I engaged in conversations
about it in various contexts, and I was often confused by reactions to
this work-in-progress. Too often, my defense of the quantitative and
my argument for better training in research design and statistics in
composition programs were misunderstood, and my attempt to pro-
vide a contextualist view that collapses the qualitative/quantitative
dichotomy in our research was sometimes plainly ignored or resulted
in a certain defensiveness from some listeners.
For example, in one job interview in 1998, two search committee
members asked me questions following the discussion of my work
that clearly indicated they weren’t willing to let go of the dichotomy
we currently have. One asked, “Yeah, but, really: What’s the best
method most suited for writing centers?” and the other asked, “If
you’re so into the quantitative, why don’t you answer any questions
with quantitative responses?”
In addition, we can easily find examples of scholars using a defen-
sive tone on “both sides of the fence,” indicating the intense passion
accompanying debates about research in our field. While I try to
avoid such a tone myself, the passion that drives our language and
voices in any debate makes our field incredibly rich and beautifully
imperfect, especially in tone.
My own passion to contribute to this dialogue and the passion of
my listeners and readers along the way resulted, of course, in several
misunderstandings. Often, I wrestled with what I found to be puz-
zling misperceptions of something I thought I was making clear. So
I’ll try to make a few points clear from the start here:
1. A contextualist approach to research does not (cannot, should
not) value one set of research methods over another. In no manner
will I argue that “quantitative” or “qualitative” methods are always
“better.” Instead, this work calls our attention to the contexts from
which our research questions come (and to the questions them-
selves)—contexts and questions that should guide our methodologi-
cal decisions, whatever they might be. In some contexts, one method
might be more appropriate and illuminating. In other contexts,
another method might be better suited to our needs. In still other
contexts, a blend might be necessary to fully answer our questions.
But in no context should we choose our method first, allowing it to
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narrow what kinds of questions we can ask, for to do so is to ignore
context itself.
2. In this work, I adopt a fluid definition of the term “context.” Here,
context means more than merely “place” or location, such as “in a writ-
ing center” or “in my classroom,” as we so often see the term defined.
Indeed, location alone as a defining feature of research contexts or
methods can cause confusion if we’re not careful. MacNealy (1999), for
instance, also attempted to avoid the qualitative/quantitative
dichotomy by using instead the distinction between “library-based”
and “empirical” research; however, MacNealy acknowledged that such
a distinction “could also create some confusion because empirical
research can be done in a library. . . . [And] in the most rigorous of sci-
entific disciplines, considerable library research must be done” (7).
Location becomes, then, a troublesome and narrow feature of research
methods and contexts.
Instead, context is not so rigidly defined here, but is “released” as a
flexible construct defined by its own power and its own variability—
both stemming from the moment a researcher wants to know some-
thing. For instance, two researchers in the same writing center could
pursue two very different questions, creating two different contexts in
the same location. One researcher might ask, “Does the pattern of
student attendance and student concerns differ between portfolio-
based classrooms and non-portfolio classrooms?” Here, this
researcher might design an instrument to keep track of student atten-
dance and concerns, seeking numerical evidence found in attendance
records and textual evidence found in tutors’ records of each session.
The second researcher might ask, “What tutorial strategies are being
used with hearing-impaired students who attend our writing center?”
This researcher would most likely observe and record tutorials, hop-
ing to observe patterns in tutoring strategies, possibly interviewing
the tutors and students observed in action. Both researchers, while
working in the same location, will choose research methods based on
their questions within their location, not on the location only. While
place might determine what research methods are possible, the
research question determines what research methods are necessary.
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3. I have no personal preference for any one kind of research method.
Though some friends, colleagues, and acquaintances sometimes pref-
ace their remarks with “Nothing against your interest in numbers, but”
or “Given your preference for the quantitative,” or while some might
expect me to use such methods all the time, I am merely curious about
everything—as I imagine you to be, too. Narrowed, personal attach-
ment to methodological choices cloud our vision of what those choices
are in the first place. Instead, my passion stems from a fascination with
the myriad of possibilities we encounter when seeking information
and insight. Rhetoric and composition is exciting because we have all
research tools available to us, useful at any moment of curiosity.
4. Finally, the presence of the highly risky term “paradigm,” as I con-
struct it in this work, invokes, of course, a Kuhnian image—one on
which our field does not entirely agree. When I began this work, I
agreed with Connors (1983) that composition might be incapable of
constructing the kind of paradigm that Kuhn (1970) outlined in The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. But Connors also speculated that
perhaps such a paradigm might still emerge one day in the future.
To help him articulate what a paradigm is, Kuhn pointed to three
kinds of work in which a field would engage if truly driven by a suc-
cessful paradigm. First, a field tries to capture and describe a class of
information that it feels will reveal the nature of things, and attempt
to refine that information as the field moves forward. This first class
of information defines the content of a field and the scope of what
kinds of nature we hope to reveal. For us, we hope to identify, reveal,
and describe the nature of rhetoric, the nature of composition.
Second, a field actively tries to make comparisons, observations,
applications, and predictions relating to the information available
within our content, attempting to produce the highest amount of
agreement within the field, and refining our information/beliefs via
new or revised theories and instruments. In other words, a field that
is driven by a successful paradigm will construct a coherent, working
body of research for its membership to consider.
Third, a field driven by a successful paradigm will turn its attention
to the ambiguities in the first two kinds of work. Knowing that 1) the
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information describing our content and 2) our predictions or applica-
tions of that information may not always be so certain in all situations,
a paradigm-driven field will continue to turn its attention to its very
paradigm in order to fully articulate its underlying theory, given the
changes in information from the other two kinds of work. Our under-
lying theory—as readers will see in chapter four—is a Contextualist
Theory of Epistemic Justification, one that turns our attention again
to our very content: the nature of rhetoric, moving us in a paradigm-
driven cycle of inquiry —a Contextualist Research Paradigm for
Rhetoric and Composition—that will, when successful, turn our
attention beyond the kinds of research we like, to explore, more
importantly, the kinds of research we and our students need.
But, for Kuhn, the adoption of a new, successful paradigm pro-
duces remarkable changes in a field:
When . . . an individual or group first produces a synthesis able to
attract most of the next generation’s practitioners, the older schools grad-
ually disappear. . . . But there are always some . . . who cling to one or
another of the older views, and they are simply read out of the profession,
which thereafter ignores their work. The new paradigm implies a new and
more rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling or unable to accommo-
date their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to
some other group. (18-19)
Embracing a Contextualist Research Paradigm for Rhetoric and
Composition, which I hope has room for all members of our field,
holds exciting possibilities for the future of our work.
To begin, this book’s first chapter will focus on the context from
which the remainder of this work emerges, with particular attention
to current trends in publications and professional conferences in
composition—especially those works and events that attempt to
define our field. Of interest here also is the basic question of how a
field defines itself in the first place, which must include a discussion
of paradigms, paradigm shifts, and debates centered on what consti-
tutes research and scholarship—and the language used either to orga-
nize or dismantle the boundaries of that same field.
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Chapter two will continue to outline the historical and current
issues in composition research, including a review of our field’s ear-
lier rejection of current-traditional rhetoric (to which we often draw
parallels when discussing current research trends), a discussion of
texts designed to help the composition researcher, a review of George
Campbell’s description of evidence, and a presentation of a simple
mock study designed to teach some research concepts.
In chapter three, I will examine three other issues that we must
address in the qualitative/quantitative debate: math avoidance and
anxiety, feminist contributions to composition and arguments
against traditional research, and a preference for storytelling as a
genre more literary than the traditional research report. The mock
study begun in chapter two will continue, in order to illustrate basic
descriptive statistics.
Chapter four will examine seemingly incompatible research para-
digms at an epistemological level and will examine the nature of “con-
text.” Of interest here is the artificial distinction composition scholars
have made among three ways of knowing: expressivist, objectivist, and
social-constructivist. To help dissolve the (false) boundaries among
these theories of knowledge, I will present a Contextualist Theory of
Epistemic Justification as a new template with which to view such the-
ories and our research. This template, to those in rhetoric, will not be
entirely new: it captures the essence of Aristotelian rhetoric, a tradi-
tion of rhetoric sensitive to context and to dialectic. This sensitivity to
context, together with a new lens through which to see research con-
texts, will allow us to construct a Contextualist Research Paradigm for
Rhetoric and Composition. The mock study will conclude with a
demonstration of some concepts of inferential statistics.
In chapter five I will present a reprint of Eileen Oliver’s (1995)
study published in RTE, “The Writing Quality of Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Graders, and College Freshmen: Does Rhetorical
Specification in Writing Prompts Make a Difference?” Dovetailing
with her study, I will insert an interview with Eileen Oliver in which
she comments on her work, describes the research process, and
explains her decisions. Such a presentation will reveal to readers that
narratives exist just below the surface of traditional quantitative
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research and are not separate from it. This presentation will also
demonstrate the Contextualist Research Paradigm at work.
Chapter six presents a second study, a pilot of my own, in which I
examine the lore surrounding red ink in teaching composition. The
purpose of the study in this chapter is to demonstrate quantitative
comparisons between groups and statistical analysis. This study also
serves as a test of much-accepted anecdotal evidence. The form in
which it is presented (as a traditional research report combined with
anecdotal evidence) suggests the possibility of lifting the underlying
narrative of such research into the text in a new, less traditional form
that composition might embrace as neither “quantitative” nor “quali-
tative,” but as a multi-modal design that is simply necessary in the
context of a particular research question, one explored with the
Contextualist Research Paradigm in mind.
With chapters seven and eight I will conclude by speculating on
the future of composition research and examining the need for a
Contextualist Research Paradigm. I will suggest new goals for the
field’s researchers, and ask several questions about the future and pol-
itics of our research, the voices of our researchers, and our training in
research design and statistics. I will propose that we teach the results
of our research in our classrooms when we teach students how to
write and that we construct a more accessible way to teach research
design and statistics to our scholars of the future.
A Contextualist Research Paradigm for Rhetoric and Composition
invites us to shift our focus—to the contexts in which we and our stu-
dents need to explore fully the nature of composing, learning, and
teaching. This focus will call us to attend to the contexts in which
rhetorical issues and research issues converge, producing varied
forms, many voices, and new knowledge, indeed reconstructing a dis-
cipline that will be simultaneously focused on its tasks, its knowl-
edge-makers, and its students. Such a paradigm calls us to emerge
from the trap of dichotomous thought and passionate debate that
keeps us locked in the past and divided against ourselves—a calling
through which we may embrace the freedom necessary to conduct
the research our discipline so greatly needs.
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Issues in Context
[C]omposition studies is a field in a preparadigmatic state, a
proto-science of a sort waiting for its first genuine
exemplars. It is difficult to argue with this assertion; since
we cannot predict the future, and for all we know a
complete composition-studies paradigm may emerge
tomorrow from completely unsuspected sources.
Robert J. Connors, 1983
The call for proposals for the 1998 NCTE Convention in Nashville,
Tennessee, began with composition’s newest and most popular tool: the
anecdote. The call for proposals was focused on the local, the personal,
and the emotional. In sharp contrast to previous calls that often placed
a particular annual convention (and its theme) in a larger context—the
overall field of teaching English, broad issues facing educators, or cur-
rent social and political trends educators need to address—NCTE
President-Elect Steiner instead told a story about “Maria”:
The semester had gone well, and I was giving the final exam to my
senior American Literature class . . . . During the exam, Maria raised her
hand. I walked over to her desk. She looked at me and asked, “Why do you
teach us how to read around the word, but then test us on the word?” (1)
Investigating what she had learned from Maria’s question, Steiner
invited other professionals in our field to engage in similar inquiry,
and while the Call for Proposals did not directly favor or debate the
value of one kind of research over another, the call for teacher
research through participant observation was clear as Steiner contin-
ued her reflection on Maria’s story:
A teacher’s role is unique. At times, as James Britton has taught us,
teachers are in the role of participant, actively involved in the classroom
with students. At other times, teachers are in the role of spectator. . . . The
1998 Convention is a time for us to reflect upon classroom practices and
upon our relationships as learners with our students. . . . Maria is not the
only student who has taught me. (1)
Such attention to participant-observation and to reflection on our
experiences drew, I’m sure, numerous insightful anecdotes and obser-
vations from our teaching at the November 1998 convention.
Reflection and anecdotes are important to our understanding of what
we do, but the NCTE announcement suggested what was not invited:
quantitative studies, experimental research, or anything else that
doesn’t seem to fit a conference theme that highlights participant-
observation and the personal anecdote:
Through the shifting roles of participant and spectator, teachers learn-
about their students and the dynamics of the classroom. Teachers alsolearn
about themselves as professionals. . . . I invite you to share your moments of
learning from or with your students at NCTE’s 1998 National Convention.
Please join us in Nashville, Tennessee, and place our mutual learning with
students at the center of our time together. Join us in celebrating the contin-
ual learning and growing we enjoy as classroom teachers. (1)
A national announcement such as Steiner’s (especially when added
to the 1998 CCCC convention theme in Chicago, “Ideas, Historias, y
Cuentos”) indicates the degree to which our field has accepted certain
forms of research—or forms we want to call research–and dialogue as
a means of defining who we are professionally.
The simple dichotomy that divides what we commonly call “quali-
tative vs. quantitative” research has now been divided even further, it
seems. Perhaps through our quest for more research, not only is
“qualitative” disparaged, but systematic rigorous “qualitative”
research seems to be less available, too, as we opt instead for the per-
sonalized anecdotal evidence we gain through experience. Rigorous
ethnographies and case studies, though qualitative in nature, seem to
be losing ground along with the quantitative–losing ground to the
simpler, more diverse, more personal story or anecdote. Such reliance
on the personal anecdote has contributed more to “lore” than to
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“research,” two components of our knowledge-making that have
always had an unfortunately strained relationship.
While I, too, will share several anecdotes in this work, in the hope
and the belief that such anecdotes can help explain or contest larger
concepts and can illuminate some of our work, “research” that shares
only anecdotal evidence seems to have found a prominent place in
our recent scholarship–and unfortunately so.
Recent collections of essays in composition studies reveal how
strongly our field has embraced the anecdote, the story, as a means of
and a form for our research. Several texts have been advertised pri-
marily for their reflective approach and for their accessibility to read-
ers; the following incomplete list offers just a few examples: Pedagogy
in the Age of Politics (Sullivan & Qualley, 1994), The Need for Story:
Cultural Diversity in Classroom and Community (Dyson & Genishi,
1994), Learning in Small Moments: Life in an Urban Classroom (Meier,
1997), Stories from the Heart: Teachers and Students Researching their
Literacy Lives (Meyer, 1996), Beginning in Retrospect: Writing and
Reading a Teacher’s Life (Schmidt, 1996), Narration as Knowledge:
Tales of the Teaching Life (Trimmer, 1997).
Potential problems of such collections, however, are noted by
Jacobs (1997) in a review of Sullivan and Qualley’s Pedagogy in the
Age of Politics (1994). Jacobs argues that the focus on anecdotes and
narratives from the individual voices of authors results in “diffuse-
ness” and the impression that the authors seem “isolated rather than
members of a social network” (464). For Jacobs, this lack of unity in
Pedagogy in the Age of Politics came from the editors’ inability to tie it
all together or explain “the circumstances under which these papers
came together” (464), and resulted in a highly inaccurate title that
Jacobs argues applies to only one-fourth of the volume (465).
At the same time, others have been critical of the quality of non-
anecdotal, more rigorous research in composition. When Stotsky
(1997) stepped down as editor of Research in the Teaching of English
(RTE), she plainly remarked,
RTE has experienced a documented decline in recent years in the
number of high quality manuscripts submitted. . . . I discovered at a 
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session for editors at the American Educational Research Association
that this quality decline is affecting other mainstream research journals
as well. (6)
To compensate, Stotsky explained, RTE published more reflective
essays, “live debates,” and other inquiry that Stotsky admitted
“helped RTE broaden its educational purpose. . . . [and] can serve a
vital role in the professional development of English language arts
teachers by informing them of the issues under discussion in the
research community” (6). But such discussions, for RTE, had to be
published due to a lack of high quality research (whether qualitative
or quantitative in nature): “Necessity very much became the mother
of serendipitous invention” (Stotsky, 1997, p. 6). Once RTE began to
accept essays with a personalized bent, the full acceptance of the
experiential through debate and anecdote was firmly in place, and
our rejection of the quantitative was complete.
Wisely, and perhaps again out of necessity, the new editors of
RTE, two issues after Stotsky stepped down, published an introduc-
tory explanation of what constitutes research, identifying a range of
methods that are welcome in the journal (Smagorinsky & Smith,
May 1997). One year later, however, in the May 1998 issue of RTE,
Smagorinsky and Smith again discussed the criteria by which sub-
missions would be accepted to the journal. The editors commented
on the need for the “archival significance” of accepted articles—
RTE is a place for public documents that chronicle the develop-
ment of a community (121). The editors published three articles
that they felt demonstrated what they meant by “significant” in the
May 1998 issue of RTE. None of the articles presented quantitative
data.
In short, the unfortunate rift between “quantitative” and “qualita-
tive” research has not only resulted in a near-abandonment of
research that seeks and analyzes numerical data, but it has also
divided us further into the more private worlds of personal stories.
While such stories can always help illuminate our work and give
meaning to our theory, research, and practice, they, alone, cannot be
the primary knowledge-making vehicle that defines our field. Given
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current trends in our scholarship that seem to indicate such a direc-
tion, we must consider these (and other) questions:
1. Have we accepted anecdotes as a form of research so much as only to
sacrifice other forms? 
2. Why has composition gravitated toward the anecdote-as-research so
quickly and so strongly?
3. Would our field be better defined by evidence that is personal, social,
numerical, or a blend of these? Can we blend them?
4. What possible solutions are there to the quantitative/qualitative false
dichotomy? What arguments would members of “both sides” listen to?
5. How would a solution change the future of composition research?
C O M P O S I T I O N  I N  A  WO R D : T R A N S F O R M AT I O N  
To examine research trends in any field is to study its processes of
knowledge-making: what logic do we use to arrive at that knowledge?
In what contexts do we believe the knowledge we feel we have? What
texts comprise what we call our body of knowledge? That body of
knowledge, of course, has boundaries that we create to determine
what can and cannot be within its scope—boundaries that we choose
to maintain or challenge, to accept or reject, to tighten or broaden,
and, most importantly, to define and redefine (again and again) in the
everchanging context(s) of the world(s) around us.
The long, multidisciplinary history of rhetoric and composition
complicates such study of our own field. Our perception of our field
and its history and research “in any given age depends on the organic
interplay between the disposition of the discipline and the intellectual
climate and social complexity of the times” (Johnson, 1991, pp. 6-7).
Indeed, Johnson presented a compelling case in Nineteenth-Century
Rhetoric in North America that “rhetorical theory and pedagogy have
displayed a dynamic tendency toward responsive transformation” (7),
often due to “shifting social and political conditions” (6). In other
words, Johnson outlined rhetoric’s heightened sensitivity to context:
The most conspicuous characteristic in the history of rhetoric has
been its responsiveness to the ever-changing nature of certain intellectual
and cultural imperatives: 1) governing epistemological assumptions
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regarding the relationships between thought, language, and communica-
tion; 2) dominant philosophical views of human nature and the nature of
affective response to discourse; 3) conventional and institutional percep-
tions of appropriate modes of formal communication; and 4) the per-
ceived role of the study and practice of rhetoric in the maintenance of
social and political order. (4)
The above four imperatives have undoubtedly shaped and
reshaped our field: how we teach, how we view ourselves, what and
how we choose to research, and what forms of knowledge we deem
valuable. Accordingly, we must take note of Johnson’s choice of
epigraphs preceding chapter one of Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric,
epigraphs that illustrate an overwhelming transformation has already
taken place in our research and in our view of knowledge:
This is a work of history in fictional form—that is, in personal perspec-
tive, which is the only kind of history that exists. (Joyce Carol Oates, Them)
The truth is, I have never written a story in my life that didn’t have a very
firm foundation in actual human experience—somebody else’s experience
quite often, but an experience that became my own by hearing the story, by
witnessing the thing, by hearing just a word perhaps. (Katherine Ann Porter)
It is like what we imagine knowledge to be:
dark, salt, clear, moving, utterly free,
drawn from the cold hard mouth 
of the world, derived from the rocky breast 
forever, flowing and drawn, and since 
our knowledge is historical, flowing, and flown.
(Elizabeth Bishop, “At the Fishhouses”)
This view of knowledge—personal, experiential, flowing, dark, free,
and expressive—has recently and greatly transformed the research of
our field. As epigraphs to Johnson’s first chapter in a book on nine-
teenth century rhetoric, the statements above serve to guide readers as
they proceed: to frame Johnson’s own beliefs about the field, to explain
her approach to historical inquiry, to align her, perhaps, with other
(women) writers/poets, and to assert what kinds of knowledge our
field has ultimately come to value most.
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Such knowledge seems best expressed through narratives and
poetry rather than scientific reports, through a story rather than data
analysis, through the emotional more than the logical, through the
specifics of experience instead of the generalizations of probability.
The recent “transformation” which Johnson used to frame her text
has, indeed, reframed the contexts in which we now do research and
publish our work—a new context that has produced research that
highlights the personal, the local, the narrative.
A responsive transformation such as this has had, on the one
hand, some positive effects: composition has found itself in the more
comfortable world of the social, personal, anthropological, political,
and literary arenas that have always been of interest to many of us
more than the scientific or mathematical; those now being trained as
writing teachers and tutors will see more readily than teachers 50
years ago that we teach not so much an impersonal subject, but stu-
dents alive with personal knowledge they bring to their writing and
reading; as writers ourselves, we seem to gain more freedom to con-
tribute to a growing body of knowledge presented in a wider range of
scholarship, including the creative; and this scholarship is more acces-
sible to most of us, more understandable—we’re in this field, after all,
because we’ve always loved to read “that kind of stuff.”
For all we have gained through such a transformation, however,
what might we have lost? New trends in our research have taken hold
strongly enough to dramatically reduce the same “responsiveness”
and “dynamic tendency” for which Johnson had once praised our
field: a stronger commitment to one kind of knowledge has made us
dangerously less responsive to other kinds and, therefore, less
dynamic in our quest to define our field. Peter Elbow’s What is
English? (1990) is the clearest example:
“What is English?” The title is not intended as a question I can answer
with my book, not a slow lob that I can try to hit for a home run. The title
is my answer, my summing up, my picture of the profession. This book is
trying to paint a picture of a profession that cannot define what it is. (v)
Elbow did not pretend to answer the question in his title; instead,
he presented his personal reflections on the 1987 English Coalition
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Conference, joined by interludes of letters, reflections, stories, and
position statements written by conference participants. This book (a
picture of a “profession that cannot define what it is”) becomes, then,
a collage of narratives, experiences—in short, a portrait of a field
based on knowledge that is (like the knowledge valued in Johnson’s
epigraphs) personal, experiential, flowing, dark, free, and expressive.
Teachers at the conference shared stories about triumphs and failures
with their students, stories about poor (and sometimes violent) con-
ditions in which they teach, questions and reflections about what they
did and did not get out of the conference, memories of their own
teachers.
By presenting primarily this kind of knowledge, Elbow, while
claiming not to define the field, presented a model, perhaps, of what
he saw as the best method for getting us there—an anecdotal
approach to clarifying our boundaries—and the kind of knowledge
to which we should assign the highest value.
I would not be exaggerating if I said, “I love Elbow’s book!” After
all, I, too, am in this field because I like to read “that kind of stuff.”
Elbow makes me think. He asks hard questions. He makes me laugh. I
think he makes us all laugh, especially at ourselves. Every field needs a
writer who does those things.
But every field needs more than that, too.
There are, after all, questions that Elbow couldn’t ask (or offer as
an “answer”), and there are parts of our field he couldn’t define (even
if he had tried) because of the method he chose for constructing that
picture of the field in the first place. While he raised fascinating ques-
tions and explored interesting theories, these questions and theories
(and the personal, individual stories through which they were raised)
cannot help us determine the scope of certain problems he saw in the
field (such as how we assign grades); they cannot help us understand
the full effectiveness of certain teaching methods; they cannot allow
us to compare classroom-wide changes after a school reduces class
sizes or installs computers or after a teacher alters her view of testing.
For example, in one of Elbow’s interludes, a teacher changed her 8th
grade literature tests when a student—and, once, the student’s
mother—had epileptic seizures after taking those tests. This teacher
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realized that her exams taxed the memory too greatly and did not allow
for investigation or application of principles (higher-order thinking
skills, in other words), so she changed the tests to include new features,
more essays, and some take-home options. She confirmed through
observation that the epileptic student performed far better on the new
tests, but she offered no report on whether students who had already
performed well were getting more out of the new tests, too (258-259).
Here we recognize a teacher who feels she made a change for the better.
We have every reason to believe that one student is better off, and we
might guess that others are, too. But that’s all we can do: guess.
In What is English? Elbow presented the “kind of stuff” that is
moving. It’s “that kind of stuff” that inspires me to stay in this field
where everyone seems to learn so much, so much of the time. But it’s
that kind of guessing (at “dark knowledge”) that dangerously draws
us further from the kind of research that could shed more light—if
only we let it. After all, to allow such “knowledge” to remain dark is,
in the end, to accept incomplete knowledge.
To illuminate the assumption that a change for the better for one
student is a change for the better for all, the above teacher could have
conducted a fascinating study right in her own classroom: to compare
student learning of (and, perhaps, attitudes toward) literature before
and after her new tests, to explore her test as not so much a test but as
another teaching tool, to assess the value of her classroom after the
change, perhaps even in comparison to other classrooms.
But such a study takes time and, worse, requires quantifying and
analyzing data (numbers, in other words), and Elbow warned us in
this book that any reduction of anything to a single number is
“untrustworthy” (251). Never mind that Elbow also warned us in the
beginning of the same book that his reflections were biased and that
he, like Gulliver, was a less-than-reliable narrator (vi). The current
climate of our field (one of new favoritism toward anecdotal forms of
research) has produced a battle for trustworthiness between a num-
ber and a narrative. And the narrative clearly wins—not because it
necessarily offers more (or more accurate) information than the
other, but because the narrative offers one kind of information that
we clearly value more.
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After all, that is English.
But not all narratives and personal experiences are as easily
received in composition as those in Elbow’s book. Indeed, not one of
Elbow’s narrative interludes began with “I conducted a study once” or
“I was thinking about an experiment I read.” When I attend profes-
sional conferences in composition, most often on writing centers, and
share some of my own narratives, the experiences I now bring to this
work, they are often pointed out as “unpopular to say.” For example,
as an undergraduate, I majored in composition and cognitive psy-
chology. While pursuing these majors, I participated in an under-
graduate experimental psychology research group. I once conducted
and presented a study on attitudinal similarity and image mainte-
nance between writers and evaluators of writing. I enjoy the challenge
of studying statistics and experimental research designs and I wanted
to write a dissertation on related issues. My colleagues’ responses to
these “stories” of mine have ranged from suggesting I’m in the wrong
field, to incredulous remarks (“are you serious?”) to warnings not to
ruin my career, to a simple uncomprehending blink or two.
To me, the defensiveness in these reactions was confusing. My
interest in composition began as a peer tutor in a writing center,
when I was a sophomore in 1986, about to begin my major in English
with an emphasis in composition. At the time, majoring in both
English and cognitive and experimental psychology, my studies in
these two different areas made a lot of sense to me. When I was tutor-
ing writing, for example, I often kept in mind a principle of human
memory from cognitive psychology called the “serial position effect,”
a notion based on years of research on memory that suggests we
remember best what we see last, we remember second best what we
see first, and we remember the least the stuff in the middle.
Regardless of what direction my tutorials took, I always tried to
engage the writers with whom I worked in a summary of what had
just happened—a collaborative summary at the end of the tutorial, a
tutorial strategy based on theories of collaborative learning (as com-
position had emphasized to me) and on principles of cognitive psy-
chology (as research had emphasized). When writers struggled with
organization—or with introductions and conclusions—the “serial
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position effect” was also useful and gave us another language with
which to talk about readers and their memories and how the writer
can help work the brains, so to speak, of their audience.
Studies in social cognition, especially in attribution theory, gave
me a lens—not the only lens, of course, but an important one—with
which to see a writer’s level of confidence, how a writer measured his
or her success. Attribution theorists often attempt to answer the ques-
tion “to what do we attribute our success, our failure, our beliefs, our
performance in varied contexts?” Of special interest are attributions
to external factors (such as luck or help) vs. internal factors (such as
effort or intelligence or ability). I was often struck by the number of
students—often those who lacked confidence in their ability—who
attributed success to my help, rather than to their own effort or intel-
ligence. I was especially struck by the students who attributed success
to luck, an external factor even more out of their control—or my con-
trol as their tutor, for that matter.
Psychologists have found many relationships between attributions
to external, uncontrollable factors for success and issues of low self-
esteem, low-to-medium success in careers, and poor self-image (espe-
cially among women). While tutoring, I would use attribution cues
from students—cues that would help me listen for when they needed
help seeing the importance of their effort, their ability, the time spent
on drafting, their motivation to succeed, their talent and strengths—
hoping they would transfer their attributions for their success from
others to themselves, so they would become more independent writ-
ers, more confident and more proud of their work.
While I often applied what I had learned in my psychology major to
my work as a writing center tutor, application often worked in reverse
as well. My training as a writing consultant was important to my par-
ticipation and my learning in our experimental psychology research
group. Most of our meetings focused on helping someone design a
study. Questions I learned to ask as a writing tutor were important to
me and my fellow researchers: questions that tried to determine what
the researcher wanted to know, why it was important to know it, and
how best to arrive at some answers—questions and guidance that, as a
writing tutor, I used all the time in a writing center. Often, my 
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colleagues in the research group would ask me (because I was the only
“English person” in their group) for my help wording their arguments,
finding the best mode of argumentation based on their data, finding
the clearest language with which to express their statistical analyses.
For me, there were all sorts of connections between studies in cog-
nition and tutoring writing, between experimental designs and how
we think through a tutorial, between theories of psychology and the-
ories of reading and writing. But when I got to graduate school and
began to focus my studies on composition and rhetoric (and writing
centers in particular), I would learn a disturbing truth: (some of) the
most prominent scholars in composition and rhetoric and writing
centers argue that these two worlds—one world of the cognitive, the
experimental, the psychologist, and the other world of the composi-
tion specialist, literacy theorist, writing teacher and tutor—were not
connected at all. (see chapter two) 
In my own graduate courses in composition, for example, research
methods considered to be more “naturalistic” were often favored over
those more “scientific”—favored in student projects, in professors’
selections of reading materials, and in course content. In these
courses, language we often associate with traditional research was also
under fire as other political arenas within composition (especially in
basic writing and writing centers) have been ablaze with criticism for
terms like “standard,” “control,” “marginal,” “manipulation,” and
other terms central to an understanding of statistics. And the study
and use of statistics, of course, require numbers—numbers that many
who are formally trained in a literary tradition find confusing and
useless, if not hateful and (for Elbow) “untrustworthy.”
F I E L D - B U I L D I N G  I N  A  P O S T M O D E R N  A G E  
Not knowing what evidence to “trust” is natural for any field in a
world we now call “postmodern”—but lack of trust seems not only
natural but necessary for a field born in part because of that world.
For Phelps (1988),
The postmodern world is marked by themes of loss, illusion, instabil-
ity, marginality, decentering, finitude. . . . Across the disciplines, all of the
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old realities are in doubt, placed under radical critiques—critiques that
challenge reason, consciousness, knowledge, meaning, communication,
freedom. . . . These assaults destroy absolutes and leave us in fear of an
ultimate meaninglessness that will paralyze action and thought. (5)
Phelps praised the postmodern consciousness for its attack on 
scientism—science’s belief in its own methods, proof, knowledge—
and for questioning the knowledge that scientism has upheld as “per-
manently valid” and with “absolute authority” (9). In Foucault’s (1972)
terms, a whole “field of questions” has emerged, seeking “discontinuity
(threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation)” (5-6).
The modern version of composition studies—though grounded in
a long-standing rhetorical tradition—emerged amid such chaos—in
the context of a rupture, a transformation, a mutation, if you will,
called the “literacy crisis” of the mid-1970s (Harkin & Schilb, 1991).
Sommers (1979) had argued that our field lacked an articulated the-
ory at that time because of the chaotic response to the literacy crisis, a
response that resulted in numerous teaching methods developed
without the support of a theory of how students learn.
By 1991, Harkin and Schilb asserted that “composition studies
has now become a fully authorized academic field and a site of
inquiry in its own right” (3). However, their introduction to
Contending with Words remained alive with, well, contending words:
“tensions,” “resistant,” “crisis,” “refuse,” “interrogate.” And they did-
n’t quite say how this new field became fully authorized, though it
seems to me that such a fully authorized field wouldn’t need so
much contending, wouldn’t need to point out that contributors to
the volume were those who “refuse to act as the ‘window washers 
of the academy’” (5). Indeed, the culture into which composition
was born was one of change, of dissolving boundaries, or,
for Phelps, “composition comes to maturity at just the moment
when discourse (especially writing) and its interpretation stand 
at the epicenter of a great change, a fundamental crisis in human
consciousness” (4).
Placed “at the epicenter of a great change,” then, the field has had
to construct its own boundaries in a culture that had just destroyed
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the old ways of boundary-making and had begun to question knowl-
edge in a new way.
For Hairston (1982), this change was called a “paradigm shift,”
based on the work of Kuhn (1970). But, in Connors’s (1983) reading
of Kuhn, our field did not have a paradigm from which to shift in the
first place, and was or is, therefore, preparadigmatic, with preparadig-
matic elements competing against each other—possibly as a result of
our field’s history, which Connors called “chaotic, anti-empirical,
confused, and at times mindless” (18). In Connors’s review of com-
position scholars’ borrowing from Kuhn, he noted that all of those
scholars—those who have seen a paradigm shift and those who have
argued the field is preparadigmatic—were nevertheless “united in the
belief that composition studies can attain a Kuhnian scientific para-
digm” of some sort (5).
Regardless of how Kuhn has been applied to composition studies,
the quest for a paradigm—for defining boundaries—has been made
clear. Currently, composition is defined by a confusing array of ideas.
On the one hand, some have said current-traditional rhetoric
stemmed from the nineteenth century, and, later, changed, suggesting
the widely-accepted notion that our field has, indeed, experienced a
paradigm shift of sorts. On the other hand, those who argue that
composition studies emerged in the 1970s during the “literacy crisis”
suggest that the field possibly emerged because of that paradigm
shift, suggesting that the earlier paradigm was quite possibly a very
different field, not our own field as we now know it. Currently, the
rapid rise of anecdotal evidence, story-telling, and qualitative
research, together with a few remaining traditional studies, has multi-
plied the ways in which the field can define itself. For Kuhn (1970),
such a wide range of evidence and its accompanying, competing the-
ories suggests a preparadigmatic state:
In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for a paradigm, all of
the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science
are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far
more nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific
development makes familiar. Furthermore, in the absence of a reason for
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seeking some particular form of more recondite information, early fact-
gathering is usually restricted to the wealth of data that lie ready to hand.
The resulting pool of facts contains those accessible to casual observation
and experiment, together with some of the more esoteric data retrievable
from established crafts. (15)
I agree with Connors that composition was preparadigmatic in
1983. If it is possible for a field to become “more preparadigmatic” as
time goes on, composition seems to have done so. In Charney’s
(1996) words, our recent reliance on individual, personal studies has
produced “a broad shallow array of information, in which one study
may touch loosely on another but in which no deep or complex net-
works of inferences and hypotheses are forged or tested” (590). In the
absence of a paradigm, as Kuhn noted, our frequent use of random
activity and casual observations via the anecdote, together with our
struggle to make varied kinds of evidence equal to each other, has
broadened the scope of our inquiry, certainly in some valuable ways;
but such diverse activity has also, unwittingly perhaps, removed the
very thing many of our scholars have been searching for: a definition
of our field, a paradigm, sensible boundaries in which to contain a
seemingly chaotic volume of scholarship.
If we believe that our field emerged in the context of what others
have described as a chaotic state, a whirlwind of debate about knowl-
edge, paradigms, and history, it is no wonder that composition has
now gravitated toward the heavy use of the personal, individual,
anecdotal evidence now seen in much of our scholarship. Perhaps
storytelling and experience-sharing allows us a means to join the cri-
tique of scientism, or perhaps it binds us to the only part of our
knowledge that we believe is still certain and accessible—our personal
experience. Perhaps story telling allows us the chance to start over—a
new paradigm of sorts that paradoxically favors the absence of one.
Such a shift, for Ward (1995), is reminiscent of Snow’s (1965) dis-
cussion of the clash of “Two Cultures”—a gap between the sciences
and humanities that Snow tried to close even though he saw the gulf
as irreconcilable (4-5). In spite of some criticism that Snow’s divi-
sions were too simplistic, Ward (1995) has asserted that such a gulf is
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not only evident, but has actually widened at the close of the twen-
tienth century, dividing not only fields, but subfields and colleagues:
Often in loosely knit and divisive fields, like literary criticism, philoso-
phy, and sociology, the collective representation of the field itself has not
been completely settled and is, therefore, up for grabs. . . . In these settings,
cliques and subgroups with competing truth claims and ideologies are
likely to exist. (9)
For those fields that reject scientism as a means of organizing
themselves, to what do they turn? For Ward, the debate about what
constitutes knowledge—what research and inquiry should define a
field—is rarely about knowledge itself so much as it is about “ongoing
organizational and political struggles” (4). Composition is currently
constructing, then, not a Kuhnian scientific paradigm, but what Ward
called an “organizational myth”—a “banner or totem around which a
social group is internally organizing itself and under which a new
political assault on the scientific establishment is being made” (1).
Our own “new political assault” advances under the “banner” of the
story or anecdote.
Given our field’s recent history of doubting traditional research,
our current interest in research methods other than the quantitative,
our distaste for statistics, and our need to maintain all forms of
research in our scholarship, the composition field needs a more acces-
sible analysis of the available research methods and, especially, of the
contexts in which we use them. A new look at research in context will
enable us to understand the potential of diverse research forms, to
realize that numbers indeed may tell a story, to accept the terminol-
ogy of scientific inquiry on its own terms, and to engage in the plea-
sure of asking wide-ranging questions and seeking their answers.
Such an analysis addresses the nature of research paradigms, the
effects of rapid changes in those paradigms, and the power of
research to define a field. Scholars in our field currently engage in
passionate, sometimes defensive, debates about just those issues, pos-
ing arguments and establishing preferences, though unfortunately
creating dichotomous language that further divides those same schol-
ars. To achieve common ground, we must avoid the artificial
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dichotomy (and divisive language) that has naturally and unfortu-
nately emerged from discussions of our research. Others have put
forth excellent discussion in an attempt to collapse this dichotomy
(Charney, 1996; Hillocks, 1992; Schriver, 1989; Kirsch, 1992) but
could do so only through the same dichotomous language and, there-
fore, have not yet succeeded..
Some of the following terms are central to the debate. A list of def-
initions for these terms helps condense the conflicts in our field to a
concise space—a space in which the language we use to keep our-
selves apart is highlighted. Labels we place on our research (and
researchers), with their diverse connotations, are, for some, accusa-
tions rather than concepts worth defining. Defining such concepts,
however, provides a framework in which disputing parties might
come together and embrace some of this same divisive language in
order to start a discussion toward collapsing the dichotomy from
which such language emerges. In the following list, I adopt current
usage of some terms as they have appeared in composition scholar-
ship; for other terms, I establish more useful boundaries:
1. Research: While many inquiries constitute “research” (I agree, for
example, with Miller’s (1992) argument that writing about theory can
be understood as a form of research), my use of the term in this pro-
ject is more narrow, focusing on inquiry guided by specific research
questions actively explored by a discernible method, such as experi-
ment, interview, survey, ethnography, or case study. Some of the fol-
lowing terms further define different kinds of research as perceived by
our field.
2. Scientific Inquiry/Methods: I am using “scientific” to describe research
methods that engage in hypothesis-testing and employ statistical
analyses of data gathered from measurements of identified, controlled
variables within the research context. Purposes for such inquiry
include description, inference, prediction, and/or explanation as
guided by the question being explored in the research context.
3. Empirical: For some in composition, empiricism is related to scientism
or to extreme positivism (for example, Phelps, 1988). Its relation to the
scientific method, to methods of systematic testing and observation
(Kerlinger, 1986, pp. 4-5), quite possibly causes this interpretation.
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However, a more accurate definition can be found in Reading
Empirical Research Studies: The Rhetoric of Research. Hayes et al. (1992)
included as examples of empirical research in composition “case stud-
ies, naturalistic observation, surveys, protocol studies, correlational
studies, experiments, historical studies” (5).
4. Naturalistic Inquiry/Methods: “Naturalistic” refers to those research
methods that seek to describe and/or narrate events, people, phenom-
ena, and experiences as completely as possible by including all vari-
ables gained through dialogue and/or observation. Politics of research
in composition are such that “naturalistic” is often used in contrast to
(and to highlight) “artificial” scientific inquiry; while I object to such
distinctions, I will adopt the terms as currently used.
5. Narrative: While literary theorists have proposed elaborate definitions
of this term, narrative in composition research is synonymous with
other terms, such as “anecdote” and “story” or with the kinds of texts
that offer full descriptions of events, such as ethnographies and case
studies. For composition, then, narrative seems to describe any text that
presents a temporal “telling” of some event(s) or phenomenon, a telling
that will often have a “personal voice” or personal involvement on the
part of the writer. I adopt this use of the term throughout this text.
6. Positivism: A view of knowledge “characterized . . . by the use of math-
ematics, logic, observation, experimentation, and control” such that
the “scientific method is the only source of correct knowledge about
reality” (Angeles, 1992, pp. 234-235). While this extreme view of posi-
tivism does not exist in quite this form in our field, those who define
themselves through “humanism” in contrast have argued as if it does.
7. Humanism: In composition research debates, humanism is defined in
sharp contrast to positivism and is further defined by humanities
training, mostly in literary studies. From a research point of view,
humanism rejects methods that involve mathematics and that attempt
to control variables, preferring instead methods that involve, for exam-
ple, dialogue and observation in natural settings through ethnography,
case studies, and interviews.
8. Qualitative vs. Quantitative Research: This distinction is often made in
our scholarship, producing a false dichotomy between, for example, a
case study as a qualitative work with only descriptive value, lacking
quantitative data, and an experiment as a quantitative work with only
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numerical analysis, lacking descriptive qualities. I try to avoid these
stereotypes except where already used by composition researchers
cited in this work.
9. Objective vs. Subjective Research: This distinction, too, is made in com-
position research, and I use these terms only as they appear in our
scholarship; otherwise, I avoid perpetuating this distinction as a fur-
ther division among researchers.
S TA RT I N G  P O I N T S  A N D  A S S E RT I O N S  
Such divided language and passions concerning how research is
conducted in composition suggest the need for a thorough examina-
tion of our research processes and the arguments we construct to
defend our preferences for constructing our field. Indeed, Connors
(1983) accurately argued, “as a research discipline we tend to flail
about” (10).
This book is a response to that “flailing about,” and it grows out of
my own concern for our growing unwillingness to listen to each other
and to create an inclusive research paradigm. While I would never
dare suggest that such a work will “cure” all flailing about, I sincerely
hope that it helps us (at the very least) flail about less often and (even
more importantly) understand why we flail about at all and (most
importantly) helps us find new ways to appreciate and engage in not
just the kinds of research we like, but also the kinds of research we
need.
Many obstacles interfere with this goal, I think. Indeed, for me and
for this work, Elbow (1990) captured the most difficult obstacle of all
in What is English? when he argued that the field cannot define what
it is in the first place. Yet, to hold steady, for the moment, the current
politics of composition research and the historical forces that have
shaped current debates among researchers, the following assertions
will guide the remainder of this work:
1. Contemporary composition theorists have erroneously blamed a sci-
entific epistemology for the failed current-traditional paradigm.
2. The current explosion of interest in a social-constructivist epistem-
ology and its accompanying research methods has further shifted
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researchers’ attentions and questions away from contexts that could
benefit from scientific inquiry.
3. Shifting away from scientific inquiry has resulted in newly accepted
modes of research in composition that are valuable for answering cer-
tain kinds of questions in certain contexts.
4. Formal training in the humanities has not prepared composition spe-
cialists for scientific investigations, has constructed a body of knowl-
edge seemingly foreign to and separate from the scientific, and has
developed an axiology in which controlled, scientific inquiry is less
valued.
5. Most texts that seek to guide researchers in composition are inade-
quate in their explanations of research design, in their choice of sam-
ple studies, and in their treatment of statistics.
6. All research methods are limited in the kinds of questions they can
answer and depend on the contexts in which those questions are
asked; similarly, all research methods have value within certain ranges
of research contexts and questions.
In summary, the goal of Composing Research is to collapse the
qualitative/quantitative dichotomy in composition research and to
construct instead a Contextualist Research Paradigm for Rhetoric
and Composition—one that focuses our attention not on form or
politics, but on the processes of research that naturally produce var-
ied forms in the varied research contexts we encounter in our work.
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2 R E S E A R C H  I N  C O M P O S I T I O N
Current Issues and A Brief History
[I]n a very real sense, the debate about the relative merits of
qualitative and quantitative research is a distraction,
masking our more basic differences in a rush to argue about
numbers. I want to suggest that it is not whether we use
quantitative or qualitative methods, but the intellectual
stances that underlie the research questions we ask and the
evidence we seek that are at the heart of our differences.
Judith Langer, 1987
Current debates about research methods have often focused on where
and how researchers view reality and evidence. Because we debate the
value of evidence—rather than the contexts from which we gain that
evidence—the rift between different kinds of researchers has resulted
in stereotypes: ethnographers have criticized the rigid, controlled,
decontextualized methodology of the experimental researcher; exper-
imentalists have, in turn, perceived the observations of the ethnogra-
pher as loose and error-ridden. In the middle, some researchers have
acknowledged a wide range of methodologies stemming from varied
epistemologies in what is now called “methodological pluralism”
(Kirsch, 1992).
Schriver (1992) illustrated the different perceptions naturalistic
researchers and scientific researchers have had of each other, building
on the debate composition studies began in the 1980s between cogni-
tion and writing (equated with scientific studies) and writing-in-
context (equated with cultural studies):
The stereotype of the researcher interested in cognition is the positivist
who makes reductive statements about human behavior or who confirms
the obvious. The stereotype of the researcher concerned with context is
the naturalistic observer who creates sweeping generalizations about
human behavior or who argues the impossibility of drawing any general-
izations at all. (190)
The stereotypes Schriver outlined here are well-documented.
Berthoff (1990), in a most scathing example, criticized the researcher
who seeks numerical data—a quest that, for Berthoff, is devoid of
meaning:
If meaning is set aside in the search for “data,” the findings will not
then be applicable to the making of meaning. But composition specialists
who follow psycholinguistic principles of analysis want to have it both
ways: their empirical research requires that meaning be left out of
account, but they also want to claim that their findings are relevant to
pedagogy. (14)
Berthoff condemned cognitive psychologists as researchers who
“deliberately ignore” context (22) and ridiculed psychologists gener-
ally for being “usually about a generation behind” (16). Indeed,
Berthoff painted a ridiculous picture of psychology as a field that is
still “awash in Piagetian concepts” (16).1
Perhaps in response to (or out of spite for) the so-called positivist
inquiry Berthoff loathes, she proposed her own theory of composing—
a theory that cannot possibly be quantified or analyzed by anyone:
To teach the composing process entails coming to terms with alla-
tonceness, learning to consider it not as a source of roadblocks but as a
resource. When we write, we are simultaneously naming, inferring, refer-
ring, recognizing, remembering, marking time, wondering, wandering,
envisaging, matching, discarding, checking, inventing. . . . We need to
teach ourselves and our students to manage the complexity of allatonce-
ness, to learn to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity, to recognize the value
of not knowing what your thesis statement is and thus discovering the
uses of chaos. (86)
In part, I agree with Berthoff: wonderful prose can emerge from
chaos, and writing is seldom an orderly thing. While we need to be
more tolerant of that ambiguity, however, an ambiguous theory rarely
helps us manage, tolerate, or contextualize ambiguity any better than
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we did before. Mysterious theories about mysteries, in other words,
keep us where we are—in a complacent acceptance of the unexplain-
able “that’s just the way it is” rather than in an active quest to discover
and understand the contexts in which we write and how those contexts
affect the processes and products that result. Berthoff succeeded, how-
ever, in producing a theory that looks very different from a theory that
is “orderly” or controlled or cognitive: her theory of Allatonceness—
“everything happens at once or it doesn’t happen at all” (86)—is, per-
haps, the most “disorderly” and uncontrollable theory composition
has ever seen. The “black box theory of composing” leaves questions
about context unanswered, unexplored—in spite of Berthoff ’s criti-
cism for other researchers she felt ignore context as well.
Berthoff, however, was not alone in her criticism of the “reduction-
ist” nature of cognitive studies or in her resistance to methodologies
used in such research. Since North’s The Making of Knowledge in
Composition (1987), several debates have emerged with methodology
as centerpiece. Because North’s work divided the “knowledge-
makers” of the field by methodology, new doors were opened for
analyses of how we think—as a field, as researchers, as scholars, as
teachers—new avenues for debate that perhaps divided us more than
North imagined at the time. North’s quest was simply to map the field
and its “modes of inquiry—the whole series of steps an inquirer follows
in making a contribution to a field of knowledge—as they operate
within methodological communities” (1) and “to characterize—and
indeed, value—each brand of knowledge on its own terms” (5).
North’s work provided, in other words, a look at the questions we ask,
who asks them, and how we go about answering them—a valuable
contribution to the field in its own right at the time.
Since then, however, North’s divisions among our researchers have
been expanded and sometimes redivided in other terms—a division
healthy for the sake of debate but dangerous for a field still attempt-
ing to define itself. As Langer (1987) argued, our field “has been using
our methodological differences to keep ourselves apart” (117).
Indeed, since The Making of Knowledge, tensions in our field have
provided some of the most popular dichotomous topics in our schol-
arship: between the social and the cognitive (Berkenkotter, 1991),
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between theory and practice (Phelps, 1991), between cognition and
context (Flower, 1989), just to name a few.
Rose (1988), however, reminded us that difficulties in cognitive
studies do not always lie in the methodologies used or in the questions
asked. In small part, Rose saw weaknesses in some cognitive studies,
but to a greater extent, he blamed our own application of such studies
and theories for the disaster he called “cognitive reductionism”:
My intention in this essay is not to dismiss these thinkers and theories
but to present the difficulties in applying to remedial writers these models of
mind. For there is a tendency to accept as fact condensed deductions from
them—statements stripped away from the questions, contradictions, and
complexities that are central to them. . . . This reductive labeling is going on
in composition studies at a time when cognitive researchers in developmen-
tal and educational psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy are
posing more elaborate and domain-specific models of cognition. (294)
In contrast to Berthoff, then, Rose saw research findings “stripped
away” from context not by the researchers, but largely by the readers
of that research: ourselves.
In spite of his analysis, however, most scholars in composition
through the late 1980s and early 1990s have seen themselves as irrec-
oncilably divided by methodological and epistemological differences.
These tensions come from the perceived differences among research
methods and the epistemological stances on which they are based,
resulting in a much greater preference for research we call “naturalis-
tic,” often rejecting research that looks “quantitative”–a tension that
scholars such as Irmscher (1987) have summarized in generalized
statements: “scholars in the humanities characteristically distrust
quantitative measures, even for linguistic or stylistic studies” (85).
In a 1987 review of composition’s struggle for a place in the acad-
emy, Irmscher blamed Richard Braddock, the first editor of Research
in the Teaching of English (the NCTE journal most likely to present
studies with numerical data) for a misdirection in our research:
Braddock, whose degree was in Education, was undoubtedly instrumen-
tal in shaping prescriptive, positivist standards for research in composition,
encouraging a model that has prevailed in composition studies. . . . Research
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in composition has become identified with one kind of research—
controlled experimental studies producing statistical evidence. (82)
Further, Irmscher blamed what we’ve come to call the “Braddock
Report” of 1963 (Research in Written Composition) for why our field
had yet to gain “academic respectability” (82) by the late 1980s;
Irmscher was in full agreement with Hagstrum’s 1964 review of the
Braddock Report:
These are undoubtedly the five best “scientific” studies ever conducted
on written composition—virtually the cream of the cream. It is therefore
extremely disheartening to have to say that 1) none of them strikes a lay-
man as definitive or persuasive and 2) there is very little promise that,
without rigorous antecedent thought, the “scientific” method applied to
composition will yield better results in the future than it has in the past.
(qtd. in Irmscher, p. 83)
Interest in methods that downplay the role of numerical evidence,
as North (1985) reminded us, is natural for “people who are trained
as humanists” (89); or as Irmscher argued, composition specialists
have much in common with literary colleagues, “with critics, textual-
ists, historiographers, bibliographers, linguists, novelists, and poets,
each of whom differs in approach, but all of whom represent the tra-
dition of humane letters” (85). For example, Ede (1992), who has
considered herself open to a range of research methods, admitted that
her training as a graduate student in Victorian Studies made her real-
ize “the distinction between quantitative and traditional humanistic
research” and that her training taught her “to do, and to value, the lat-
ter” (317). Beach (1992) agreed: meaningful research comes more
often from ethnographers, and he has made a distinction between
artificial environments—environments Irmscher (1987) called “for-
eign” (83)—created by the experimentalist vs. the natural (i.e., more
meaningful) environments studied through ethnography (219).
In a discussion of research on writing centers, Neuleib and
Scharton (1994) have argued that since writing centers already engage
in observations of students, “the most suitable methodology for
[research in writing centers] is some variation on an ethnographic
model,” discounting the possibility of other kinds of research in the
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writing center (55). Neuleib and Scharton argued that we must reject
the “dispassionate distance of scientists” (55) immersed in “some
kind of animal research based on generations of selective breeding”
(54): “student writers are not laboratory rats, with genetic and behav-
ioral constants we can manipulate experimentally” (55). Similarly, the
1990 CCCC Roundtable, “The Writing Center as Research Center,”
condemned “Research with a capital R”; this roundtable called for
more case study and ethnography in writing centers—research that is
more “beneficial,” “pragmatic,” “dynamic”: “The best method for
writing center research ought to mirror the daily activity of tutoring”
(Bushman, 1991, p. 34).
In spite of the clear popularity of “naturalistic” methods, Schriver
(1992) was hopeful when she commented on her own summary of
research stereotypes, noting that the most extreme stereotypes might
be fading (190), and for a few scholars, they are. Kirsch (1992), for
example, explored the potential of methodological pluralism in our
multidisciplinary field, but Kirsch’s questions suggest that a strong
polarity—a climate of difference—still remains within the field and
among its researchers:
What philosophical and epistemological assumptions guide different
research methods? How are different methods related to each other? Do
multiple methods build upon one another, producing cumulative knowl-
edge? Or do various methods stand in conflict with each other, producing
contradictory results? (247)
Central to this debate about different methods has been the ques-
tion of evidence rather than the question of varied contexts from
which we gain evidence. As Hillocks (1992) has written, “This distinc-
tion divides us over questions such as what counts as research, what
counts as evidence, and what the principles are by which we connect
evidence to our claims” (57).
In summary, our research, our claims, and our principles have
been governed recently by a growing preference for certain kinds of
evidence, most of it personal–not governed by full analyses of
research contexts or guided by a clear understanding of and training
in a wide range of methods and research principles.
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G U I D E S  T O  R E S E A R C H  I N  C O M P O S I T I O N : A  C R I T I Q U E  
Although several texts in the last decade have attempted to train
composition researchers in the procedures and concepts of research
(or have invited us to explore research paradigms and epistemolo-
gies), their success has been clearly limited. Lauer and Asher
attempted to guide composition researchers in Composition Research:
Empirical Designs (1988). Lauer and Asher began with a valuable goal
and with an argument similar to the one I am making here: composi-
tion researchers, trained in the humanities, either reject scientific
inquiry or “consume” it indiscriminately (ix). According to Lauer and
Asher, “adequate study of the complex domain of writing must be
multidisciplinary, including empirical research” (ix). In the end, how-
ever, Lauer and Asher look at only the many puzzle-pieces of design
as “obstacles to understanding for the humanist” (ix), obstacles that
remain for the humanist due to other difficulties in the text: they offer
examples of studies that are far too complex to be used as tools for
teaching and are not well designed, present statistical analysis out of
the context of the research process (by relegating statistical analysis to
an appendix), and removed the method from the context of the
research question (by focusing only on the mechanics of each
method, ignoring the questions that method could answer).
For instance, Lauer and Asher included as an example Pianko’s
(1981) study of students’ writing processes. Pianko’s study had more
dependent variables (twenty-two) than students (seventeen). Lauer
and Asher stated that the high number of dependent variables was a
problem (84), but the study was used anyway as one of three exam-
ples of quantitative description—a research method described in a
short twenty-page chapter, of which nearly one page (87) was the list-
ing of Pianko’s twenty-two dependent variables.
Unfortunately, it is in this context that Lauer and Asher introduce
the concept of independent and dependent variables:
We identify the terms independent and dependent here because they
are used by many composition researchers. The distinction between them,
however, is rather imprecise in descriptive research. Researchers often call
those variables independent which constitute differences in subjects prior
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to research—e.g., class level, age, or gender. Dependent variables are often
those introduced by the researcher for the analysis, e.g., prewriting time,
planning behavior, or number of pauses. (86)
Such definitions of independent and dependent variables (espe-
cially for those who are new to such concepts) are confusing and
unfortunate. First, Lauer and Asher suggested that they used these
terms only because other composition researchers use them, not
because they are important concepts for any researcher to know.
Second, the distinction between the two kinds of variables was noted
as “rather imprecise,” when in the context of most research tasks,
researchers make very precise distinctions between dependent and
independent variables in the attempt to understand the differences
and the relationships among them. Third, readers of Lauer and
Asher’s text should be confused by their suggestion that independent
variables are only those that exist prior to research (such as gender)
and that dependent variables are “introduced by the researcher for
the analysis.” Researchers “introduce” both independent and depen-
dent variables (as long as they are the ones designing the study), but it
would be more accurate to say that dependent variables are “mea-
sured” rather than introduced—they are, in a sense, the “resulting dif-
ferences” among independent variables (variables that may or may
not exist only prior to research). Finally, Lauer and Asher listed a few
examples of dependent variables—such as prewriting time—that,
depending on the full context of a study, could be either independent
or dependent variables. Prewriting time, of course, can have an effect
on a later process (such as revision) or a feature of a product (such as
organization) and, thus, would be an independent variable (a com-
mon sense notion, given that prewriting obviously comes before
other kinds of writing/revising/editing). This is where Lauer and
Asher’s inattention to context (and heightened attention to only
mechanics of research design) fails to help readers become better
researchers—indeed, might do more harm than good.
But problems inherent in how we teach research concepts (and,
especially, statistical concepts) pose difficult questions about
research-in-context. If we teach research methods as merely methods
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and procedures devoid of context, such principles are difficult to
grasp and are often meaningless without some grounding of purpose.
On the other hand, research methods introduced in particular con-
texts potentially draw attention to the intricacies of the context itself
(past research, politics of an area of study, formal knowledge of the
specific area of expertise, etc.) such that discussions of method
become secondary. To equalize the interplay of context and research
method for beginners, we would do well to choose concrete everyday
contexts in which to demonstrate research procedures.
Effective training in research methods and statistics is often based
on the outlines of simple, hypothetical, yet realistic contexts in which
we might want a question answered. Demonstrations based on televi-
sion programs, movies, recreational activities, and daily living often
begin an introduction to research concepts, especially in courses
attended by students from several disciplines, carrying with them dif-
ferent kinds of formal content knowledge.
Starting with simple contexts enables students to expand later into
contexts more closely related to their areas of study. While some
everyday, humorous, simple contexts might seem a bit corny at first
(my favorite and most effective statistics professor had a fondness for
Blondie and Dagwood and The Sound of Music), such contexts allow
the explanation of research concepts and statistics to gain clarity
while the humor in them aids our memory. Hence, the following sim-
ple context–the test of a lucky bowling ball–will be inserted through-
out the next three chapters.
SOME BASIC RESEARCH CONCEPTS:
A TRIP TO THE BOWLING ALLEY
So somebody gave you a new bowling ball for your
birthday—a new, shiny red one. You put your old green one in
the closet, and suddenly your game improved. Now you think
your new red bowling ball, even though it’s the same size and
weight as the old green one, is responsible for improving your
game. Somehow, the red ball is making a difference in your
scores. Your friends, however, laugh at your superstition. 
“Prove it,” they say.
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So we need to design an experiment to see if your red bowl-
ing ball is as lucky as you think. We’ll take your old green ball,
your new red ball, and we’ll steal that pretty purple one with
glitter (also of equal size and weight) from the next lane. We’ll
let the bartender bowl in one lane, trying each color, testing
your prediction that the red ball is luckiest. (We don’t trust you
to bowl—you might cause the red ball to win because that’s
what you hope to find.)
We’ll keep score, of course, to see which color does the
best. And because we’re testing the luckiness of your red bowl-
ing ball, we’ll make a chart to organize scores by the color vari-
ables: red, green, or purple. By the way, these are the
“variables,” because we are varying or manipulating them in
our study. Colors will be the “independent variables,” because
they have the freedom and power (independence) to cause a
change in your bowling scores. We are seeing if the difference
in score depends on the color of the ball, which is why we’ll call
the scores the “dependent variable.” It, too, varies, but its
variation depends on the color of the bowling balls, the 
independent variable.
Therefore, we have three levels (red, green, purple) of one
independent variable (color), and we’ll see if the variation in
colors has an effect on your scores. Our research question,
then, is this: Is there a difference in bowling score (dependent
variable) with changes in bowling ball color (independent
variable)?
To help answer the question, we’ve controlled for two poten-
tially “extraneous variables”: 1) the bartender bowls in only one
lane to ensure that a difference in lanes doesn’t affect the
score; 2) only the bartender will bowl to ensure that other
bowlers’ skills do not affect the difference in scores.
While we will not be able to make any grand claims from
such a small study, this context will enable us to play around
with some research concepts. In other contexts, we would not
want to gather data from just one person, so our ability to
generalize this study to others will be limited. In other words,
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we’ve enhanced “internal validity” by controlling for the
extraneous variables. Because only the bartender is bowling
(and in only one lane), we have limited “external validity,”
preventing us from making generalizations to other bowlers or
other lanes. But that’s not our purpose here. Our purpose is to
provide some information and a way to think about something
that interests you.
If you’re worried about how the lucky red ball will do here,
we should stop the study now so your superstition can remain.
But you strike me (ho, ho) as the type who wants to be a more
informed bowler. Getting this information (or knowledge) isn’t
hard at all. And learning about independent and dependent
variables doesn’t have to be, either.
Lauer and Asher’s text had other problems for those desiring to
learn research methods. For example, the treatment of statistics was
too brief to be especially accurate, it had very little context, and it
could be confusing in the complicated formulas designed to
“enhance” their explanations. Lauer and Asher discussed the null
hypothesis (the hypothesis that asserts “there is no difference” in vari-
ables being measured) as a hypothesis we “accept” or “reject.” In more
accurate terms, we only “reject” or “fail to reject” the null hypothesis.
There is a reason for this: accepting the null hypothesis would con-
note that “there is no difference” among or between variables being
studied, when the study itself did not test all possible differences
and/or might have failed to show the specific difference sought. Lauer
and Asher here provided not only simplified information worthy of
more discussion, but also potentially misleading language with which
to relate our research.
In a way, we teach a form of hypothesis-testing to our fresh-
man composition students all the time. In research writing
especially, we advise our students to 1) formulate a research
question to guide their library work and other research, 2)
guess or hypothesize about what they’ll find, and 3) later
construct a clear thesis to guide their texts that convey their
research. We as researchers construct a research question
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first and then recast the question into a claim: a hypothesis
(proposed thesis). Our later write-ups, too, will be governed by
our “answer”: the thesis.
At the bowling alley, remember, our research question is, “Is
there a difference in bowling score with changes in bowling ball
color?” Recast as our hypothesis, it would look something like
this: There is a difference in scores achieved by different
bowling ball colors. You, of course, hope the red ball achieves
the highest score. However, every researcher is accompanied
by a skeptic (which is why you took us along), and the skeptic’s
job is to say, “I doubt it,”— in other words, “the difference will
probably be null.” The skeptic’s null hypothesis is this: There is
no difference in scores achieved by different bowling ball
colors—that is, any difference you have obtained among the
different colors has been obtained by chance and, therefore,
do not reflect “real” differences.
If your scores show that the difference is unlikely to be due
to chance, you can reject the null hypothesis, because it only
takes one good piece of concrete evidence to argue that a
skeptic is wrong. If, however, the scores show no difference
(just like the skeptic predicted in the null hypothesis), you can
argue effectively that one trial cannot demonstrate the skeptic
is probably right. While we have gained an interesting piece of
information, we have no proof yet that another trial won’t
produce different scores or that other variables we haven’t
talked about yet didn’t interfere with the red ball’s performance.
Therefore, we can’t fully accept the null hypothesis, either (that
there is never, ever a difference in these scores). At this time,
we simply fail to reject it.
The skeptic (being a skeptic) will understand this. Further
demonstrations (replications) will help us answer our question
more fully in the future. Later in this study, we will test our
hypothesis and discuss the role of chance.
In a text with a different purpose, Understanding Research in
Reading and Writing, Kamil, Langer, and Shanahan (1985) attempted
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to help reading and writing specialists “come to terms with many of
the techniques and perspectives of reading and writing research” (ix)
and to “encourage nonresearchers to understand and use research”
(x). In short, this text focused on helping readers become more criti-
cal “consumers” of research: “Our purpose is not to explain how to
do research. Doing sophisticated research takes time, effort, and
experience” (x).
While bowling alleys may not be the most sophisticated
place to do research, our task is complicated and will, of
course, take time and effort. For instance, we need to decide
how many trials each ball should have. And because only the
bartender is bowling, we must consider the bowler’s potential
fatigue.
In addition, we’ll need to decide in what order the balls
should be bowled: they should not, for example, be bowled
always in the same order (red first, green second, purple third,
for instance). The last color bowled may achieve a low score
because of the bowler’s fatigue, and the first color bowled may
score the best because our bowler will be “fresh.” On the other
hand, our bowler might not get fatigued at all; instead, the
more the bowler practices, the better the bowler might get, so
later balls bowled might score higher. Either way, we introduce
a potential bias into the study if we don’t mix up the colors 
somehow. 
Therefore, the colors should be systematically rotated







Counterbalancing ensures that each color will be first,
second, and last an equal number of times so that fatigue or
practice will not influence a difference in scores per color.2
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Counterbalancing helps answer the question about how
many trials we should ask our bowler to bowl. Since there are
6 possible combinations of the three colors (see above), we
could have our number of trials for each ball be in multiples of
6 (6, 12, 18, etc.). Now we have to ask a harder question: how
much time do you want to spend at the bowling alley?
OK, we’ll just do 6 trials for each ball, for now.
Even though Understanding Research in Reading and Writing was
aimed at nonresearchers, it curiously assumed a background in basic
statistics (x). Therefore, the authors’ treatment of statistics is brief,
but it is always (wisely) within the context of research questions. The
authors gave examples of various research questions and how they
have been explored by reading and writing specialists, and they
offered sage advice to readers of this research. For example, the
authors wisely warned us against inferring causation from correlation
studies; they reminded us to articulate our data clearly in our texts
and not to let an extremely high number of variables complicate our
studies.
In other words, Understanding Research in Reading and Writing has
given us just what the title suggested and what the authors promised:
a consumer’s guide to research. It has not, however, (as the authors
also acknowledged) provided a guide for doing research, a guide our
field greatly needs. As a result, such wise advice as theirs has often
gone unheeded. Hillocks (1986), too, provided general criticism for
how researchers unknowingly destroy their own results by not pre-
senting and articulating their data clearly enough, not establishing
clear criteria for what we wish to know, and for inferring cause and
effect too readily (often assuming, for example, that observed behav-
ior causes observed writing). In addition, in spite of Kamil, Langer,
and Shanahan’s warning against allowing too many variables to com-
plicate a study, Lauer and Asher’s text (three years later) provided as
an example, remember, Pianko’s study, which did just that. (See also
Ferris, 1994.)
Another text for researchers in our field, Multidisciplinary
Perspectives on Literacy Research (Beach, Green, Kamil, & Shanahan,
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1992), offered a collection of papers from the 1990 National
Conference on Research in English. While the title suggests “multidis-
ciplinary” perspectives on research, authors of most individual essays
obviously favored some perspectives over others, fueling an already-
growing debate about our research and research methods.
Harste, for example, set the tone in the “Foreword” by sharing a
story in which an international student asked him about his use of
the phrase “nauseous positivism” during a debate about research
methods in a graduate seminar at Indiana University (ix). Harste
shared the story in order to illustrate his own position in the debate
and to highlight the passion of the debate itself. Further stating his
position, Harste argued that researchers in literacy should find their
own method and stop pretending to be cognitive psychologists or
anthropologists and stop borrowing from their methods; he
responded negatively to “the illusion which the volume gives that all
research methodologies are equal. . . . I have trouble with this. . . .
[N]ot all methodologies are equal for me. Some violate what we
know” (xi). For Harste, the methodologies that “violate what we
know” are those that stem from what he called “nauseous positivism.”
In their introduction to the text, the editors reiterated the per-
ceived paradigm shift in English Studies and examined its effect on
our research:
shifts in conceptions of literacy have resulted in a shift in the kinds of
methodological approaches employed. . . . Many of the experimentalist
approaches employed in previous literacy research, which attempt to
“control” for factors shaping literacy events, have been seen as artifi-
cially constraining the ways in which readers and writers construct
knowledge. (5)
These editors equated our changing notion of research with, not
surprisingly, our previous rejection of “traditional, formalistic text-
book models of composing” (2); similarly, they forecasted the future
of research in reading and writing by equating an outdated view of
literacy as a controlled, scientific, and objective series of “cognitions”
with the controlled and scientific methodologies that attempt to pro-
vide “simple answers to a complex problem” (3). While the editors of
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the volume attempted to create an “open dialogue between a range of
perspectives” (8) in research and acknowledged that criticism among
all perspectives exists, their own criticism for only one end of that
range continued:
Cognitive psychologists often prefer controlled experiments . . . while
sociolinguists or cultural ethnographers often prefer ethnographical
observations. This latter approach assumes that the meaning of literacy
events could only be understood by studying these events as they occur in
authentic settings, rather than as “controlled” in an experiment. And it
assumes that quantitative analysis of literacy practices strips away the rich
meanings available from observational analysis. (9)
Again we see authors and editors valuing the kind of personal
knowledge that Elbow used to construct What is English? and that
Johnson used in epigraphs to chapter one of Nineteenth-Century
Rhetoric in North America. While composition should value this kind
of knowledge, we now do so by devaluing other kinds that, in spite of
being “controlled” or quantified or “cognitive,” could also be of great
value in the varied contexts of our teaching and our research. We are
teaching and researching in a field that claims to have “multidiscipli-
nary perspectives,” while clearly designating which perspectives are
welcome and which ones are not.
Similar in purpose to Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Literacy
Research was Methods and Methodology in Composition (1992), edited
by Kirsch and Sullivan:
Because this collection aims to expand our understanding of research
methodologies, [the editors] decided to present reflective essays that
examine procedures, assumptions, and issues relevant to a broad range of
research methods, and not to only a few well-established methods. (4)
The essays in this volume explored, for example, how ethnography
unfolds in language studies, how writing about theory is a form of
research, in what ways historical inquiry contributes to our body of
research, how to code data, and how competing epistemologies come
together in methodological pluralism. Most of the essays, in other
words, do not so much offer research procedures as they examine the
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politics of research, reflect on some research topics, and debate the
value of varied research methods. In chapter ten, for example, Beach
also paralleled our current shift in research strategies with the earlier
paradigm shift we perceive in teaching strategies, reminding us again
of that previous era of current-traditional rhetoric:
The textbooks of the era were filled with model essays and endless
grammar exercises. . . . It was assumed that if teachers in all classes taught
the “five paragraph theme” and grammar rules, that students would learn
to write. Given the teacher-centered nature of this approach, researchers
therefore were primarily interested in determining whether certain kinds
of direct instruction worked.
Traditional method A versus method B experimental research
reflected the limitations of this prevailing paradigm. (217)
Here again we see the dichotomous tension among our
researchers, augmented by the perceived parallels to an earlier para-
digm shift in teaching. The “once that, now this” approach attacks
one set of well-established empirical methods; at the same time, such
a “paradigm shift” approach forces choices such that multi-modal
research becomes discounted as well.
Fitting well with the editors’ promise to explore methods other
than the “few well-established methods,” Sullivan, in her chapter
(“Feminism and Methodology in Composition Studies”) in the
Kirsch and Sullivan volume, argued that “methodological underpin-
nings of modern science . . . have developed according to male pre-
scriptions and proscriptions of knowledge” (56) and described the
current research debate in composition in terms of feminist response
to male dominance:
[feminist approaches to research] do not represent a wholesale rejec-
tion of empiricism by feminists but only of the positivist elements that
still linger in the dominant paradigm of scientific inquiry. . . . Many are
drawn, for example, to the cluster of methods that fall under the rubrics
of qualitative and naturalistic inquiry. (57)
Here, Sullivan (as I will discuss more fully in chapter three) drew
further distinctions among researchers that, again, encourage us to
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seek research methods that fulfill certain ideologies rather than seek
methods that adequately answer our research questions that emerge
naturally from varied contexts—questions that vary in form and pro-
cedure within and among varied ideologies because of shifting con-
texts and, therefore, require varied methods to seek their answers.
In the newest book available as this work goes to press, Strategies
for Empirical Research in Writing, MacNealy (1999) addresses sev-
eral issues similar to ones I explore here. MacNealy admirably
devotes space in her text to “calming the nerves” of her readers,
addressing anxieties about numbers, research, and terminology
through a calm voice that speaks directly to readers and asks gentle
questions. MacNealy explores the need for research, the need for
theory, and the relationships and tensions between research and
lore. Most importantly, MacNealy stresses the importance of valu-
ing all research methods and provides an excellent model through
her own text, which is fleshed out by research of all kinds, including
her own personal anecdotes, to help readers gain a conceptual
understanding of research as well as an introduction to some
research procedures.
In fact, I liked MacNealy’s approach so much, I wished that she
had continued beyond the introductory level this text provides. Her
introduction to some concepts, such as kinds of data (nominal, ordi-
nal, interval, and ratio) and some statistical procedures, is necessary
to a new researchers’ understanding. But what next? Our field still has
not produced a comprehensive series of texts that will help us
advance in our research capabilities beyond a fairly modest level.
G E O R G E  C A M P B E L L  A N D  T H E  N AT U R E  O F  E V I D E N C E
The current-traditional rhetoric that flourished in the nineteenth
century, supposedly defining “truth” as external, objective, and
empirically verifiable, has been displaced in favor of other theories of
composition that view “truth” either as residing “within” (as internal
and subjective), or as stemming from, the transaction between the
external and the internal (as now evident in the popularity of social-
constructionist theories). In other words, current-traditional rhetoric
has been rejected because of its view of reality, which, for some, reeks
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of positivism, an argument that extends to our use of scientific meth-
ods in our research.
As composition researchers argue the value of diverse research
methodologies, we can learn much by returning to George
Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), in spite of the fact that
Campbell has taken much of the blame for the current-traditional
approaches we now reject.
In chapter five of Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell, linking forms
of evidence to forms of logical truth, presented two kinds of evidence.
The first, intuitive, relies “on a bare attention to the ideas under
review”; the second, deductive, emerges “by a comparison of these
with other related ideas” (174). Intuitive evidence is much like evi-
dence gathered by the ethnographer: that which is readily observable.
Deductive evidence is much like evidence gathered by an experi-
menter: that which is compared, measured, altered, and tested.
Campbell gave us three kinds of intuitive evidence, presented as
“basic” forms of human knowledge, easily observable by the seeing,
thinking person:
Intellection: mathematical axioms, such as “two plus two is four.”
Consciousness: concerning only the existence of the mind, requiring basic
thought.
Common Sense: an extension of basic, logical thought; knowledge such as
“there are other intelligent beings in the world besides me” (174-81).
For Campbell, then, intuitive evidence includes the kind of basic
knowledge that something is irrefutably true (“such as two minus one
does not equal three” or “humans need water to survive”) or the kind
of knowledge that something exists: if I’m in a bad mood today, for
instance, I am aware of it through Consciousness; through Common
Sense, I extend that knowledge to realize that being in a bad mood also
means I am not in a good mood or that being in a bad mood might
affect others around me. To ask why I’m in a bad mood, however, asks
a different question, calling on a different kind of evidence, that
through which we can deduce meaning and speculate on an answer.
Campbell divided deductive evidence into two types: moral and
demonstrative (or scientific). Moral evidence is divided into four
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kinds: experience, analogy, testimony, and calculations of chance. These
types of evidence involve, as their names suggest, critical thinking and
reflection. For instance, I note through experience, perhaps, that I had
skipped breakfast this morning, and the last time I was in a bad
mood, I skipped breakfast, too, allowing me to deduce that breakfast
might have something to do with my bad mood. For me, the analogy
of a car running out of gas or of trying to bake bread without enough
flour helps explain how I feel and suggests how essential breakfast
might be to my moods. Testimony from a friend might add that she,
too, experiences bad moods after skipping breakfast. Calculations of
chance allow me to speculate on the probability that I will be in a bad
mood the next time I skip breakfast. For Campbell, that calculation is
mathematically possible if, for example, we’re in a coin toss or rolling
a pair of dice (a calculation that can be done prior to any trials), but
speculation of chance can also be based on experience. If I’ve noted
twice that I’m in a bad mood after twice skipping breakfast, I could
speculate that the probability I’ll be in a bad mood after skipping
breakfast again is high.
While much of this moral evidence seems to make sense—seems
to suggest, for instance, that I’ll be in a bad mood whenever I skip
breakfast—conclusions drawn from such evidence are premature.
This kind of moral evidence is valuable in the absence of other evi-
dence—if impossible to obtain. But in order to arrive at any meaning
through this series of moral proofs, I must impose order upon it. I
now see only the connections I can see and, possibly, connections I
want to see. For instance, my friend provided testimony that she, too,
is in a bad mood whenever she skips breakfast, testimony that seems
to lend credibility to my claim when added to my own experience.
But what if I’m ignoring other observations I’ve made that she will
also be in a bad mood whenever a traffic light turns red, whenever her
favorite parking spot is taken, and whenever a vending machine
rejects her dollar bill? I am guilty, then, of assigning too much credi-
bility to her single testimony about skipping breakfast.
And what if I focused on the wrong variable in my own personal
experience, ignoring other variables in the full context? Sure, I
skipped breakfast twice, but a colleague who joined me for lunch
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both times reminds me that I ate two Big Macs to make up for skip-
ping breakfast and that, perhaps, such indulgence in fast food has
something to do with my mood? To complicate matters, the same
friend reminds me that my bad moods, too, are not unique to the
days on which I skip breakfast.
Concluding from this moral evidence alone that skipping break-
fast has something to do with my bad mood, then, is a mistake. For
help, we need the second of Campbell’s two kinds of deductive evi-
dence: demonstrative. Campbell outlined four differences between
moral and demonstrative evidence:
1. Difference in subject: moral evidence concerns independent truths;
demonstrative concerns the relationships among ideas [The analogy,
for instance, of having enough flour to make bread is not directly related
to the fact that I’m in a bad mood; the testimony of my friend’s bad
moods is independent from the fact that I, too, am in a bad mood]
2. [M]oral evidence admits degrees, demonstration doth not [Unable to
“measure” what a bad mood is or how bad a mood I’m in, the determina-
tion of my bad mood is, in part, based on opinion and is debatable— i.e.,
in terms of degree in relation to other kinds of bad moods, other people’s
bad moods, etc.]
3. In moral evidence, truths cannot be contrary because they are inde-
pendent of one another; in demonstrative evidence, future demonstra-
tions can contradict earlier demonstrations, creating new truths [My
speculation on future bad moods does not contradict the fact that I am in
a bad mood now; testimony of anyone else’s bad mood will not contradict
my own experience]
4. Scientific evidence is simple, consisting of only one coherent series,
. . . moral evidence is generally complicated, being in reality a bundle
of independent proofs [The series of moral proofs in determining the
relationships between bad moods and skipping breakfast comes from four
different kinds of evidence that must be linked through the imagination
because they are not actually related to one another] (182-183)
These differences between moral and demonstrative evidence
should not surprise modern composition researchers. Campbell
presented the perceived difference between “naturalistic” and
“experimental” research, between ethnography and experiments:
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observations cannot be replicated, whereas demonstrations can be;
observations rely solely on one’s own memory and cannot 
be refuted, tested, or measured; the subject of one’s interest may
determine which forms of evidence should be trusted and sought;
observations have degrees, room for memory error, whereas
demonstrations do not.
Less surprising, then, is Campbell’s admiration for scientific (or
demonstrative) evidence. Based primarily on his concerns about
error of memory, Campbell warned of potential error in moral rea-
soning: “though the procedure of the mind were quite unexception-
able, there still remains a physical possibility of the falsity of the
conclusion” (197). At the same time, however, Campbell seemed to
value equally all forms of evidence and to understand the additional
potential of multi-modal inquiry. For example, Campbell believed
that mathematical axioms form the basis of revolutionary discoveries
and that testimony provides us with history. All forms of evidence, for
Campbell, create “the foundation of all conviction, and consequently
of persuasion too” (197).
Scientific evidence, for Campbell, also has room for error, much
like moral evidence does. The difference, however, is that errors made
through demonstrative evidence can be identified and corrected
through later demonstrations. This type of evidence is in the realm of
logic, rather than rhetoric, for Campbell, perhaps because of its scien-
tific nature. Rhetoricians must pay attention to scientific evidence,
however, as Campbell argued, “for though he may be an acute logi-
cian who is no orator, he will never be a consummate orator who is
no logician” (197).
Indeed, Campbell saw both kinds of evidence—though separate
and different from each other—as necessary to each other because of
their unique contributions to a greater understanding of the full con-
text for any inquiry:
if [scientific or demonstrative evidence] is infinitely superior in point
of authority, [moral evidence] no less excels in point of importance.
Abstract truth, as far as it is the object of our faculties, is almost entirely
confined to quantity, concrete or discrete. The sphere of Demonstration is
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narrow, but within her sphere she is a despotic sovereign, her sway is
uncontrollable. Her rival, on the contrary, hath less power but wider
empire. Her forces, indeed, are not always irresistible; but the whole world
is comprised in her dominions. . . . By [demonstrative evidence], we must
acknowledge, when applied to things, and combined with the discoveries
of [moral evidence], our researches into nature in a certain line are facili-
tated, the understanding is enlightened, and many of the arts, both ele-
gant and useful, and improved and perfected. (184)
For Campbell, then, the interaction of moral evidence (and its
complexity) with demonstrative evidence (and its simplicity) is 
the most powerful and persuasive of all intellectual inquiry.
Unfortunately, today’s scholars in rhetoric and composition not only
separate demonstrative and moral evidence, but argue that they must
be separated because they stem from seemingly different epistemolo-
gies. And, perhaps, the deceptive simplicity of demonstrative evi-
dence is at the core of our criticism for some inquiry being “artificial”
or out of context. The complexity of moral evidence, after all, helps
place demonstrative evidence in context, but it is increasingly pre-
ferred by our field even when stripped of demonstrations that also
give meaning to the same contexts.
At the bowling alley, we’ll be much more careful not to infer
causation from correlation. In other words, we’ll better
understand that just because two things exist somewhat side-
by-side, one does not necessarily cause the other to happen.
In fact, it’s just that kind of belief that we’re hoping to test at the
bowling alley. Every time you bowl with your red bowling ball,
you get great scores, so you think it’s lucky (as if it being red
causes a high score). We’re going to explore that issue. 
At the same time, a red bowling ball could indirectly
influence your score (even if it doesn’t directly cause your
scores to be high): for instance, if red is your favorite color, you
might simply enjoy the look of the ball and, therefore, be in a
better mood because of it; therefore, you might be influenced
by the color of the ball, but the color of the ball didn’t directly
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cause your scores to happen. Once we leave the bowling alley,
we should continue to be careful with this.
The simplicity of scientific evidence mentioned by Campbell (and
the notion that it is often quantified) is, perhaps, what Elbow (1990)
responded to when he warned,“All those valuable perceptions and data
are rendered less trustworthy and less useful when they are reduced to
a single number” (251). However, Elbow’s view ignores, here, first, that
when joined with the “complexity” of moral evidence, scientific evi-
dence adds information and helps make sense of the complexity of
moral evidence, and, second, that the “single number” never replaces
the “valuable perceptions and data”; instead, the number summarizes
the perceptions and data, which remain very much intact and are even
enhanced by the new language given as a summary: the number.
Elbow’s distrust for the “single number” brought forth by demon-
strative evidence resulted in his reliance on moral evidence in What is
English?—a book that is, in Campbell’s terms, “a bundle of indepen-
dent proofs.” And while that bundle is valuable because of the diverse
experiences offered in it, readers must provide their own coherence to
it and bring their own memories, interpretations, and at times, misin-
terpretation (or no interpretation at all) to such a text. Moral evi-
dence, then, is malleable, subject to reshaping in a reader’s mind; in
other words, we find moral evidence to have a certain beauty we eas-
ily recognize: it is quite literary.
As composition researchers who today argue the value of diverse
research methodologies, we can learn much from Campbell. Because
Campbell presented a range of evidence that encompasses all of
humanity, his analysis of evidence fits well with modern composition
concerns. As modern composition researchers seem close to the day
when they abandon “traditional” methods entirely, I argue that these
methods must be kept a part of our available tools of research for
four reasons.
First, as Campbell noted, the selection of research methods—or a
decision about admissible evidence—depends on our subjects and
the contexts in which we pursue them. In other words, a method
should be chosen based on one’s research question and the context
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from which that research question comes. To choose a methodology
based only on “what we already do” (as Neuleib and Scharton suggest
in writing centers) is to choose a methodology for the wrong reason.
Imagine someone who chooses travel destinations based only on
locations covered by a certain airline. Such a person limits travel pos-
sibilities by adhering to only one way of getting there. I am reminded
of a graduate student researcher who set out to examine the effective-
ness of a particular program but designed her research only to define
the scope of the program and to observe its daily activities because
she decided on her method first (participant-observation, because it’s
“in”) and her research question second (a question that demanded
rigorous measurement, the “effectiveness” of a program): fine desti-
nation, wrong transportation. Campbell reminded us to understand
our question-in-context first—to find out where we want to go, why
and when, and then decide the best way to get there.
Second, as Campbell reminded us, demonstrative evidence can be
replicated—can be held up against other demonstrations, inviting
contradiction or confirmation, even testing demonstrations in new or
varied contexts. In other words, demonstrative evidence allows a
community of researchers to test each other, to communicate with
each other, to refine each others’ theories and methods, and, together,
to establish the greatest amount of knowledge with the least amount
of error, applicable to the most contexts. This, ironically, relates well
to an idea that composition now greatly admires: the social construc-
tion of knowledge.
Third, Campbell also reminded us that rhetoricians should be
good logicians. In other words, composition researchers should
remain open to a variety of research methodologies with their varied
ways of thinking, with their varied epistemologies, with their varied
logic—as these elements shift in varied contexts. To study experimen-
tal design and statistics would make an ethnographer, for example, a
better ethnographer, as exercise in identifying variables, watching for
extraneous factors, and recognizing where error exists should inform
any researcher’s endeavors.
Finally, composition is quite proud, I think, of having realized
the limitations of current-traditional models. Old and useless,
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current-traditionalism is now studied with other embarrassing his-
tories of our field. The scientific thought that is supposed to have
formed the basis for current-traditional rhetoric may soon follow.
My fourth reason, then, for urging composition researchers to
maintain the availability of (and to improve our understanding of)
all methodologies is that we should not abandon what is old simply
because it’s old or somehow automatically connected to other old,
rejected ideas. Even inquiry that relies on numerical data should
remain with us and be more carefully studied and used to help us
examine our community of knowledge, achieve our research goals,
become stronger thinkers and theorists, and embrace all kinds of
knowledge we have created—both old and new.
S U M M A RY  
The debate about what kinds of evidence we should value has been
a harmful one for our field, resulting in decontextualized arguments
that seemingly center on numbers vs. narratives regardless of the
research contexts that naturally produce both. As a result, those who
argue that only naturalistic methods are sensitive to context paradox-
ically ignore the contexts in which numerical data are readily avail-
able, useful, and necessary. In our effort, perhaps, to extend
traditional forms of research guided by the scientific method, the evi-
dence associated with that tradition has come under fire in spite of its
necessary place in our scholarship. Attempts to draw parallels
between this shift in research and an older shift in pedagogy has
resulted in greater distaste for an older research tradition, erroneously
placing blame on the one common element of both “old para-
digms”—the scientific method. Such conclusions persuade us to dis-
miss a theorist like George Campbell, who was influenced by
scientific developments of his time, when such a theorist—if we were
willing to read him well—would have warned us against such a faulty
conclusion in the first place.
In Campbell’s terms, our review of “Paradigm Shift #1” and
“Paradigm Shift #2,” the scientific features they appear to share, and the
testimony on which we often rely in our arguments against scientific
methods are rich in “bundles of independent proofs,” and we cannot
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draw clear conclusions or connections among them without the help
of demonstrative evidence that can add power to the moral evidence
we’ve come to prefer. Further, our preference for what Campbell called
moral evidence not only divides our field in terms of “qualitative vs.
quantitative” research but divides us further within our qualitative
preference: moral evidence, in Campbell’s terms, does not attend to
relationships among ideas so much as it is composed of independent
ideas (such as personal anecdotes).
Before we proceed to the need for joining moral and demonstra-
tive evidence (and all research methods) in composition research
(the focus of chapter four), we must address another force that
spurs our growing distaste for numerical data–one of audience. In
an age of passionate arguments favoring the opposite(s), how does
one “sell” an argument for valuing numerical evidence more
equally? The following chapter will address three issues I see driven
by audience concerns: feminist responses to traditional research,
math anxiety, and a preference for storytelling as a genre more liter-
ary than the traditional research report. Addressing such issues of
audience, of course, is necessary for us to articulate and explore the
full rhetorical context of the perceived (and false) quantitative/
qualitative tension.
N O T E S
1. I’m not sure of Berthoff ’s information here. In my own studies in
cognitive psychology (including developmental psychology), taken
during the 1980s, when the essays in The Sense of Learning were
originally published, Piaget was presented as merely an historical
backdrop to more advanced, later theories and methods. The most
I had read of Piaget at that time was in a history of psychology
course. In applications of psychology to composition, for some
reason, we find Piaget frequently. My professors in psychology in
the 1980s were amazed by this. Therefore, our own application of
psychology to composition is a “generation behind” active psycho-
logical research, not the reverse, as Berthoff suggested.
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2. For an example of the results researchers must contend with when
they do not properly counterbalance, see Chiste and O’Shea
(1988), “Patterns of Question Selection and Writing Performance
of ESL Students” in TESOL Quarterly. The researchers tried to
determine how ESL students chose placement test questions: on
length or on position in a list of four? However, there was “a statis-
tical tendency on the 20 exams [in the study] for the short ques-
tion to be positioned at the beginning of the set and the long ones
at the end” (682). In other words, the authors had to admit, “This
correlation hinders any attempt to attribute primary responsibility
to either of these factors [length or position]” (682). These
researchers 1) reviewed previous placement tests they had readily
available and then 2) asked a question that the study (and the cho-
sen tests) was not designed to answer. Designing a new study that
would answer their question would require counterbalancing:
questions of different lengths should be equally rotated among the
four positions in a list. Such care in a designed study would pre-
vent the unsupported conclusions these authors drew: “Questions
that seem most accessible to ESL students should be positioned at
the beginning of the set, where they are most likely to receive
attention. . . . To prevent selection by length alone . . . questions
should be comparable in length” (683). Such conclusions cannot
be supported by this study because the authors could not deter-
mine the separate effects of either length of prompt or its position.
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3 N U M B E R S , N A R R AT I V E S ,
A N D  H E  V S . S H E
Issues of Audience in Composition Research
Whether “knowledge” gets noticed at all is partly a matter of
whether the community is ready and willing to listen.
Karen Schriver, 1989
It must be assumed that the objecting audience has the epis-
temic goals of truth and the avoidance of error. If they were
not critical truth seekers, they would not raise appropriate
objections.
David Annis, 1978
Our growing defense of qualitative research and storytelling in com-
position is accompanied by passionate arguments against the older,
traditional research paradigm—a passion that, as conversation with
others in the field has made clear, makes some of us look the other
way or lash out at the “old school” whenever conversation turns to the
older tradition. That paradigm, for many, has grown out of a male-
dominated tradition, places too much value on mathematics, and is
written in a stifling, disinterested style that is unpleasant to read (and
write).
More importantly, our abandonment of “traditional” research has
been praised for allowing more diverse researchers to express their
voices, voices that—as women, people of color, and practitioners—
have been relatively silenced until recently. Such shifts bring into
focus new epistemological stances that question the traditional ways
of knowing, and this epistemological shift has produced attacks
aimed at the old research paradigm on two levels: the broader issue
of epistemology and the more narrow issue of research methods.
Before we review how and why research methods relying on numeri-
cal data should remain potentially valuable depending on context, it
is important to address that part of the audience that wants nothing
to do with such research.
I focus here on three particular sources of arguments against the
traditional research model. While this chapter is divided into three
sections, readers will see features and arguments that overlap among
the sections: 1) our general anxiety about mathematics and statistics,
2) feminist responses to that older model, and 3) our preference for
writing that is more creative and literary than the standard research
report. These arguments often relate to each other, but for my pur-
poses here, each deserves its own treatment.
D O N ’ T  M A K E  M E  D O  M AT H : M AT H  A N D  S TAT I S T I C S  
AVO I DA N C E  A N D  A N X I E T Y  
If I could steal a dedication from someone else’s work and use it
for my own, I would steal from Paulos’s (1995) A Mathematician
Reads the Newspaper, dedicated “To storytelling number-crunchers
and number-crunching storytellers.” Paulos briefly shared some
childhood memories, joked about using Pythagoras and Pulitzer in
the same sentence, and speculated on the relationships between
mathematics and our daily lives. In the plainest of language, Paulos
explained, “The misunderstandings between mathematicians and
others run in both directions” (4), but Paulos argued that “number
stories” can enhance our understanding of economics and environ-
mental predictions, illuminate our understanding of “crime, health
risks, or racial and ethnic bias,” and even eliminate myths surround-
ing sports figures (4).
For Paulos, mathematics provides insight into popular culture and
scholarly pursuits and should not be separated from either, but he
understands where much of our anxiety comes from:
[B]ecause of the mind-numbing way in which mathematics is generally
taught, many people have serious misconceptions about the subject and
fail to appreciate its wide applicability. . . . It’s time to let the secret out:
Mathematics is not primarily a matter of plugging numbers into formulas
and performing rote computations.It is a way of thinking and questioning
that may be unfamiliar to many of us, but is available to most of us. (3)
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Indeed, in composition studies, quantifying data is rarely seen as
illuminating what Paulos called “people stories” (3) and is seen
instead as a separate world, often having nothing to do with people at
all, certainly nothing to do with anything pleasant. Phelps (1989)
called scientific research “distanced and neutral, sometimes employ-
ing elaborate statistical apparatus” (40), suggesting that statistics play
a role in separating such research from people stories. Charney
(1996), in “Empiricism Is Not a Four-Letter Word,” strongly objected
to such distinctions but accurately captured the distaste often
expressed toward numbers and the unfortunate stereotype of
researchers who use them:
[N]o one likes the way scientists seem to privilege numbers and dis-
parage words—the way numerical and graphic evidence is treated as
clean, precise, and solid. . . . misrepresenting the world as manageable,
fully determinate, and reducible to clear and accurate formulas. (571)
And if we believe Shea’s (1996) comment in an article on statisti-
cal significance in the Chronicle of Higher Education, we would think
that everyone in higher education trembles at the mere mention of
statistics:
No subject makes the eyes of graduate students in social science glaze
over faster, and even many professors view statistics as a necessary bit of
drudgery. (A12)
When we bring that “bit of drudgery” into composition research,
we sometimes apologize for its presence in people stories, as Lerner
(1997) did in “Counting Beans and Making Beans Count,” an analysis
of grade improvement among students who visited his writing center
and students who did not:
First a caveat: I know that numbers can obscure (and what I’m about
to detail does reduce those complex human beings who come to our writ-
ing centers down to manageable integers). My own research into writing
center settings has primarily used qualitative methods because it’s the
processes of interaction, goal setting, teaching and learning that make our
work so fascinating. (2)
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As if aware of his “anti-bean-counting” audience, Lerner carefully
walked his readers through the process of his data gathering and
comparison, providing excellent explanations for his choice of meth-
ods. He presented his “bean counting” with humor, especially in
headings like “Full of beans” and “Bean counters unite.” Lerner
praised the “exciting prospect” of numerical data gathered on the
National Writing Centers Association website as added proof that
“writing centers can and do make a difference” (3). But Lerner cap-
tured what many see as the necessary evil of numbers when we direct
writing programs or writing centers. After all, we have, for Lerner, a
tougher audience to please:
[I]nstitutional mandates, bean-counting administrators, and, ultimately,
our professional standing often call for answers. . . . I’ve learned about a
whole new level of accountability. . . . I need to anticipate my audience’s
needs. College administrators often want numbers, digits, results. (1-2)
Lerner’s justification illustrates Charney’s (1996) assertion that
“Compositionists readily assume that disciplines that adopt scientific
methods do so for reflected glory and access to institutional power”
(576). When we adopt such methods—and their accompanying
numbers—for ourselves, then, it is sometimes due to the pressure to
gain that same protective power or simply because we feel, apologeti-
cally, that we have to. Especially in writing centers, for Kail and Allen
(1982), research is necessary for many reasons in writing centers: one
reason is to “educate your administration,” and “like it or not, admin-
istrators need numbers” (233).
At the bowling alley, we’re gathering numbers to please no
one but ourselves. We’re here because we really want to know
if your red ball is as lucky as you say. Now that each ball has
been bowled 6 times, we have our scores, our data set,
showing how many pins out of ten each ball managed to knock
down:
Just by eyeballing the raw scores, we note that the red ball
seems to have come in second. But don’t panic yet. Thankfully,
we have more ways of looking at numbers that can help us out.









Totals 36 42 48
For now, you’ve taken the first step: gathering, organizing, and
presenting the information you found.
In addition to apologies for numerical data, we have examples of
research that gathered such data but surprisingly did not share it. For
example, Fitzgerald, Mulvihill, and Dobson (1991), in their work on
graduate writing groups in writing centers, conducted a survey of
graduate students at their university. They asked graduate students
about their preferences for working on theses and dissertations and
about the kinds of services the writing center could offer them. The
authors referred to the survey (attached as an appendix to the pub-
lished article) but did not report any of the quantitative data they
worked so hard to gather.
The survey asked, for example, if graduate students would prefer
multidisciplinary writing groups or discipline-specific writing groups
if the writing center offered such services to graduate students. Instead
of reporting the answers to that survey question, the authors stated,
“the students told [the director], almost unanimously, that they pre-
ferred to be in groups with people from other disciplines” (137). Here,
the authors preferred—and have given more value to—the testimony
of the few students who participated in graduate writing groups, when
much more data were readily available about their graduate popula-
tion generally (data that readers would undoubtedly find useful).
Hunzer (1997) also conducted a survey in a writing center to explore
gender stereotypes. After observing that female students preferred
working with female tutors because male tutors were “intimidating”












Totals 36 42 48
Avgs 6 7 8
and that male students preferred working with male tutors because
female tutors “were not aggressive enough” (6), Hunzer mailed a survey
with twelve questions to seventy-four students. She printed three of
those questions in her article but did not share any of the responses.
While she noted the number of students who responded (39 total, 16
male, 18 female, and 4 anonymous) and the age range of her sample
(17-30), she shared results only from the five students who volunteered
(and kept their appointments) to be interviewed (7). Responses in these
five interviews—not responses on thirty-nine surveys—formed the
entire data analysis. While student responses here are interesting to con-
sider in relation to gender stereotypes and student expectations of writ-
ing center tutors, more data were available but not given.
Now that you’ve gathered the scores at the bowling alley,
we need a way to talk about them. It’s a bit bulky to discuss
your raw scores: the red ball scored a 9 and then another 9
and then. . .
Averages or means help us share information with others.
We can easily figure the average scores for the bowling balls by
dividing the total score by the number of trials each ball had (6).




You still shouldn’t panic. After all, the average, or mean, is
only one way of looking at these data. The mean is a measure
of central tendency, or a number we can use to summarize the
data somehow, to capture its “flavor,” so to speak, or describe
the data in some way—which is why we call it a descriptive
statistic. Like adjectives, these numbers describe what we see,
so we can more clearly share them with others. Here, “7” is the
best descriptor of the red ball’s overall performance. 
But there are other measures of central tendency that can
describe what we see. Stay tuned. I know you’re going to like
one of them.
In “Students’ Reactions to Teacher Comments: An Exploratory
Study,” Straub (1997) did present his data, but only descriptively: in a
study of 142 students’ ranking of forty teacher comments on a four-
point scale (1=definitely prefer, 2=prefer, 3=do not prefer, 4=definitely
do not prefer), Straub presented the average score students gave for
each teacher comment and some average scores for categories of com-
ments (such as “praise” or “advice”). Straub made comparisons among
students’ responses by “eyeballing” the average scores. For example,
Straub concluded that 
These students were generally receptive to questions, but they were
particularly receptive to open questions. . . . The average rating for open
questions was 2.08, the third-most preferred mode of commentary in the
study, behind advice (1.76) and explanations (1.56). The average rating
for closed questions was considerably less favorable: 2.24, only a notch
better than imperative comments. (109)
Eyeballing the data to determine differences resulted in Straub’s
loose phrasing, such as “generally receptive,” “considerably less favor-
able,” and “a notch better”—loose comparisons that significance test-
ing would have clarified. Overall, Straub concluded that students
“seemed to be influenced far less by the focus of teacher comments
than by the degree of specificity of the comments and the modes of
commentary” (100). Even though these three variables—focus, speci-
ficity, and mode—were a part of this study, Straub presented only one
table of data: for mode of commentary.
Statistically, “mode” has a different meaning. While the
mean determines the arithmetic average of a set of scores, the
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mode describes the same set of scores by looking at the most
frequently-occurring score. The mode, of course, does not con-
tradict the mean. It simply gives us another angle from which to
view the same thing, as all researchers converge on their data
in as many ways as possible to learn as much as possible
about it.
Since you want the red ball to win, presenting the mode
might help you. Even though the red ball placed second in
overall raw score (and, therefore, the mean), you win when it
comes to the mode. Of the three balls, the red had the highest
mode, or most frequently occurring score: 9. The mode for the
purple ball was 8, and the mode for the green ball was only 5.
At this point, the red ball still has hope. While the purple ball
achieved the highest average, you could argue that the red ball
appears to achieve the highest score more consistently. If you
argued only the mean vs. the mode, however, you would never
get anywhere. So the difference here between the mean and
the mode illustrates two more important points: the mean is not
the only number that can describe our data, and we need to
look at our data set in other ways in order to understand all of
the information it contains.
If Straub crunched his data beyond simple averages, he did not
share it. Certainly, looking at the means for each comment helps us
describe students’ preferences, and anyone would know that a mean
of 2.1, for example, seems different from a mean of 3.1. But how dif-
ferent were they? How much variation is it, exactly? And, for an item
that achieved a mean of 3.1, for instance, how varied were students’
responses within that item? Straub didn’t elaborate on his data by dis-
cussing or presenting the standard deviation, another descriptive sta-
tistic that gives us more information about the averages, except for
one comment in a footnote:
The extent of students’ agreement about their strong preference for
advice is indicated by the standard deviation on their ratings for the eight
advisory comments. It is .84, the lowest in the study, indicating only a
minor variation in the students’ preferences for items in the group. (114)
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Readers should also be interested in the highest standard deviation
in the study, a number that would tell us the extent to which students
might have disagreed about their preference for a certain comment,
but Straub did not share it. Here, we have a study in which data are
presented, but only in part—and data will always contain more than
just averages.
At first glance, standard deviation looks like an oxymoron,
but it is, actually, a very descriptive term. Here, “deviation”
refers to how far an individual score deviated (or varied) from
the mean. When the green ball scored a 9, for example, we
can see that it deviated 3 points from the mean (6.0). Knowing
how far each score varied from the mean gives us additional
information about those scores and about the mean’s ability to
describe the whole data set. But to talk about each individual
score, again, gets bulky, so we’ll instead determine the
“average” deviation among the individual scores in each set:
the standard deviation.
To do that, let’s see how far each score varied from the
mean by subtracting the mean from each score. You’ll notice,
though, that subtracting the mean from each score will result in
some negative numbers. How do we get the average deviated
score when we have to add negative numbers? If we add the
numbers we get when we subtract the mean from each score,
we’ll have zero, as the second column below shows. We solve
the problem by squaring that score (multiplying two negative
numbers gives us a positive number). Think of it as
grammatically correcting a double negative. Later, we’ll have to
remember that we squared these numbers. 
For now, let’s label our columns to help keep them straight.
Let’s work with the red ball as an example, and label the raw
score “X,” the deviated score “x,” and when we square that x,
we’ll label it x2.
Once we’ve squared each deviated score, we can
determine their mean by adding them (22.00) and dividing by
the number of scores (6), just like we compute any average.
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The average (mean) turns out to be 3.67, but remember we
had to square each deviated score to correct for negative num-
bers. The average, 3.67, then, is the standard deviation
squared, not the standard deviation for the green ball’s scores.
We can take the square root of 3.67, however, and get that
number: 1.91. The scores that the red ball achieved deviated
from the mean of 7.0 by an average of 1.91 points.
calculating the mean of X: 42/6 = 7.0 
calculating the mean of x2 : 22.0/6 = 3.67 
standard deviation: √3.67 = 1.91
You can do the math for the green and purple balls. 
Similar to Straub’s study, in which he gathered data but did not
share a full analysis, was Radencich’s (1998) summary of research
done by four of her masters students (coauthors, Eckhardt, Rasch,
Uhr, & Pisaneschi). In one of the four studies, which tried to deter-
mine a difference in word count in students’ journals when given
either teacher-provided or self-selected journal topics, Radencich
articulated the data analysis as follows: “Becky computed word
counts per journal entry per student and then used an ANOVA to
compare those of boys and girls for teacher-provided and self-
selected topics. The only difference she found was higher word counts
for self-selected than for teacher-provided topics” (88). Here, mere
mention that an ANOVA was done seemed sufficient, rather than a
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TABLE 3.3
Standard Deviation for the Red Ball
X subtract x x2
the mean
9 -7.0 2.0 4.0
9 -7.0 2.0 4.0
8 -7.0 1.0 1.0
7 -7.0 0.0 0.0
5 -7.0 -2.0 4.0
4 -7.0 -3.0 9.0
Totals 42 0.0 22.0
full detailing of the analysis and results. In another of the four studies
—one that attempted to measure the effects of different background
music (including a no music control) on students’ journal writing—
Radencich also ignored numerical data, sharing only the teacher’s
observations and students’ commentary. While Radencich’s purpose
was to examine her graduate-level course on research, such vague
summaries of the research done in the course cannot help us under-
stand the full context in which that research was conducted or what
that research might mean.
While other researchers certainly publish the data they find, the
above examples illustrate that it is possible to publish research that
relies on data without reporting all of that data–or any data at all–or
to convert numerical data to a qualitative report. This is a surprising
notion, considering how difficult it is to gather that data in the first
place: why wouldn’t a researcher want to share the results of such
hard work? But perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised to see some
researchers ignore the math when research textbooks in our field do
the same. Lauer and Asher (1988) explained statistics and measure-
ment in an appendix to Composition Research: Empirical Designs,
referring to a list of other suggested readings “for someone without
extensive statistical background” (232). In a more comprehensive,
sophisticated text, Hayes et al. (1992) reviewed strategies for reading
research reports, including the statistics/results section, but suggested
to readers who “have trouble reading graphs” that they, too, refer to
the list of “additional readings” that can help with such matters (15):
“Our objective is not to give you extensive knowledge of subject mat-
ter or of statistical methods” (11). And while MacNealy’s Strategies for
Empirical Research in Writing (1999) was “intended for novices: those
with no background in empirical research and even those who are
afraid of math” (ix), MacNealy acknowledged that her introduction
to statistical procedures was insufficient: “As you begin to think about
possible statistical procedures to use in analyzing your data, you
should consult one of the many books on statistics” (x).1
While none of these texts purported to be a statistics textbook,
each reviewed several studies and research methods that relied on sta-
tistical analysis in order to provide meaning to that research. All
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referred readers elsewhere to learn more about statistics on their own,
as if it is not the place of the composition researcher to teach stats, or
as if readers wouldn’t mind that omission. While these texts offered
definitions of statistical concepts, none walked readers through the
intricacies of basic procedures to help them understand the logic
behind them, in the full context of investigating a research question.
Without such help, mere definitions often remain confusing, vague.
While these authors acknowledged that some of their readers would
need help with (or, perhaps, would have anxiety about) statistical
analysis, none took the opportunity to offer full procedural and con-
ceptual help that would ease anxiety or clarify confusion.
Such anxiety is not uncommon in a field more concerned with
words than with numbers—with literacy rather than numeracy
(Steen, 1990; Snyder, 1990). Steen (1990) argued that, even in careers
requiring mathematics, some must overcome “insecurity brought on
by their school experience with mathematics” (216). Still others,
though often well-educated, “are virtually innumerate; others become
‘mathophobic,’ avoiding tasks or careers that require any use of math-
ematics” (216) (see also Tobias, 1978, 1987). For Steen, lack of confi-
dence in math or statistics naturally leads to avoidance.
Other forces, of course, have shaped our response to numbers. A
Nike advertisement for women’s athletic shoes, printed in popular
women’s magazines in the early 1990s (and available now on several
websites), captured both a public and a scholarly awareness of the
potential harm in a number:
A woman is often measured by the things she cannot control. She is
measured by the way her body curves or doesn’t curve, by where she is
flat or straight or round. She is measured by 36-24-36 and inches and
ages and numbers, by all the outside things that don’t ever add up to who
she is on the inside. And so if a woman is to be measured, let her be mea-
sured by the things she can control, by who she is and who she is trying
to become. Because every woman knows, measurements are only statis-
tics and statistics lie.
We have to be careful, especially in rhetoric and composition, if we
believe that statistics lie. Our own field has had to justify rhetoric as
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an honorable pursuit, refuting charges that often come with phrases
like “mere rhetoric” or “empty bombast”—phrases that suggest
rhetoricians, too, can lie. And let’s admit it: words tell more lies than
numbers do. After all, we have another way of pointing out liars:
“you’re just telling stories.”
F E M I N I S T  R E S P O N S E S  T O  T H E  T R A D I T I O N A L  R E S E A R C H
PA R A D I G M : I N  S E A R C H  O F  O U R  M O T H E R S ’ VO I C E S  
Science and scientists—and the numerical data and scientific
thought accompanying them—have been criticized for years by femi-
nists fighting the combined effect of male domination in science (and
in higher education generally) and society’s general acceptance of sci-
ence as power. There is widespread discussion, of course, of the high
number of men over women involved in the sciences, of numerous
fields (especially medicine) studying men far more often than
women, of differences between men’s and women’s ways of knowing,
and of long-standing social expectations of women to engage more
fully in the arts or humanities than in the “bolder,” more analytical
sciences, often remaining assistants to the men who “do real science.”
Before I proceed, I feel the need to make my own stance clear here.
I include a review of feminist arguments about research and research
methods only to caution against choosing research methods based
only on political ideology or against choosing research methods only
because they do not have a male-dominated history. At the same
time, several feminists have posed perhaps the most valuable argu-
ments about our research at the epistemological level (producing
great changes, of course, in what we hope to know, how we can come
to know it, and, most importantly, who can be a valid knower). Still,
several others have pushed a feminist ideology stripped of epistemo-
logical discussion that could and should include everyone.
Feminists and non-feminists alike may ask feminist or non-
feminist research questions, and, of course some questions may be nei-
ther. I agree with Harding (1987) that both men and women can
engage in feminist inquiry and that research without loyalty to either
gender is possible and can be helpful (Harding, 1986). At the same
time, however, gender neutrality in research does not always help us
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understand women and men when gender is not an explicit variable,
and feminist researchers still run the risk of being perceived as “persons
who ‘stir up trouble’ over nonissues” (Carter & Spitzack, 1989, p. 1)
when they move from gender neutrality to gender studies.
We would make a big mistake if we understood feminist contribu-
tions to our research as contributions by and for women only. In spite
of some arguments to that effect, I hope instead to present feminist
inquiry as aiding our understanding of both women and men and,
especially, the unwritten rules of the power structure in which we live.
Of special interest here are the arguments put forth about traditional
methodological preferences for research. An even bigger mistake than
always choosing one method would be to reject a research method
only because of its male-dominated history or to prefer some methods
because they appear to suit women better. For some, this might
sound like an anti-feminist argument that requires more defense.
Like many women, I first came to feminism for survival and for
tools for fighting back. In my first semester of graduate school, I had
the opportunity in an advanced composition class to write about my
own experiences as they relate to a larger social issue. In my essay, I told
my favorite shaping stories in an exploration of sexism: my stories
about raising pigs when I was in high school so that I could go to 
college—only to be voted “prettiest pig farmer in town”; about bring-
ing those pigs to market—only to be asked if I was “keeping Dad com-
pany”; about working at a farm supply store for a couple of years in
college—only to be doubted that I even knew where things were; and
about driving a forklift in a freezer during the summer between my
undergraduate work and graduate school—only to be told too many
times,“let one of the men get it”. (Often, the men who challenged me in
these ways “got theirs” eventually, especially when I worked in that
freezer—like the men who wouldn’t take my advice to put their tailgate
up to hold the 100 pounds of ice they just purchased: I was told not to
worry my little head, but I laughed that “little head” off when the ice
didn’t make it out of the parking lot, when it started to melt immedi-
ately and slid off, and the men were too embarrassed to come back.) 
And in my first week as a writing center director, the male profes-
sor who asked me if our new furniture arrangement came out of that
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same “little head” reminded me yet again that women’s battles—and
my own personal ones—are far from over.
I share these stories not only to demonstrate my own fondness
for stories and my understanding of what they can reveal, but also
to illustrate that my life does not allow me to be anti-feminist, in
spite of some questions I have of feminist arguments about our
research. Especially in composition, many women are now in posi-
tions to make a difference, and we do—for the present and the
future. Active research of all kinds will move us forward so that no
more histories of male domination are needed to assert our right
to the present. Such research will require that we use all available
tools to make necessary changes. With this in mind, several texts
are well worth reading—with a critical eye for what they mean for
all of us.
While I hope we’re ready to move beyond discussions of
our male-dominated history, I cannot deny that we still live
within the culture that such a history shaped. Go back to the
bowling alley and ask yourself if you assumed our bartender to
be male or female. Be honest. In the actual text, the bowler
has no gender. Your vision of male or female was imposed on
the text. If you assumed neither sex, good for you. If you
assumed male, it doesn’t mean you’re sexist: you simply live
in the same world feminists have been trying to expose and
change for decades.
For many, research that relies heavily on numerical data embodies
a set of stereotypically masculine values. Relating her experiences as a
biochemist, Shepherd (1993) speculated on “the emotional” more
often associated with the feminine and “the rational” more often
associated with the masculine. In her quest to “unveil the feminine
face of science” (as the title of her book suggests), Shepherd traced the
male domination of science—as have numerous feminist scholars2 —
and blamed such domination for a decreased public interest in sci-
ence, for scientific language that has become increasingly cryptic and
more separate from the public, and for “the intentional repression of
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one such approach, that representing the feminine viewpoint, which
has been ignored from the outset” (2).
Science without feeling (in other words, science without the femi-
nine) if taken to its extreme, Shepherd argued, is akin to Nazi scien-
tists conducting experiments on Jews (249)—the extreme result, for
Shepherd, of masculine thought that looks only at the objective, at
the data and procedures, and ignores what the feminine attends to:
the interconnectedness of people and of social responsibility (250).
This absence of emotion or of personal involvement in the sciences
was addressed immediately by Shepherd’s first sentence of her
“Acknowledgments”: “This book is a personal journey, embarked
upon to discover and honor the emerging Feminine in myself and in
our culture” (vii).
For some, the inclusion of women and women’s issues involves a
change not only in research questions and the researchers themselves,
but also in research methods. Railing against a male-dominated tradi-
tion and its favored research models, we now seek different methods
that seem able to embrace and reveal what Shepherd called the “personal
journey” and what has become a new epistemological stance. For exam-
ple, Hawkins (1989) argued that “participant observation, unstructured
interviews, and use of personal documents” should be emphasized in
research on (in particular) sexual harassment and (in general) any
research that recognizes the “reactivity of human beings” (61).
Langellier and Hall (1989) argued for interviews as the best method for
understanding women’s communication, rather than “sex as a variable
measured against male-as-norm” (202), in their research involving
women’s personal narratives about food and food preparation.
In composition, Sullivan (1992) also favored such methods for
advancing feminist inquiry. While she praised composition for the
large number of women who have been pioneers in our field and
for not being guilty of studying male populations only (38-39), she
curiously proclaimed that women students who enter the male-
dominated academy still must learn “modes of discourse that
[women] have had little voice in shaping” (40). Sullivan, like
Shepherd and others, lashed out at the male dominance in higher
education and in the sciences:
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Taking gender as the starting point of inquiry . . . is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition of feminist methodology, for feminism has as its
ideological goal the overturning of patriarchal assumptions and practices
that render women’s experiences invisible and undervalued. (50)
For Sullivan, this feminist ideology leads feminist composition
researchers to prefer “the cluster of methods that fall under the
rubrics of qualitative and naturalistic inquiry” (57), arguing that “tra-
ditional methodologies—the research practices and assumptions—of
our discipline” continue to allow “men’s discursive practices to define
the standard against which women’s writing is judged” (58). Sullivan
was highly critical of two texts in particular that have attempted to
contribute to composition’s quest for a firmly established research
paradigm:
The dominant paradigm, reflected throughout works such as Lauer
and Asher’s Empirical Designs and in parts of North’s The Making of
Knowledge in Composition, dictates that the researcher must detach herself
from the object of inquiry and keep personal bias and values from influ-
encing her observations and analysis if she is to paint an objective and
undistorted picture of reality. (55)
Sullivan relied heavily on Harding’s (1987) work, in which
Harding questioned the existence of a “feminist methodology” but
proposed three important characteristics of feminist inquiry: 1) it
should be based on women’s experiences; 2) it should examine phe-
nomena important to women; and 3) it should involve the researcher
and his/her experiences and assumptions rather than pretend objec-
tivity through a disinterested stance.
Highlighting the voices of women (including the researcher)
seems to be the most important contribution feminist scholars can
make to composition. To achieve this goal, Sullivan argued for
research methods she called “qualitative and naturalistic”—research
that invites a prose style related more to narrative than to the tradi-
tional research article:
Techniques such as open-ended interviews and case studies enable
researchers to generate descriptions of composing from the point of view
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and in the language of the writers they are studying. Participant observa-
tion, a defining feature of ethnomethodology, allows researchers to reflect
critically on their own subject position, both as researchers and as
authors, in the twin sites of the study—in the field and on the page. (57)
While Sullivan concluded that these particular methods would
suit a feminist researcher best, she admitted in the same piece that
previous case studies—even those on (and by) women writers—have
upheld the male-dominated prescriptions of good writers, especially
in graduate work. She criticized a case study in her own 1988 disserta-
tion and another presented by North (1987, pp. 37-42) in The Making
of Knowledge in Composition; both case studies focused on women
graduate students who were struggling to succeed. Sullivan illustrated
how the lack of a feminist research question and feminist research
principles created studies that she later seemed to construe as anti-
feminist—in spite of methodologies she argued were naturally suited
for feminist inquiry. Both studies, for Sullivan, drowned the voices of
the women being discussed and never considered socialization of
gender as a potential reason for difficulty in either woman’s writing.
In short, while Sullivan argued for case study methods as a means of
revealing women’s voices and as an appropriate tool for feminist
inquiry (or for inquiry in composition generally), she illustrated how
case studies can also distort—through the very subjectivity of the
author—that same inquiry.3 In other words, Sullivan inadvertently
demonstrated that method alone cannot determine good or poor
feminist scholarship: in spite of her argument that qualitative and
naturalistic methods are more suitable for such scholarship, she illus-
trated two cases in which this was not true. And in spite of her
reliance on Harding’s work, which is open to a range of research
methods and styles, Sullivan suggested, though indirectly, that any
study involving women must be done in a certain way or it will not
make a valid contribution (or, conversely, that other, different ways
are still acceptable for studying men, with or without their “voices”).
Also relying on Harding’s (1987) question of feminist methodol-
ogy, Kirsch (1993) constructed and defended her research method in
Women Writing the Academy according to Harding’s three principles
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of feminist inquiry: focusing on issues important to women, ground-
ing inquiry in women’s experiences, and being personally involved as
a researcher. Kirsch presented valuable case studies that examined
women’s views of authority and audience in their writing for various
disciplines, but, like other researchers, Kirsch defended her method
politically and ideologically rather than via her need to answer a par-
ticular research question. Even though Harding doubted the existence
of a feminist research method, Kirsch adopted Harding’s principles in
“method form” and apologized for how traditional that method
appeared when written out in chapter two:
The feminist research principles described by Harding informed the
design of this study. . . . Although the subheadings of this chapter appear
to indicate a rather traditional research report, the discussion within each
section, the last section of this chapter, and the overall organization of the
book (e.g., the portraits of writers between chapters) all indicate the
extent to which this research is shaped by a feminist methodology. (30)
The apology for such a traditional-looking research report sug-
gests the extent to which composition researchers have established
their distaste for such research, even for how it looks. In her defense
of her chosen method, Kirsch also implied that research in traditional
form is never based on experience, never involves the researcher per-
sonally, and never examines feminist research questions. Of course,
Women Writing the Academy contributes greatly to our inquiry about
gender issues and writing and is enlightening and readable. On a less
positive note, however, it contributes also to the tension of a false
dichotomy–separating (and elevating) one kind of research from
(and over) another.
Preferences for case studies and other qualitative forms of research
have often been contrasted with what has been called the “masculiniza-
tion of thought” that requires objectivity, mathematics, and distance on
the part of the researcher. A stronger defense of personal narratives and
case studies, then, has been developing among several scholars in our
field—a field said to be highly feminized (Lauer, 1995; Enos, 1996;
Connors, 1995, 1996; Healy, 1995) and, therefore, in a position to be
naturally opposed to such masculinization of thought—especially for
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feminist scholars who use gender issues as a means of defending such a
growing preference. Much in our field has been determined feminine:
student-centered and collaborative pedagogies, the nurturing environ-
ment of writing centers, and the staffing of most first-year writing
classes and writing centers. Changes in the field brought on by women,
I believe, are the strongest and most productive new features of our
field. It seems natural, then, that preference for research methods mir-
roring these features—case studies, narratives, interviews, ethnography
—are now rapidly following suit.
Even when narratives are combined with numbers in multi-modal
research, narratives are sometimes assigned more weight. In Gender
Roles and Faculty Lives in Rhetoric and Composition, Enos (1996) pre-
sented an extremely valuable study on composition faculty in English
departments that gave special attention to gender issues. Enos’s blend
of demographic data, survey results, and interviews provided a strong
picture of the scope of gender bias in our field, and the stories from
many women (and a few men) illustrate all too clearly the often com-
bined struggles that composition faculty still face against literature-
dominated departments and that women face in a male-dominated
hierarchy. In spite of a large amount of numerical data presented with
these stories, however, Enos believed the stories clearly carried more
weight: “I believe our stories, more than statistics, tell who we are” (2).
I believe the “power” depends on something besides “reasoned dis-
course” or statistical analysis. I believe this book’s most powerful use of
“data” is the narrative, in the stories that help us define our places in acad-
emia so that we can better trace our future. The stories you will hear, more
than the “hard data” you will read, use the power of the occasion to make
our histories more compelling, more true. (1)
Of interest here is that Enos presented the stories as more true
than the statistics she gathered to show the scope of the problem.
Without those numbers, however, some value in the stories would be
lost (though they would not be “less true”): the numbers and the nar-
ratives support each other too well; one without the other would col-
lapse their mutual support on which the power of Enos’s book
depends.
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P R E F E R E N C E  F O R  N A R R AT I V E - A S - G E N R E : A R E  W E  S T I L L
T H E  S T E P C H I L D  O F  L I T E R AT U R E ?  
Like Enos, who argued that stories are more true for us than statis-
tics, Elbow’s What is English? (1990) demonstrated a clear hunger for
stories among teachers of writing. Sharing his notes from one session
at the 1987 English Coalition Conference, Elbow captured a discus-
sion in which Janet Emig asked other participants, “What are the con-
ditions that all teachers need?” Some participants gave standard
responses, such as “smaller classes” and “more time.” Then, according
to Elbow’s notes, “Rosalinda Barrera suggests stories” (197).
Stories. Indeed, the blurb on the back cover of Elbow’s book
praised its storytelling nature, especially for being “very personal” and
for having been written in “a lively and accessible style”—features we
would rarely assign to even the best of traditional academic theory or
research. Writing teachers naturally gravitate toward methods that
not only relieve us of the need to crunch numbers or count beans, but
also allow us to share the things we like best: Stories. Stories with
style.
For some, stories have provided the foundation for teaching
philosophies. Carroll (1997) argued, “English I is about telling stories,
about the stories we tell students and the stories they tell us and the
stories we construct together. At the same time, it’s all true, not
because stories map a unified reality but because stories do have con-
sequences” (932). Welch (1997) articulated the role of stories in her
own teaching philosophy:
I approach composition with the belief that rhetoric and poetics are
intertwined, that arguments are underwritten by stories, and that these
stories work powerfully as forms of persuasion. . . . I learn from stories.
(939)
In a positive review of five books on storytelling and teaching
writing, Welch argued, “All five can teach us about the shapes and
uses of stories in our field” (940).
Perhaps this passion for stories is what made Rose’s Lives on the
Boundary (1989) so popular. The subtitle gave it away: “A Moving
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Account of the Struggles and Achievements of America’s
Educationally Underprepared.” For me, the book was, indeed, mov-
ing, especially in those places where I saw stories much like my own.
Rose relied on stories—stories from his own life and from others—
and, for Rose, there was a reason for that:
The stories of my work with literacy interweave with the story of my
own engagement with language. Lives on the Boundary is both vignette
and commentary, reflection and analysis. I didn’t know how else to get it
right. (xii)
Other researchers also attempt to get it right through stories. For
composition studies, storytelling serves as the primary selling point
of methods such as ethnography; as Brodkey (1987) so concisely
articulated, “All ethnographies begin in stories”:
[O]ne needs more, not fewer, ways to narrate experience, for the value
of ethnography inheres in neither analysis nor interpretation, but in the
researcher’s decision to examine lived cultural experience—to conceptu-
alize it, reflect on it, narrate it, and evaluate it. (32)
Relying on Foucault’s (1977) discussion of authorship (“What Is
an Author?”), Brodkey explained that ethnographers, not the
method, tell the story. In contrast to experimental replications or
repeated explications of the same poem (works that “display method-
ologies” more than their “authors”), ethnographers are in charge of
their “candidly authored” works and construct narratives anew; they
are, therefore—for Brodkey and in Foucault’s terms—authors (27).
For those who have explored the place of stories in our scholar-
ship, a new focus on the author (and on authorship) holds power in
other ways as well. Gannett (1995), for example, explored the story as
not only a means of sharing our lives or reflecting on our lives, but,
more importantly, as a means of making our lives, as the title of her
essay (in Phelps and Emig 1995) explicitly stated: “The Stories of Our
Lives Become Our Lives.” In part, Gannett reviewed, as others have, a
male-dominated history that once prevented women from engaging
in academic discourse, a restriction that attracted (forced?) women to
the set of genres known as journals and diaries (114), a set of genres
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that Gannett argued is now entering university discourse: “In the uni-
versity, women have begun to valorize and reclaim the discourse tra-
ditions they have historically found empowering” (124), a discourse
tradition based on the personal and social meanings found in
stories.4
Storytelling also has the power to construct our identities as class-
room teachers. Royster and Taylor (1997) explored the identity of the
basic writing teacher through Taylor’s teaching journal5—an identity
often lost in the scholarship that attends more to constructing instead
the identity of the basic writer. Of importance to Royster and Taylor,
however, was not only storytelling, but also a critical look at the
nature of storytelling as an inclusive tool with the potential to con-
struct identities for a diverse group of teachers:
In one way, this article is yet another call to story as a very useful
methodology for sharing classroom experiences—this time with the gaze
on the teacher. Our call, however, is also for a critical step back from our
narratives to make them reach out more inclusively and more meaning-
fully for the general landscape of our work. At this point, our view is that
we need to think, not only about ourselves in classroom space, but also
about the art of storytelling in terms of its theoretical and political impli-
cations. What have we learned about the telling of stories? How do we
assign meaning and draw value for the classroom cultures from which our
telling comes? (42)
In addition to constructing academic identities, storytellers and
authors of ethnographies are able to connect their personal
lives/identitites to their academic identities, to “bridge . . . a rather
large gap between academic research and real problems” (Moss, 1992,
p. 153). For Moss, ethnography and its focus on the everyday activi-
ties of communities allowed her to take a personal approach to her
research on literacy in the African-American church, an approach in
which the story had clear value for Moss:
[Ethnography] was the only research method I had been introduced to
that allowed a researcher to tell a story about a community—a story told
jointly by the researcher and the members of the community. (154)
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Here, Moss reminded us that the author of an ethnography not
only constructs the narrative, but she is also a part of the study itself
“in more than some abstract ‘researcher’ way” (154; see also
Radencich, et al., 1998).
Authorship in research was also important for Newkirk in “The
Narrative Roots of the Case Study” (1992). Critical of those who justify
case study research by “straddling paradigms” (132)—defending case
studies as scientifically rigorous and generalizable while upholding the
individualized narrative at the same time—Newkirk presented the
need for a case study paradigm that he understood could be perceived
as “dangerous” because it is not one “of methodology and objectivity,
but of authoring and the cultural values embedded in various narra-
tive plots” (133). Newkirk argued that we have not yet embraced such a
narrative-based paradigm because of “the consistent warning in the
educational research textbooks. . . . The great god of Methodology is
invoked to protect the researcher from charges of storytelling” (133).
The value of storytelling rests, however, as Newkirk argued,
. . . on a core of mythic narratives—deeply rooted story patterns that
clearly signal to the reader the types of judgments to be made. . . . As read-
ers of these studies, we find them true or convincing, not because of care-
ful methodology (important as that is), or because of wealth of detail, but,
I would argue, because of the gratification we get from seeing cultural
myths being reenacted. (135-136)
As these cultural narratives are reenacted, the author, more than
the method, controls the text, and while Newkirk did not say so, such
a shift from method to author allows one important feature to be
revealed that authors have and methods apparently do not: emotion.
Storytelling, more than statistics, allows our emotions to emerge, an
act that, in Newkirk’s terms, brings us gratification.
Paulos (1995), intrigued by the popular need for gratification,
pointed out the popularity of emotional appeals (rather than evi-
dence) in the media, law, and business. And while our own scholars
put forth their own reasons for storytelling and for the emotional
involvement of the researcher, Paulos proposed his own (less favor-
able, more dangerous) reason for that natural desire:
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It’s easier and more natural to react emotionally than it is to deal dis-
passionately with statistics or, for that matter, with fractions, percentages,
and decimals. The media (actually, all of us) frequently solve this problem
by leaving numbers out of stories. . . . [W]e all tend to be unduly swayed
by the dramatic, the graphic, the visceral. (80-82)
For Paulos, we avoid the mathematical/rational/statistical in part
because it is difficult and because the emotional is easier and feels
more natural. We can find numerous examples of such emotion in
composition scholarship. As Newkirk, for example, shared his own
experience with case study, he related his struggle to find the narrative
thread on which his final product would ultimately be based:
I had to “intensely consult and intensely ignore,” keeping the data I
needed, putting aside the rest, grieving a bit for all I had to leave out.
It is a lonely feeling, and for a while an empty feeling. But I was not
totally alone because I had patterns of other narratives to draw on. I could
make new stories out of old ones. (150)
Shifting our attention from the method to the writer greatly
enhances the emotional side of our research while increasing variabil-
ity in texts, audiences, and the subjects or stories themselves; indeed,
such attention to authorship and narratives, for Newkirk, has been
seen as “radicalism” in composition research, going against the grain,
so to speak, of traditional research methodologies, when, paradoxi-
cally, case studies and ethnography are based on equally long-stand-
ing traditions of “enduring narratives” such as the tragedy (136). This
radicalism, however, is demonstrated by other scholars who believe
that allowing the method and data to speak through experiment or
other standard, traditional methods is to allow the traditional genre
of academic prose to remain unquestioned, undisturbed.
Indeed, for most storytellers in composition, the value of a story
rests mostly in its potential for political resistance to academic tradi-
tion. In Narration as Knowledge, Trimmer (1997) explored the 
subordinate role that stories (and the English teachers who love
them) have held in the academy:
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We became English teachers because we loved stories. We loved read-
ing them, writing them, and talking about them. . . . But as we worked our
way into our professional lives, we slowly, almost imperceptibly, changed
our attitude toward stories. We lived in a world that did not trust them.
Stories were not true. Stories were not reliable. If we wanted to keep sto-
ries in our lives, we had to convert them into something else. Something
more serious. More scientific. (x)
For Trimmer, English teachers have compromised their love for
story under pressure from an academy that values science: we ask stu-
dents to write stories only to diagnose their errors; we teach them to
“dissect plots and theorize themes,” to be analytical rather than cre-
ative (x). The analytical dissection of text is expected in traditional
academic prose.
Kirsch (1993), too, resisted such traditional academic prose when
she refused to traditionally conclude her work on women writing in
the academy:
Conclusions demand that an author summarize and unify, make
coherent what might be otherwise fragmented, impose order and control
on material that might be otherwise out of order, out of control. . . .
[C]onclusions can lead to erasing differences, and erasing differences can
lead to the silencing of voices. . . . It is that kind of silencing, that kind of
concluding I would like to avoid here. (125)
Instead of a traditional conclusion, then, Kirsch reminded us that
the stories in her volume were presented without interruption so they
may speak for themselves, to “become audible” (126) in an academic
system blamed for drowning those voices and stories. For some schol-
ars, then, stories contribute to our scholarship by throwing in a
wrench that reminds us that academics and academic research come
from anything but a well-oiled, efficient machine. Trimbur (1993)
praised this value of stories in his “Foreword” to Kirsch’s work:
The stories women tell about their lives writing in the academy are
worth listening to in part because they challenge the conventional view of
academic publication as a seamless meritocratic system that recognizes
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significant work, rewards talent, and ignores the rest. . . . Their stories also
call into question the genres in which academics write and the reasons
they write in the first place. (x-xi)
The same kind of “breaking free” from traditional academic prose
also formed the foundation for Sullivan and Qualley’s collection of
essays, Pedagogy in the Age of Politics (1994) in which
authors locate their inquiry in their own practices as teachers, scholars
and theorists, writing from their own narratives and not merely from (or
about) the master narratives currently circulating in academe. (xii)
Here, stories allow the individual to “come forth” and combat tra-
ditional modes of inquiry we somehow find limiting or constraining
to our individuality.
In a review of Pedagogy in the Age of Politics, however, Jacobs
(1997) warned that such diverse, individual narratives “contributed
to the diffuseness of the volume and the sense that contributors are
isolated rather than members of a social network” (465). Indirectly,
then, Jacobs warned that such narratives could lead to a collapse of
community: stories are often given value for the sake of the individ-
ual telling a story or for the flavor of the story itself, rather than the
story’s relationship to other stories, to other storytellers, to the field,
or to other kinds of inquiry. Jacobs perhaps sensed the potential for
stories such as these being told outside of a larger context—specific
criticism often reserved for quantitative research (as many scholars
have condemned data-gathering as devoid of context).
S U M M A RY
Our researchers have, on the one hand, successfully highlighted
the voices of marginalized groups as valuable contributors to the
field, have critically questioned the status quo of university and
departmental hierarchies, and have produced scholarship to which
the majority of the field can personally relate. On the other hand,
some proposals that “the rubrics of qualitative and naturalistic
inquiry” (Sullivan, 1992) are best suited for such goals have stemmed
from a desire to be different from a male-dominated history and
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male-only research and research communities. In addition, other
arguments and preferences for these methods have expressed the
relief we feel when not required to do math or to write or read those
old-fashioned, boring research reports.
We must be careful not to dismiss particular methods–especially
those that rely on numerical evidence–as anti-woman, anti-humanist,
or anti-creative, for to do so would be to blame the vehicle for having
had a lot of bad drivers. Research relying on numerical data is still a
dependable vehicle for getting us to some of the places we need to go,
and we need all possible vehicles in order to convey the most valuable
and diverse body of knowledge possible. Such a vehicle need not be so
strangely driven, however: instead, we should all become the best dri-
vers we can, ready for any road.
All research methods and how we teach those methods to others
can be done in such a way to include the feminist, to understand
math as a storytelling language in its own right, and to include the
narrative as a foundation for and an extension of that research in
relation to experience and practice.
Chapter four will construct a means through which such an inclu-
sive view of our research might occur. Letting go of dichotomous lan-
guage, bypassing debates among competing epistemologies, and
returning to the roots of a long-standing rhetorical tradition—a
Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification will help us begin to
understand our research needs in the contexts from which they arise,
provide us with a more inclusive language, and enable us to further
our training in even more diverse research methods.
N O T E S
1. In a 1998 survey of subscribers to consortium-l@mtu.edu (a listserv
devoted to graduate studies in composition), none of the respon-
dents (N=8) indicated that their composition program included a
statistics course. While some graduate programs in composition
(such as my own program at Ball State University) require statistics
training for their graduate students, such requirements are clearly
N u m b e r s , N a r r a t i v e s , a n d  H e  v s  S h e 83
unpopular. Permission for this survey is on file at Ball State
University, IRB Protocol ID #98-160.
2. See, for example, Harding & O’Barr, 1987; Harding, 1986, 1987,
1991; Noble, 1992; Schiebinger, 1993; Wells, 1996.
3. Another case study that drowned the voice of the student in
question was “The African-American Student: At Risk” (Gill,
1992) published in College English. Gill argued that African-
American students face situations that are unique. She proceeded
to describe an African American male who lived in poverty in a
fatherless home with his mother supported only through wel-
fare; he needed to work full-time in order to supplement his
family’s income, and he was the family’s only hope for a college
graduate since his older sister had become an unwed mother
(225-226).
While the problems this student faced have been frequently
associated with the African American community, not all African
American individuals have faced situations similar to this stu-
dent’s, and non-African Americans face similar problems. Gill
chose an extreme scenario to illustrate her point and did not
include the student’s voice or texts.
Unfortunately, Gill’s primary purpose for sharing such a sce-
nario was to argue the benefits of giving African American stu-
dents positive feedback and praising strengths and improvements
in student writing (226). However, she did not illustrate how that
kind of reinforcement enabled the student in her case study to suc-
ceed, nor did she examine why such reinforcement is uniquely suc-
cessful with African Americans.
For a strong case study, see DiPardo’s (1992) “‘Whispers of
Coming and Going’: Lessons from Fannie” (Writing Center
Journal, 12.2, pp. 125-144). DiPardo focused on a Navajo female
student (Fannie) for whom English is a second language and an
African American female tutor (Morgan) in her second semester of
tutoring. DiPardo’s case study is informed by a sensitivity to lan-
guage, culture, class, and gender: she related passages from inter-
views with both the student and the tutor, portions of Fannie’s
essays, and excerpts from taped tutorials. She wove these voices
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with her own and with scholarship on language, culture, and
tutoring/teaching with a unique blend of sensitivity and authority.
DiPardo’s case study included as much writing and talking
produced directly by the women she was studying as passages that
were her “own.” Further, DiPardo’s case study did not purport to
generalize about Navajo students or African American tutors;
instead, she used this case study to examine effective and ineffec-
tive tutoring strategies and the need for strong tutor training.
DiPardo’s case study won the 1993 Outstanding Scholarship
Award from the National Writing Centers Association, and the
piece was reprinted, most likely for its tutor training value, in
Murphy and Sherwood (1995), The St. Martin’s Sourcebook for
Writing Tutors.
4. While it might be true that the stories women have historically told
in diaries and journals ultimately became empowering, Gannett
also admitted that men’s diaries were published far more often
than women’s and that diaries and personal writing that women
managed to publish were most often for the purpose of illuminat-
ing the life of some famous man (125). While much discussion and
research might portray personal narratives and journals as
uniquely feminine, we must not forget that many stories of histori-
cal importance were uniquely masculine. For instance, we have few
slave narratives from women (Gates, 1987), and most slave narra-
tives were introduced by white abolitionists who attested to the
credibility of the slave’s authorship.
Gannett’s argument that personal narratives (especially in jour-
nals and diaries) are, by their very nature, empowering requires
more discussion. I tend to agree more with bell hooks (1989) that
diaries and the personal stories in them have the potential to serve
as another silent place where women, especially young girls, are
“holding and hiding speech” (7) that does not necessarily empower
them so much as it maintains their silence and their status as “seen
but not heard.” Indeed, what makes a story empowering is not
always the story itself or the nature of narratives, but the changing
culture around the narrative that changes how those narratives are
perceived.
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5. Taylor’s journal, excerpted in Royster and Taylor’s article, serves as
an interesting illustration of the connection between our literary
training and our desire to tell stories. Most of Taylor’s headings for
her journal entries/stories were framed with literary references:
“September 25: Great Expectations,” “September 29: The
Outsiders,” “Late October: Invisible Man,” “The Grapes of Rap,”
and “Final Portfolios: Grim Fairy Tales,” to name a few.
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4 F R O M  E P I S T E M O L O G Y  T O
E P I S T E M I C  J U S T I F I C AT I O N
Toward a Contextualist Research Paradigm
I know that nothing pleases an academic more than a
defense of the indefensible, an affirmation of the value and
truth of what all had come to agree was worthless and false.
James L. Battersby, 1996
As rhetoricians, we have a long history of debate and verbal banter-
ing. From Plato’s attack on Gorgias, to Aristotle’s criticism of contem-
porary handbooks, to Ramus’s arguments against Quintilian, to the
nineteenth-century “art vs. science” debate, to our own time in which
we debate the kinds of knowledge we value and the kinds of research
we should conduct, the very foundations of what we believe is accu-
rate in our field have seemed to shift rapidly from the start. How we
see those foundations, however, how we frame our debates, both past
and present, is at issue here. On the one hand, diversity within our
field is necessary: diverse theories and scholars work for and against
each other in a way that is necessary for our field to enrich our knowl-
edge, to gain a respectable place among scholars in other fields, and to
invite new scholarship of the future. On the other hand, especially
regarding research methods in our field, we seem to adopt an oppo-
site view: our field is simply divided by different ways of knowing,
and we argue which ways are better and which are worse. This latter
approach has fueled our debates about research practices in our field,
highlighting a perceived incompatibility among them.
In order to progress beyond such divisions in the future, we must
first understand why they are false, harmful, simplistic, and limiting.
So far, for example, several scholars under review here have seen a cer-
tain “truth” in narratives and a certain “falsehood” (untrustworthi-
ness) in numbers (e.g., Charney, 1996, p. 582): there is an established
tendency to see information that is mathematical as somehow auto-
matically decontextualized and reductive, while information that is
story-like is seen as somehow able to capture context naturally and
automatically in a narrative. The quest for context and our sensitivity
to it has advanced our preference for the narrative, a form that we
claim has the power to reveal the full complexities of the contexts in
which we teach and conduct research—contexts in which we have dia-
logue, feelings, and problems to solve.
In spite of our tendency to believe that narrative forms capture
context better than numbers do—or that narratives are contextual-
ized by their very nature—we must understand that “context” and
“narrative” are not synonymous.1 While numbers might give us only
some information, we must reframe our praise for the narrative with
the understanding that narratives, too, give us only some informa-
tion.2 And, depending on context, the kind of information we seek
must vary: when stories are readily available and are informative (or,
perhaps, are all we have), we should, of course, share them; when
numbers are easily obtained and are informative, we should share
them, too (and share them completely and, certainly, without apol-
ogy). To argue instead that narratives, anecdotes, and stories are
always more true than numbers, that numbers are always for some
reason out of context and narratives are not, that it is always appro-
priate to share a researcher’s personal voice ignores the very thing to
which we claim to be rhetorically most sensitive: context.
Instead of discussing our research with a sensitivity to the contexts
from which our work emerges, we have developed a sensitivity to a
more simplistic element: form. The narratives we share and the num-
bers we show are products of inquiry that emerged from some natural
process, a context in which we had the desire to know something.
When we argue, as we have been, that some forms of research products
are more welcome, more interesting, more “true” than others, we
ignore the full contexts of research that would naturally produce
other valid forms or, especially, contexts that would naturally produce
a mix of forms.
When we publish our research in traditional scientific-looking
forms, the process of that research often seems to be hidden—never
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ignored, but assumed to be understood by the trained eye—and is,
therefore, misunderstood by the untrained eyes of our field. The nar-
rative form, in contrast, is readily understood—literary training has
enabled us to easily grasp it, relate to it, and extend its meaning. In
other words, we forget our own advice that the process of learning
and process of writing cannot always be seen in the product alone. As
teachers of writing, we are trained, and continue to train ourselves, to
look at products from our students as clues to their processes, know-
ing the process is there and how to look for it. As researchers of writ-
ing, we do not look at our research with nearly as much care—or with
as much sensitivity to context as we claim to have.
A greater sensitivity and attention to form has instead produced a
body of scholarship in composition that defends our preferences for
certain forms. Theories of knowledge, as we have come to frame them
in our field, have been artificially divided as much by form as by
“thinking”—a division that also ignores the varied contexts in which
we learn and know. Worse, we sometimes argue that some theories of
knowledge, or epistemologies, are sensitive to context while others are
not. The context (usually ideological) in which such arguments are
made, however, is often ignored.
Because our response to quantitative research methods has been,
in part, emotionally and politically driven(as argued in the last chap-
ter), the epistemological arguments we make to defend and to theo-
rize our positions often leap widely from the local to the global. On a
daily basis, we don’t live at an epistemological level; we live in the
immediate, emotional, political, social world of things we like or are
good at (such as form) or things we need to get done at the present
moment—that is, for academia, our teaching, researching, and pub-
lishing. We construct epistemology abstractly as a means of defending
our world—defending our preferred teaching methods and, espe-
cially, preferred research methods—but we can’t always “get there
from here” without dismissing other worlds, other methods.
As a field of composition, we need to “get there from here” in a
more inclusive manner, but a discussion of only competing episte-
mologies would erroneously make the same leap while maintaining
the artificial dichotomy we have already created. Therefore, the 
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competing epistemologies we have outlined for our field will be
briefly reviewed in this chapter—but only for the purpose of illustrat-
ing the decontextualized arguments they represent. The remainder of
the chapter will present a Contextualist Theory of Epistemic
Justification (Annis, 1978), a theory that allows for what Hobson
(1992) called an “epistemological mix,” a template for rethinking our
research and one that (re)grounds us firmly in the rhetorical princi-
ples that have guided our field from the start and that should always
guide our research questions, whatever they may be—as shown in the
Contextualist Research Paradigm proposed later in this chapter.
Instead of arguing, in other words, about which research method
or which epistemological stance is sensitive to context, we must ask
instead: In what context does that sort of argument make sense? In
what context does such division naturally occur? In what contexts do
divided ways of knowing serve us well? In what contexts in other
areas of our lives do we make such distinctions?3
Divisions among theories of knowledge construct context artifi-
cially, after the fact. As a result, we are often coerced by our own field’s
scholarship now to reject traditional research methods, opting
instead for other methods, regardless of what we want to know,
regardless of how best to come to know it. Simultaneously, we pro-
pose misguided arguments that only certain methods are sensitive to
that same context—contexts we either ignore or construct artificially
after our chosen method is comfortably in place. Inattention to the
contexts in which we construct such arguments, and ultimately
choose one research method over another, has created the unfortu-
nate illusion that the range of research methods available to us some-
how stems from incompatible systems of thought—incompatible
and, therefore, competing epistemologies.
C O M P E T I N G  T H E O R I E S  O F  K N OW L E D G E  I N  C O M P O S I T I O N
Berlin (1987) once noted that 
[R]hetoric refers to a diverse discipline that historically has included a
variety of incompatible systems. . . . [E]very rhetorical system is based on
epistemological assumptions about the nature of reality, the nature of the
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knower, and the rules governing the discovery and communication of the
known. (3-4)
The notion of epistemological assumptions was captured by
Emig’s (1982) articulation of “Inquiry Paradigms,” in which she
asserted the need for five elements in such a paradigm:
1) a governing gaze; 2) an acknowledged, or at least conscious, set of
assumptions, preferably connected with 3) a coherent theory or theories;
4) an allegiance to an explicit or at least a tacit intellectual tradition; and
5) an adequate methodology including an indigenous logic consonant
with all of the above. (65)
In Emig’s words, “there can be no more than three governing
gazes, so it is easy and almost inevitable to regard most of us as one of
three kinds of gazers: positivistic, phenomenological, or transac-
tional/constructivist” (65) (see Figure 4.1). In other words, as Emig
defined a governing gaze—“a steady way of perceiving actuality”
(65)—there can be no more than three, there can be no overlap
among the three she has outlined, we can adopt only one of them, as
the three are clearly incompatible with each other. For Emig, the most
“diametrically different,” and “most fundamentally opposed” (65)
were the positivist and phenomenological governing gazes: the posi-
tivist focusing on phenomenon stripped of context and ignoring
individual interpretation, and the phenomenological focusing on
context and the perspective of the individual who is perceiving the
phenomenon.
Emig connected the phenomenological gaze, as others have, to
Polanyi’s (1964) concept of “personal knowledge,” a concept Emig
praised as “steadily useful” (67). Kerlinger (1986), too, found Polanyi’s
concept of personal knowledge to be useful, though as a behavioral
scientist, in a different way. Borrowing Polanyi’s phrase, “passionate
commitment,” Kerlinger outlined the role of personal knowledge for
the scientist (those often accused of the narrow, useless governing
gaze of positivism). Though the following passage from Kerlinger is
quite long, it is this very passage—the first page of his Preface to the
third edition of Foundations of Behavioral Research—that helped me
F r o m  E p i s t e m o l o g y  t o  E p i s t e m i c  J u s t i f i c a t i o n 91
begin to rethink our own debates about how we conduct research in
our own field—a rethinking that, in part, inspired and formed the
context for this work.
Some activities command more interest, devotion, and enthusiasm
than do others. So it seems to be with science and with art. . . . It seems a far
cry from science to art. But in one respect at least they are similar: we make
passionate commitments [Kerlinger cited this phrase as Polanyi’s] to them.
This is a book on scientific behavioral research. Above everything else,
it aims to convey the exciting quality of research in general, and in the
behavioral sciences and education in particular. A large portion of the
book is focused on abstract conceptual and technical matters, but behind
the discussion is the conviction that research is a deeply absorbing and
vitally interesting business.
It may seem strange in a book on research that I talk about interest,
enthusiasm, and passionate commitment. Shouldn’t we be objective?
Shouldn’t we develop a hardheaded attitude toward psychological, socio-
logical, and educational phenomena? Yes, of course. But more important
is somehow to catch the essential quality of the excitement of discovery
that comes from research well done. Then the difficulties and frustrations
of the research enterprise, while they never vanish, are much less signifi-
cant. What I am trying to say is that strong subjective involvement is a
powerful motivator for acquiring an objective approach to the study of
phenomena. It is doubtful that any significant work is ever done without
great personal involvement. (vii)
In contrast to the many in composition who see the subjective and
the objective as fundamentally opposed to one another, Kerlinger
invited his students, readers of his text, to bring their own personal
commitment to their reading and offered two pieces of advice: First,
“I would encourage students to discuss, argue, debate, and even fight
about research. Take a stand. Be opinionated” (viii). This is the part
that composition has done quite frequently, though not in the context
of Kerlinger’s second piece of advice: “Later try to soften the opinion-
ation into intelligent conviction and controlled emotional commit-
ment” (viii). In the end, for Kerlinger, “It is doubtful that students can
learn much about science, research design, and research methods
without considerable personal involvement” (vii-viii).
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Such emotional commitment and personal involvement, for Emig
and others in composition, are often perceived as absent in what we
have framed as “objectivist” or “positivist” epistemology—a percep-
tion that has fueled our passionate defense of the personal as more
valuable than the scientific. Such a perception has narrowed, espe-
cially recently, our potential channels of scholarship: in the current
climate of composition research, the personal commitment that
brings us to our research must result in an equally personal
text/product. Often citing critics of science (as Emig did), rather than
scientists (such as Kerlinger), we have latched onto that criticism of
science before we have firmly grasped what science is,4 what a scien-
tific method is.5 Thus, what Emig called governing gazes and what
others have called epistemologies remain artificially contrasted,
divided, and separate in our field.
Berlin, especially, outlined a simplified division among epistemo-
logical assumptions in our field—three theories of rhetoric (see
Figure 4.1): objective theories based on a positivistic epistemology
that locates truth in the external, measureable world; subjective
theories based on truth residing within the individual, a notion elo-
quently captured by writers such as Emerson and Thoreau; and
transactional theories based on the assumption that truth arises from
the “interaction of the elements of the rhetorical situation” (7-17),
the basis for current theories regarding the social construction of
knowledge.
Berlin outlined three kinds of transactional theories: the cognitive
and the classical, which, Berlin argued, virtually ignore the role of
language; and the epistemic, which involves language “in every
instance of its manifestation” (16). We could rebut Berlin’s assertion
that language was not significant in the classical tradition or the cog-
nitivist (16), and we should have difficulty with his use of “truth.”
Gradin (1995), for example, found Berlin’s simplification of episte-
mological stances in our field troublesome, and, frankly, I’ve always
been confused that some epistemologies are “epistemic” and others
are not. This classification, however, has provided language and
frameworks that we have used to solidify the divisions within our
field ever since.
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Lunsford (1991), for example, went on to identify three kinds of
writing centers (see Figure 4.1): the garret center (expressivist)
where writers go to think individually and be inspired, the store-
house writing center (objectivist) where writers get information on
rules and so on, and the collaborative center—a center based on a
social-constructionist point of view and a center that Lunsford
argued was best.6 Murphy and Sherwood (1995) applied a similar
three-paradigm model for writing centers in their Preface to The St.
Martin’s Sourcebook for Writing Tutors. While Murphy and Sherwood
argued that “tutorials are rarely, if ever, exclusively the product of
any one paradigm” (4), they point out limitations and criticism of
only two of them—the current-traditional/objectivist and the
expressivist—while upholding the social-constructionist as “domi-
nant” (3), pointing out the strengths of only this model.
Using a collaborative/social-constructionist model, Murphy and
Sherwood articulated four “principal ideas” governing the rest of
their text and, generally, the tutors’ role: 1) tutoring is contextual, 2)
tutoring is collaborative, 3) tutoring is interpersonal, 4) tutoring is
individualized (1). Of course, all tutoring is contextual, but the last
three principal ideas decontextualize the tutor’s role: not all tutoring
is automatically collaborative when direct instruction is sometimes
necessary, online tutoring has brought into question our definitions
of “interpersonal,” and small-group and in-class tutoring creates
contexts in which tutoring might not be individualized.
Unfortunately, only the first principal idea can be supported, and in
the context of the first, the other three cannot, because they ignore
the first—context. Construction of these principal ideas was based
on the dominant social-constructionist model of rhetoric, ignoring
other theories.
Such divisions among theories of rhetoric have been of concern to
some in the field. Gradin (1995), for instance, argued that Berlin’s
three-part division for theories of rhetoric was too simplistic (see also
O’Donnell, 1996). Of concern to Gradin, however, was the separation
between expressivist and social theories, two stances she combined in
Romancing Rhetorics. Gradin offered a new look at romantic rhetoric
through which “we can continue to embrace social theories while
94 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
retaining what is most valuable about expressivist doctrine” (165), an
argument that rests on the field’s current acceptance of social theo-
ries. Of the three-part division that Berlin offered, Gradin, here,
sought to join only the transactional and the expressivist. Evidently,
the objectivist is dead and buried.
L I M I TAT I O N S  O F  T H E  C O M P E T I T I V E  E P I S T E M O LO G I C A L
F R A M E WO R K  
Such artificial divisions among theories of knowledge have led to
the artificial dichotomy we have perpetuated in our research. When
debating the merits of qualitative and quantitative methods, we con-
nect that debate to competing epistemologies, as our field has out-
lined them (Figure 4.1), in order to defend our preferences.
Such competitive theories of knowing, however, are stripped from
the context of the need to know and are, therefore, false lenses through
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which we attempt to define our research, accepting in the process only
limited parts of what it means to know something fully. How we see
our research has suffered from this self-imposed near-sightedness—a
near-sightedness that threatens to move our research even further
from the contexts of other work in our field, such as our teaching.
For all of our attempts to construct such competitive theories of
knowing, after all, composition teachers and tutors are already keenly
aware that elements of all of them, in spite of the competitive nature
we have assigned to them, are at work in our field at every moment.
Any writing teacher who takes attendance, gives grades, and teaches
students how to correct grammatical or structural errors works in the
so-called outer, measurable, objective world. Any teacher who has
individual conferences with students, small-group work in the class-
room, or interaction with a writing center, operates on transactional
theories. The same writing teacher who incorporates journals,
freewriting, and expressive assignments allows for the subjective to
work, too. And when students attend writing centers, the best tutors
will know that sometimes students need dialogue to generate ideas,
sometimes they need to vent or “talk out” an idea, and sometimes
they need direct instruction on writing skills that can’t be coaxed into
their minds through questions or discussion.
On a day-to-day basis, experienced and successful teachers and
tutors do not flail about when all of these “competing” elements enter
our teaching, our offices, our writing centers, our classrooms—as
they so regularly do. On the pages of our scholarship, however, pages
on which we construct our theories and present our research, we
divide these same elements and defend our stances passionately, as if
the elements have nothing to do with each other. Appropriately,
Connors (1983) specified our research rather than our teaching when
he noted, “as a research discipline, we tend to flail about” (10).
Especially for those who advocate qualitative research on the
grounds that quantitative methods/researchers ignore context, the
decontextualized three-part epistemological structure of our field
must be revised and recontextualized. (It should also be blamed in
large part for the flailing about that currently plagues us.) To 
construct competing theories of knowing, as we see them operating
96 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
in our research, does no more than suggest that we are incapable of
embracing all ways of knowing, and that we refuse to acknowledge
the truth of our field: we live in all worlds, in all modes of knowing,
but we are trained to understand only some, unable to discuss the
“other,” and unwilling to see the narrow channels of scholarship we
have imposed upon ourselves.
And what, ultimately, are we saying about ourselves when we con-
struct such arguments? Consider, for example, arguments that sup-
port socially-constructed models of knowing because they are more
collaborative (feminine) than competitive (masculine): these argu-
ments are also based, directly or indirectly, on a competitive (mascu-
line?) model of epistemological difference (after all, “collaborative vs.
competitive” is, in itself, a competitive way of thinking). Indeed, we
embrace one epistemological stance by acting through another.
Further, our distrust of numbers—or our misunderstanding of
them and our own poor training in how to use them—has led us to
distrust the researchers who use them as well. I agree with Charney
(1996, p. 583) that we have fallen into a most destructive and inaccu-
rate view of quantitative researchers: if the traditional researcher
focuses the context of an experiment in such a way that does not
reveal the “gut feelings” that led to the study, does not articulate the
full process and trials and tribulations of that research, and does not
share emotion, that researcher will be criticized not so much for not
sharing it, but for not having that process at all. Add to that our anxiety
about statistics that inhibits our understanding of that text, that
makes our “eyes glaze over,” and we fall victim to another all-too-
human phenomenon: to blame the “other” for what we cannot
understand: It is wrong to use numbers (because I don’t like reading
them, and I’ve never understood them); it is wrong to use an experi-
ment (because I’ve never conducted one myself).
In the context of our experiment at the bowling alley, we are
motivated by your personal belief that your red bowling ball is
lucky. Luck, of course, has much to do with “chance,” so it is
only fair (and necessary) to determine mathematically the
extent to which the data we have gathered are due to only
F r o m  E p i s t e m o l o g y  t o  E p i s t e m i c  J u s t i f i c a t i o n 97
chance. We have noticed differences in the average scores for
each color (green=6.0, red=7.0, and purple=8.0). By eyeballing
these means, remember, we could guess that the purple ball is
actually “luckiest,” but we also remember that individual scores
within each color group varied, too. Chance, then, could be
operating in two places: between colors (each color achieved a
different mean), and within colors (the 6 scores within each
group were not consistent). To determine the extent to which
the color differences are not due to chance, we can determine
the ratio of the two places where variation occurs: between col-
ors and within colors. 
This is what an Analysis of Variance (or ANOVA) does. Stay
tuned and relax. 
Our anxieties about numbers, experiments, and the statistical
analyses they require have moved our field to construct epistemo-
logical stances abstractly, as a means of defending our own anxieties,
our inadequacies, our lack of training—epistemological stances from
which we attack “the other”—in an uncomfortable contact zone
(Pratt, 1991) in which two cultures (Snow, 1965) collide, miscommu-
nicate, and remain by our own contention irreconcilably different.
Perhaps epistemology does not “construct us” as strongly as we sug-
gest, at least as such inquiry appears on the pages of our scholarship:
after all, we were researchers and teachers long before epistemological
inquiry appeared in that scholarship. We constructed it. If we created
these false divisions and a false theoretical security through our epis-
temological inquiry, we, too, can change it.
Though we have successfully broadened the scope of our research
potential to include more than the older tradition of the quantitative,
we swing too far, dismissing the value of that tradition for reasons
that do not serve any of our research endeavors well, whatever the
contexts might be.
For simplicity here, let’s look at only the red ball and the pur-
ple ball. Of course, your red ball was the reason for this experi-
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ment, but the purple ball scored a higher average. To see if the
difference between the purple score and the red score was due
to chance, we need to determine three kinds of variation
among the scores achieved by each ball: 
1. What is the total amount of variation in the study? 
2. Of that total amount of variation, how much of that varia-
tion can be explained by a difference in color (the variation
that occurred between the color groups)? 
3. Of the total amount of variation, how much cannot be
explained by a difference in color (the variation that
occurred within each group)?
This mathematical procedure will look similar to the
procedure for the standard deviation described in chapter three.
First, let’s review the raw scores and the group averages
we’re looking at:














To determine how much variation was due to differences in
color and how much was due to differences in individual
trials/scores, we first need to calculate the total units of
variation and then we’ll determine how many of those units
were due to the color of the ball and how many were due to dif-
ferences in individual scores within each color group.
To do this, we’ll first need to calculate the grand mean, the
mean for all scores in this red/purple comparison, by adding
all 12 scores and dividing by 12: the grand mean (or M) is
90/12 = 7.5.
Now we return to the three places where we determine how
many units of variation we have: 
1. the total units of variation will be determined by subtract-
ing the grand mean (M) from each raw score in the study
(Y), or: Y-M.
2. the units of variation due to group differences (between
colors) will be determined by subtracting the grand mean





3. the units of variation due to individual differences (within
groups) will be determined by subtracting the group mean
(Y
_
g) from each individual score (Y), or: Y-Y
_
g.
This process determines components of differences,
allowing us to look at each different score in different ways. To
look at these individual scores in the overall study, however,
we’ll need to compute in a similar fashion the components of
sums of squares.
This computation is similar to the procedure for computing
the standard deviation. We’ll need to square each difference
we find through subtracting and then sum (∑) those squares.
Our overall formula for Components of Sums of Squares
looks like this: total variation = variation between groups + vari-





The chart below will help clear up confusion. We’ll subtract
as outlined above, but remember from computing the standard
deviation: if we add up all the results of our subtraction, we’ll
always have zero (because we’re subtracting using the mean,
and it makes sense that the mean will have an equal amount
above and below it). Therefore, we’ll square each result like we
did for the standard deviation. Our computations for total units
of variation (Y-M) will look like this:
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You can practice your own computations to determine how
much of this total variation (35.0) is explained by differences
between colors (Y
_
g-M, and then square the difference) and
how much cannot be explained because it’s due to differences
among individual scores within groups (Y-Y
_
g, and then square
the difference).
I’ll give you the answers: the units of variation explained by
difference in color is 3.0. That is, of the 35.0 units of total varia-
tion, 32.0 cannot be explained by difference in color because
they were due to differences within colors. Does that mean
your results are not statistically significant—due merely to
chance and not differences between colors? Stay tuned for the
significance testing and find out.
THEORIES OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION: META-EPISTEMOLOGY
All epistemological inquiry, of course, focuses on the nature of
knowledge, how we go about finding or creating it, how and where
it exists in the first place, and what can even be known. Alston
(1989), however, distinguished between epistemology and epistemic
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TABLE 4.2
Y-M (Y-M)2












Total Units of Variation 35.00
justification, asserting that there “is a distinction between what we
may term substantive epistemology and meta-epistemology”:
Meta-epistemology is concerned with the basic concepts we employ in
epistemology, concepts of knowledge, truth, belief, justification, rationality,
and so on, and with the methods, procedures, and criteria to be employed
in determining how to apply those concepts. Substantive epistemology, on
the other hand, consists in our endeavors to use these concepts to arrive at
results on such matters as the conditions under which we have knowledge
or justified belief of one kind or another, and on what knowledge or justi-
fied belief we have. (1-2)
In other words, a meta-epistemology focuses on all of the parts
that are at work in an operating epistemology and conducts analyses
of how those parts work and definitions of the terms we need to dis-
cuss epistemology. Substantive epistemology puts those parts in
motion (in practice, so to speak) and prepares us to share our beliefs
and knowledge with others. Alston’s book, Epistemic Justification,
then, focused on meta-epistemology through an analysis of epistemic
justification theories, a look at all “the parts” of our justification for
beliefs or knowledge and how those parts work.7
Theories of epistemic justification, when properly understood,
will aid a researcher’s understanding of a research process grounded
not so much in competing epistemologies, but in an epistemological
dynamic that allows us to find the best available means of knowing at
a given time, in a given place. Alston explored the nature of justifi-
cation as both (and necessarily) objective and subjective. The notion
of justification, especially epistemic justification, is, on the one hand,
subjective and personal:
What confers justification must be “internal” to the subject that she
has a specially direct cognitive access to it. It must consist of something
like a belief or an experience, something that the subject can typically spot
just by turning her attention to the matter. (4-5)
At the same time, epistemic justification involves and seeks the
objective, the external world we hope to justify, to know, or to believe:
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We typically turn our attention to justification and the like when we
fall prey to doubts about the possibility of knowledge, about our capacity
to get beyond our own thoughts and experiences to the real objective
truth about the world outside our minds. . . . For nothing else would lend
a belief some rational credibility when we are radically questioning our
access to anything beyond our own consciousness. (5-6)
Alston warned against seeing only the “internal,” personal view
here as the driving epistemic force in our inquiry. The interplay
between the subjective and objective—the interplay between our own
doubts, our own experience, and our world—moves us beyond an
“egocentric position” (6).
Our development as researchers who are able and willing to pur-
sue the wide range of research questions we naturally encounter
requires a movement beyond an egocentric epistemological state.
Though our work is often personal, individualized, and based on
experience, the natural interplay of both quantitative and qualitative
is necessary for full epistemic justification of our beliefs. We composi-
tion scholars, then, could learn much from Annis’s (1978)
“Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.”
Annis’s theory focuses on three “parts” of epistemology in particu-
lar—three parts that, for composition scholars, will look remarkably
familiar. Our field has divided itself by competing epistemologies
(objectivist, subjectivist/expressivist, and transactional/social-con-
structivist), but these, for Annis, are not competing substantive epis-
temologies so much as they are the necessary “parts” that comprise
his theory of epistemic justification based on what Annis called an
“issue-context,” as shown in Figure 4.2: 1) the belief sought to be jus-
tified, 2) an appropriate objector group, and 3) a believer’s level of
understanding.
Annis’s contextualist theory shifts our attention from specific sub-
stantive epistemology to a meta-epistemology by asking us to attend
more seriously to context and to examine more fully the “parts” that
exist in that context before we put them in motion. Instead of argu-
ing, for example, that qualitative or quantitative research methods are
best, that one kind of research is natural or another unnatural, or that
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all research must include student and researcher voices, a
Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification draws us to an analy-
sis of context: what do I want to know? why do I need to know it? how
can I frame my question in a way it can be answered? and so on.
Such a framework offers a meta-epistemological reflection before
the “parts” of the epistemology are put in motion through research—a
reflection that might produce surprising answers for those who favor
one kind of research method over another, and a reflection necessary
for serious inquiry: Annis’s theory rightly assumes, as we should
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Necessary components for epistemic justification,
not competing elements of epistemology
assume in our field as well, that those who engage in inquiry through
research are “critical truth seekers” (281), not merely defenders of their
own preferences, ideologies, or writing styles.
The issue-context is contextually- and socially-driven, based on
the “actual social practices and norms of justification of a culture or
community of people” (282). Because composition studies has
become a multidisciplinary endeavor, we have access to numerous
cultures and communities, including the scientific. If, for example, I
believe that using red ink on my students’ papers will cause a negative
feeling in my students (a believer’s level of understanding), and if
other writing teachers around me (an appropriate objector group)
believe the same, we agree enough to accept the belief that red ink is
“bad.” However, if I remember that as a student, I never experienced a
negative feeling toward red ink when my own teachers used it, I
might begin to doubt the belief our group holds and construct a new
belief of my own. I might strengthen that belief by using red ink on
my students’ papers and then informally asking them for their reac-
tions to it. If the objector group, my colleagues, wish to maintain their
belief and reject my new belief, I am now in a position to test or to
experiment on my new belief in a way that will either support or
refute the objector group. In a final report of this actual study (in
chapter six), I will illustrate those rhetorical decisions about events,
experience, and data—decisions guided by the context of both process
and product.
The Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification is grounded in
the assertion that all justification of beliefs is a social act. In a social
act, we always have 1) individuals with their own individual experi-
ences and beliefs, 2) other people around the individual who may
object to or accept the individual’s belief, and 3) issue-related facts,
data, demonstrations, and observations that will help refute or con-
firm both the individual’s belief and the group’s beliefs. Because justi-
fication is a social act, the contexts in which it occurs will vary and, in
contrast to how some composition scholars have defined a “social
act,” some contexts naturally include numerical data or the need to
understand probability. Annis outlined an example of a drug being
tested to see if it would cure a disease without causing harmful
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effects. If researchers are testing the drug’s effect on animals, their
concern for adequate proof will not be as high as it would be if they
were testing the drug’s effect on humans, so the researcher might
require a more stringent significance level in statistically testing the
outcome (282). Here, Annis showed the effect that context has on
how we analyze data for statistical significance.
For our own test of statistical significance, we return to the
units of variation explained by color difference (3.0) and the
units of variation not explained by color difference (i.e.,
Variation due to individual differences in scores within color
groups) (32.0). Getting the ratio of explained variation to
unexplained variation is what we do when we get an F-ratio.
But first, we have to take into account the “size” of the two
places where variation occurred. Variation between color
groups occurred only between 2 colors. Variation within color
groups occurred among 12 individual scores. It seems unfair,
in a sense, to compare 2 things to 12, so we’ll have to factor in
the size of these comparisons through something we call
degrees of freedom.
The easiest way to explain degrees of freedom is to play a
game: If I tell you that a set of 6 scores must add up to 42, and
then ask you to randomly start listing those 6 numbers as you
wish, you will have 5 numbers that could be anything. Once
those 5 are filled in, however, the 6th will have to be the number
that makes all 6 add up to 42. Let’s say you pick 4, 5, 6, 7, and
8 as your first five numbers. The 6th number must be 12 in
order for all 6 to equal 42. In other words, that last number has
no degree of freedom for you to choose what you want. What
you had, however, was 5 degrees of freedom or N-1.
Since we only had two color groups, the degrees of freedom
are easy to figure out. N-1 (where N is the number of groups) is
2-1, which is 1. For the 12 scores, however, each set of 6 was
in its own group. The 6 red scores had to add up to 42, and the
6 purple scores had to add up to 48. That would leave you with
5 degrees of freedom for each group, or N-k, where N equals
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the number of scores, and k equals the number of groups 
(N-k = 12-2 = 10).
Before we get the ratio of between-group differences to
within-group differences, then, we’ll “even out” the size of those
groups by dividing by their degrees of freedom:
In most statistics handbooks, we’ll find an “F table,” or a
table of values where we can find our own F ratio by the
degrees of freedom in both the numerator and the
denominator in the above equation. An F table looks like a
grid, listing degrees of freedom for the numerator (1, in our
case) across the top, and degrees of freedom for the
denominator (10, in our case) down the side. Like using a
map, we find our degrees of freedom and use them like
coordinates to look for the critical value required for our F ratio
to be statistically significant.
But before we look up our own F value to determine its
statistical significance, we have to decide at what level are we
willing to accept some error? The F table will give us different
critical values for an F ratio having 1 degree of freedom in the
numerator and 10 in the denominator, based on levels of
probability: Once out of a hundred (.01)? Five times out of a
hundred (.05)? Only once in a thousand (.001)? 
The standard level of acceptance for statistical significance
(especially in the context of a study as harmless as ours) is five
times out of a hundred or .05. If we find our F value to be
significant at the .05 level, we can confidently say that the
probability with which our results were due merely to chance is
less than 5 times out of 100.
According to the ratios presented in the F table, if we have 1
degree of freedom in the numerator and 10 degrees of
freedom in the denominator, our F value needs to be at least
4.96 to be significant at the .05 level. Our F value is .9375. 




While the purple ball achieved the highest average in our
study, you can at least argue that such a result could be due
merely to chance. At the same time, however, we need to
return to the null hypothesis here: there is no difference in
scores bowled by different colors. At this point, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis. This suggests, based on the data we
collected and analyzed, that we have no reason to believe that
one color is luckier than another. 
A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification reframes our
current view of epistemology-in-competition and constructs instead
an epistemological dynamic that emerges naturally from the need to
know, from a question arising from a particular context that will, if
we examine context fully, lead to the best research method(s) avail-
able for answering that question at that moment. If we view our
research from this template rather than from one of competing epi-
stemologies, we construct much more than a mere “gray area,” a
“happy medium” on which we might agree philosophically but con-
tinue our debates practically. In the past, others have attempted to
achieve such agreement, but strong division among our researchers,
dichotomous language that traps us into “camps,” and a focus on
method rather than context has kept us frozen and separate in the
same attempts to bring us together.
T H E  P O T E N T I A L  O F  R E - C O N T E X T UA L I Z I N G  O U R  
E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L  F R A M E WO R K
North, in 1987, proposed methodological egalitarianism: the “I’m
OK, you’re OK” approach to methodological diversity in our field.
Practitioners are OK, historians are OK, clinicians are OK. To draw an
analogy, imagine an integrated neighborhood of mixed race, one in
which no one really interacts. You do your thing, and I’ll do mine, and
as long as we don’t cross boundaries, we can live happily in our neigh-
borhood. In 1992, Kirsch called for methodological pluralism, a call
for the children of this neighborhood to play together. After all, they
can learn much from each other, share culture and language and 
values—if only we encourage them to try. But as long as the adults in
108 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
this neighborhood make the public rules, provide the language, and
teach the values, these children might not play together well, might
not play together willingly, and might not play together for very long.
Contextualized epistemological pluralism asks that the adults in
this neighborhood be willing to play together, too—finding common
ground, understanding the wealth of knowledge we have when we
put that whole puzzle together, recognizing the contexts in which we
naturally share common goals, and changing language to reflect that
new value. We must first understand that, though we appear to be dif-
ferent, it is that very difference that makes us necessary to each other
when we desire to fully examine the contexts in which we
work/play/learn—a difference that gives us something to offer each
other. After all, if we were all the same, what could we possibly learn
when we explore our questions?
A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification forces us to
focus not on numbers vs. narratives, but on the questions that moti-
vate us to learn in the first place. A template such as this grounds us in
the things we most value as scholars of rhetoric: context, questions,
knowledge, and a mix of cultures—and the active quest they set in
motion. Much as we teach our students to ask critical questions, to
examine all possible points of view, and to find as many sources that
help them get to the bottom of their own inquiry, a contextualist the-
ory will help us do the same, will help us practice what we preach,
and will ground us again in the rhetorical tradition that shaped the
context for our field in the first place.
One final note before we leave the bowling alley (and, yes,
we are now leaving). This should not be the only study on which
you base firm conclusions. Surely, the results of this study are
worth sharing and thinking about, but don’t forget the context in
which this was done: at only one bowling alley, for only one
bowler, with only three colors, and with only 6 trials per ball. The
fascinating thing about experiments like this is their sensitivity to
context: what will happen when we play with that?
And a personal note: I hate bowling! I am far from being a
bowler or a bowling fan, but I know a good research question
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when I see one; my feelings about bowling don’t keep me from
asking those questions. I hope the same is true for anyone
doing research in our field, as well.
E P I S T E M I C  J U S T I F I C AT I O N  A S  R H E T O R I C :
D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G  I N  C O N T E X T  
Though Annis never framed his theory as Aristotelian in nature, he
could have easily done so (and, perhaps, he should have). For compo-
sition scholars, Annis’s theory is composed of elements in a rhetorical
dynamic similar to what we have come to call the communications tri-
angle, a dynamic inherent in Aristotelian rhetoric.8 Scholars such as
Booth (1963) and Kinneavy (1971) have examined the three-part
rhetorical foundation that most of us teach our students in some fash-
ion. How many of us encourage students to examine 1) their persona
as a writer in relation to 2) their subject/issue and available informa-
tion/data related to their subject and 3) their intended audience, all in
the rich context of having a purpose or of having a question to
explore? How often do our textbooks and our classrooms explore 1)
the ethical appeal, 2) the emotional appeal, and 3) the logical appeal,
each corresponding to those familiar elements: the writer, the audi-
ence, the subject, supported by adequate facts/data/information? 
We discourage students’ use of purely emotional appeals, calling
on them to ground that appeal in solid examples, data, statistics, facts.
Aristotle argued, “it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into
anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straight-
edge rule crooked before using it” ([1354a], p. 30). Our own scholar-
ship, however, has been guilty of the opposite: we have fallen into an
odd, imbalanced rhetorical stance that comes from the stories we tell,
stories that appeal heavily to audience emotions but stories that are
also uniquely personal to the writer, to which an audience may or
may not relate.9 Annis’s exploration of the three-part theory of epis-
temic justification is remarkably similar to Booth’s (1963) explo-
ration of why we teach those three parts of rhetoric—together—not
to exploit only one or two parts of this human system, but to achieve
a natural balance as dictated by context: “the habit of seeking this bal-
ance is not the only thing we have to teach under the heading of
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rhetoric. But I think that everything worth teaching under that head-
ing finds its justification finally in that balance” (145).
A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification not only retrains
us to seek that same balance in our research, but also grounds us
again in a rhetorical tradition in which such a balance was not only
sought, but also was the honest thing to do—an honesty and code of
ethics explored not only by Aristotle, but by others who followed
him, rhetoricians such as Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine, as
well as a few scholars of our own time. To balance our justification of
knowledge in composition research, we must understand where and
how the rhetorical issues and the research issues in which we conduct
our inquiry intersect.
A  C O N T E X T UA L I S T  R E S E A R C H  PA R A D I G M  
In an effort, then, to bypass the dispute between numbers and nar-
ratives, we must return to the notion of context and revise our view of
divided epistemologies. Numbers as well as narratives naturally occur
in most contexts. A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification is
a useful template on which to base a new inclusive paradigm, helping
us to decide on research methods for a particular project based not
on politics or on personal preferences, but on the contexts in which
our research questions arise.
Numerous forces shape our research questions and decisions.
Those decisions are guided by the contexts in which we work, contexts
in which must ask several questions and solve several problems—
about method, form, ourselves, our audience, and our evidence.
Figure 4.3 presents a Contextualist Research Paradigm for Rhetoric
and Composition—a matrix that shows the intersection of the rhetor-
ical issues and the research issues that form varied research contexts.
Our use of this matrix should be guided by three simple principles.
1. There are no predetermined answers for any of the questions in the
matrix. Researchers must answer these questions in the specific con-
texts of their own research.
2. Each cell in the matrix, though focused on a particular kind of ques-
tion, cannot be explored without the others. In other words, no ques-
tion in any cell can be asked and answered without all of the others
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being asked and answered as well. Such is the relationship of evidence,
method, form, writers, and audience—dependent on each other.
3. The questions presented in the matrix do not have to be asked in any
particular order, as all research could potentially have any starting
point, depending on individual contexts.
The questions I’ve placed in each cell of the matrix are general
enough to be asked by any researcher. Specific answers and further
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What types of readers or
listeners will value this
study (students, teachers,
tutors, the field, my
department, myself, funding
sources, administrators,




have driven me to ask this
question? What do I hope to
learn? Why am I curious?
Do any ethical concerns
bother me?
How should I word my
question such that I can
answer it with the resources
available to me? What is the
most accurate portrayal of
my task? Does my question
have ethical problems?
Whom will my research
benefit? How will my
research benefit them?
Where would I “”fit”” in the
available literature?  When I
read related literature, with
what points do I disagree?
Agree?
What evidence will most
fully help me answer this
question? What types of
data should I explore?
How does my audience 
usually discuss this
question? What methods, if
any, could I borrow from
others? Do scholars in my
field call for new methods to
be applied to this question?
Do I have resources, access,
and expertise necessary to
accurately and ethically
explore this question? What
are my strengths and
weaknesses in this project?
How is my research
question different?
What methods and/or 
literature will help me find
and evaluate the data I am
seeking? Which data are
readily available? What
instruments will I need to
borrow/construct?
What is the best form and
language for presenting my
research, given the audience
I envision?
How do I want to be
perceived as a researcher in
the final presentation? What
voice would best enhance
what I’m trying to say?
How do I articulate my 
evidence accurately,
persuasively and ethically?












































questions must be provided in context and will, of course, vary. Each
question, however, ties the researcher specifically to the context of the
initial research question being asked in the specific context from which
the question emerged. Such a matrix, then, keeps us focused on the
issue at hand, rather than letting us become embroiled in arguments
about competing epistemologies, political defenses of research meth-
ods, and an avoidance of quantitative measures that do enhance the
knowledge of our field.
In Alston’s words, a matrix such as this helps us move beyond our
own consciousness, embracing the interplay of the subjective and
objective—an interplay necessary for discovery, for constructing our
identities, and for sharing our discoveries. Such a matrix helps us
break free of our current anxieties and debates about different
research methods so that we are better able to conduct more of the
research we—and our students—need, research that will explore
what we feel is the truth and what we do or do not believe. Aristotle
reminded us, “things related to truth [are greater] than things related
to opinion” ([1365a], p. 74).
In this matrix, we see rhetoric and dialectic unfold in Aristotelian
terms. In his translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Kennedy (1991)
retained the original Greek antistrophos in the first sentence: “Rhetoric
is an antistrophos to dialectic. . . . All people in some way, share in both;
for all, to some extent, try both to test and maintain an argument [as
in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in
rhetoric]” ([1354a], pp. 28-29). While current interpretations of anti-
strophos vary (see Green, 1990), the interplay of rhetoric and dialectic
was, for Aristotle, determined by context: “Let rhetoric be [defined as]
an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of
persuasion” ([1355a], p. 36). The pursuit of any research question,
then, is based on the dynamic interplay between rhetoric and dialectic
and guided by an understanding of contextualist principles.
Phelps (1988), too, applied “contextualist principles” (219) in her
own quest to reconstruct “composition as a ‘discipline,’ a human sci-
ence” (205). Phelps drew heavily from varied theories in an effort to
illustrate the potential of drawing together the eclectic epistemic foun-
dations of our field. For instance, Phelps explored the role science
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plays when testing our experience but also discussed science-as-back-
ground that we fold into our experience. While I agree with much of
Phelps’s exploration—and certainly admire her goals—her own con-
text seems unclear, because the text is purely theoretical.
Though Phelps addressed briefly the notion that teachers often
object to theory (207), her text doesn’t address that objection directly
through concrete examples–an important task in light of her argument
that teaching/praxis should be a central issue in our field. Indeed,
Phelps’s text is far removed from the contexts of our day-to-day teach-
ing and inquiry. Phelps acknowledged that she gave limited attention
to “the fact that students are themselves human subjects in the class-
room and the further complication that they are themselves learning to
reflect via written language” an element seemingly crucial to her argu-
ment. One might argue that Phelps’s reconstruction of composition as
a human science—teaching, praxis, integrating varied forms of knowl-
edge with our practice—cannot succeed outside of the context of what
we most wish to research: our teaching and our students’ learning.
In contrast, a Contextualist Research Paradigm that focuses on
questions (rather than just theory) and that demonstrates how eclec-
tic forms of knowledge could work together in varied contexts (rather
than just theorizing that they could) is able actually to release the
power of the research process and the actions of the researcher within
the specific contexts that produce them.
A P P LY I N G  A  C O N T E X T UA L I S T  R E S E A R C H  PA R A D I G M  
A Contextualist Research Paradigm allows us to see not only the
process of our research, but also the products of that research differ-
ently. A new lens such as this will enable us to see more clearly the
bridges that already exist in the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy.
Quite naturally, narratives and numbers often coexist in some fashion
in most research contexts. If we truly embrace a wide array of
research methods, we will see especially the narrative undercurrent of
traditional-looking studies and begin to understand better why
researchers make the decisions they do, guided by their understand-
ing of the intersecting rhetorical and research issues present in the
context of their work.
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To illustrate the matrix at work, chapter five will re-present Eileen
Oliver’s (1995) study published in RTE, “The Writing Quality of
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Graders, and College Freshmen: Does
Rhetorical Specification in Writing Prompts Make a Difference?”
Inserted throughout the reprint of Oliver’s study are sections of an
online interview in which Oliver articulated the story behind her
study and her reasons for choosing her methods—a description of
decisions made in the context of her desire to answer a research ques-
tion and to share her discovery. To the traditionally trained eye, such
a description will not be a surprise. To those trained only in narrative
methods, however, I hope the presentation of these two texts together
begins to show how a traditional study can also reflect a “thick
description” and—as the matrix illustrates—a natural product of the
research and rhetorical processes at work in a scholarly context.
N O T E S  
1. Consider, for example, Enos’s (1996) Faculty Lives and Gender Roles
in Composition. Enos outlined carefully how she gathered her
demographic data—where the numbers came from, how she gath-
ered them, and what they might mean. In other words, she carefully
articulated the context from which those numbers emerged. In con-
trast, not all of Enos’s narratives were so carefully presented. While
most stories clearly revealed moments of discrimination, several
stories are vague and hard to understand—were out of context—
partly because Enos kept the storytellers and their institutions
anonymous. Enos, in her introduction, remember, argued that nar-
ratives more than numbers tell us who we are (and are more
“true”). However, because her numbers are more consistently con-
textualized, we might find them more “true” than the narratives
sometimes taken out of context.
2. The notion of “partial truths” in narrative was articulated by
Clifford (1986) in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of
Ethnography. Clifford argued that ethnographies are fictions in
“the ways they are systematic and exclusive. Ethnographic writings
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can properly be called fictions in the sense of ‘something made or
fashioned.’ . . . Interpretive social scientists have recently come to
view good ethnographies as ‘true fictions.’ . . . Ethnographic truths
are thus inherently partial” (6-7). Clifford introduced the essays in
Writing Culture by emphasizing their attention to the creation of
form. Something is always excluded from our stories because “one
cannot tell all” (7).
3. In A Mathematician Reads the Newspaper, Paulos (1995) outlined
numerous contexts in which the average American pays attention
to mathematics, including policy-making in the courts, fat grams
in food items, personal finance, presidential polls, and health
reports. In other contexts of our lives, in other words, we make
numbers important.
4. In a review of five books on science, Selzer (1998) noted that only
one of the five, Toumey’s Conjuring Science (1996), “renders sci-
ence as a benign, trustworthy, liberal, liberating, and admirably
self-regulating enterprise that deserves public support” (450). In
contrast to the other four books reviewed, “Toumey takes as his
given that science is a part of culture, and as such is both a product
and producer of it . . . that science is indeed open to humanist
scrutiny” (450). Selzer’s complaint about two other books under
review, Taylor’s Defining Science (1996) and Gates and Shteir’s
Natural Eloquence (1997), revealed our misguided expectations of
scientific inquiry and our attention to form: “there is too little tex-
tual analysis to satisfy someone like me who understands English
studies primarily as the investigation of written discourse” (Selzer,
1998, p. 450).
5. Emig called the scientific method ‘mistakenly named’ (66). Other
scholars have similarly doubted the phrase as well: Shapin (1996),
Phelps (1988), Ray (1992), to name a few.
6. Bushman (1998) articulated a “Social-Expressivist” writing center
based in part on Lunsford’s (1991) three-part division for writing
centers. Though Bushman also cited criticism for such divisions,
such as Hobson’s (1992) examination of epistemological debates in
varied writing center contexts, he defined his terms, as Lunsford
and Berlin did, with three ways of knowing—the transactional,
expressivist, and objectivist. Like Gradin (1995) and O’Donnell
116 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
(1996), Bushman attempted to join only two: the transactional and
expressivist.
7. Alston noted that many theories of epistemic justification are not a
unified set of theoretical explorations. Indeed, Alston pointed to
some epistemic theories’ potential for justifying beliefs even in the
face of that belief being clearly incorrect and to some epistemic
theories that do not allow for intuition or experience on the part of
the knower (3). This, of course, poses a problem for theories of
epistemic justification generally, but Alston’s warning here is one
of common sense or, perhaps, what happens when common sense
is lacking.
8. See especially, On Rhetoric, (1356a): “Of the pisteis provided
through speech there are three species: for some are in the charac-
ter [éthos] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in
some way, and some in the argument [logos] itself, by showing or
seeming to show something.”
9. In spite of the popularity of personal stories and anecdotes in our
research, we must examine those times when stories fail to commu-
nicate. While I was finishing the first draft of this project, for exam-
ple, I had numerous conversations with a friend of mine (who has
given me permission to relate this), a woman approximately my age
who had just started the doctoral program I was then finishing. For
reasons I cannot fully understand, she had felt an overall sense of
powerlessness in her coursework. She had shared stories with me,
trying to give me examples of the lack of power she felt. In turn, I
had given her stories in which I tried to share numerous (and simi-
lar) times when I have not felt powerless in the same program.
Eventually, however, she gained a new sense of power—not through
stories, but through reading theories of critical pedagogy. When I
asked her why my stories didn’t help her (and why abstract theory
did help her), her conclusion was simply that “You’re not me, and
I’m not you.” My stories and hers, though they appeared to be con-
textually similar, were, in fact, different—because they were so per-
sonal and could not cross boundaries that two individuals would
naturally have.
Briggs (1998) outlined a similar use of narrative—as a writing
center director/tutor, Briggs shared a past tale of her own frustration
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with academic norms (an M.A. thesis) in order to help a freshman
confront her own frustration in a freshman composition class.
Briggs explored why this “narrative as response” worked here, and I
have also made such storytelling work with my own students, both
in a writing center and in a classroom. But I have more stories that
did not work with my students, and in their own words, “But you’re
the teacher, I’m a student!” or “You’re an English major!” or, more
simply, “Yeah, right, like you can compare your writing to mine!” As
much as I might see those connections and try to make my students
see them, too, their unwillingness to find what we have in common
makes the storytelling fail because the stories are personal and, there-
fore, different.
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5 A  C O N T E X T UA L I S T  R E S E A R C H
PA R A D I G M  
An Illustration
My sense is that many put quantitative work down because
they don’t know how to do it. Again, it’s certainly not the
end all, and I very much believe in and do more qualitative
“stuff” these days. But hard data can be very useful coupled
with other means of analysis.
Eileen Oliver (interview)
My M.A. thesis was a cross-cultural learning styles study in which I
tested the applicability of field dependence-independence measures
as a means of assessing cognitive style among minority groups. I fin-
ished the project in the summer of 1993. Traditional in format, my
thesis reviewed the literature from researchers who have asserted that
African-Americans, for example, have a holistic, field-dependent (in
contrast to an analytical, field-independent) learning style based on
instruments and theories developed by Herman Witkin in the 1940s
and 50s. I, too, gave one of those instruments but introduced at the
same time a new instrument that had not yet been used in cross-
cultural studies: the Kolb Learning Style Inventory (LSI). Groups in
my study showed a statistically significant difference on the old
instrument that measures field dependence-independence (FDI) but
no differences on the Kolb LSI, illustrating differences between the
instruments and their cultural assumptions. I also incorporated
interviews in which students upheld the findings of the Kolb LSI and
refuted the findings of the older FDI measures.
While writing my thesis, I enrolled in a graduate seminar (Spring
1993) called “Cross-Cultural Studies and Composition” in which we
focused on ethnography, especially through Clifford and Marcus,
Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (1986). I was
hoping the course would provide some insight on my thesis and on
my thinking about cross-cultural issues generally, and it did. But the
course also produced some tension: our class discussions often
focused on the power of ethnography over more rigid, controlled sci-
entific experiments as a means of revealing or constructing culture.
Traditional research was limited, we decided, but there I was: neck-
deep in my M.A. thesis in which I was doing “traditional” research.
Out of frustration, wrestling with my thesis, and partly out of guilt, I
asked my professor if I could write the “flip-side” of my thesis for my
seminar paper instead of exploring a whole new project. He thought
the idea was fascinating, and I thought I’d have a chance to “remedy”
the ills of the rigid tradition appearing in my M.A. thesis, thus
redeeming myself by studying culture in the way our class decided
was best: through narrative.
For my seminar project, then, I wrote the story about how my the-
sis was constructed: how I came upon the idea, how I designed the
study, the problems I encountered with subjects, the difficulties of
statistical analysis—but I drew the same conclusions. The project
earned an A for that course, and my thesis was completed a few
months later, but my curiosity about what had just happened never
diminished. On the one hand, I felt I had creatively constructed two
versions of the same study—one centered on “context” and one cen-
tered on “science”—two worlds that many composition scholars see
as fundamentally opposed to one another. On the other hand, both
studies described the same conclusions, but without the quantitative
measures in the first study, I could not have written the second text,
the narrative.
The two texts, in other words, could not have been written in the
reverse: if I had done a purely qualitative study for my M.A. thesis, of
course, I could not have recreated a second text that would somehow
rely on numerical data I had never gathered. The fact that two texts
written by the same researcher ended up being very different was, in
part, a matter of a choice in presentation (a matter of understanding a
genre and an audience), not a matter of “context-stripping” vs. “con-
text-building.” More importantly, it was a matter of understanding the
full context of the research project and the research questions being
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explored. That I was able to write a second text describing my thesis in
a different way suggested the rich, multiple, and diverse layers of texts
that exist in traditional research that relies on numerical data: the
“narrative flip-side” that could reveal the context for my thesis was
“there” all along. Any well-trained researcher could construct the same
text, and any well-trained reader of traditional research could, too.
For example, one sentence that often appears in traditional
research interested me in particular: that sentence in which researchers
articulate how many subjects participated in the study and how those
subjects were recruited. I, too, had such sentences, a few short ones, in
my M.A. thesis, in which I stated concisely the number of students in
my study and how they volunteered. But in my seminar project for the
course on cross-cultural studies, I rambled for more than two pages,
explaining how hard it was to get volunteers, that some students who
had signed up didn’t show up, and of those who showed up, some 
didn’t follow directions, so their tests had to be thrown out.
While it felt good to get all of that “off my chest,” I always won-
dered if it was necessary. After all, don’t all researchers face similar
problems? Certainly, specific problems with subjects are unique to
each research project, but the general notion that researchers will
likely encounter problems is commonly understood. After all, how
did I know to give advice to a classmate when she started her disserta-
tion, hoping to have eight case studies: Aim for more than eight, I
said. If some don’t show up, don’t cooperate, or change their minds,
you might end up with eight after all. Researchers know. And I think
that’s why I never showed my thesis advisor the narrative of my study
as the seminar professor (praising its creativity) suggested. Trained in
research, my advisor would know, too.
U N D E R S TA N D I N G  C O N T E XT S  F O R  Q UA N T I TAT I V E  R E S E A RC H :
A N  I L LU S T R AT I O N  
How could we all be trained to become better readers of research
that relies on numerical data or experimental designs, readers who
would see and appreciate the context of the study in spite of the num-
bers? If we asked other researchers who have done such studies to tell
the stories behind their research, could they? Could narratives about
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their research assist our understanding of that research so that we can
become better producers and consumers of all studies, fully under-
standing the researchers’ decisions in the contexts of their research
questions?
To find another study that would help me illustrate how the story
behind traditional-looking research can be reconstructed, I searched
for authors in the journal most criticized for publishing that kind of
research: Research in the Teaching of English. Searching issues from
two years1 (Spring 1995-Spring 1997), I chose Eileen Oliver’s “The
Writing Quality of Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Graders, and College
Freshmen: Does Rhetorical Specification in Writing Prompts Make a
Difference?” (December 1995).
Below is a reprint of that study2, and inserted throughout the
reprint, is Dr. Oliver’s commentary on the study—transcribed from
my interview of her via email3—and, in italics, my own commen-
tary on Dr. Oliver’s interview as I see it relating to her published
study and to the Contextualist Research Paradigm. Throughout the
interview, Dr. Oliver explained the process of her research, the
instinct that often guided the study, and her feelings about the pro-
ject in general: in short, she revealed how the intersections of
rhetorical issues and research issues formed the context in which
she made her decisions and explored her research questions—a
rich, dynamic context in which processes naturally resulted in a
“quantitative” product.
The Writing Quality of Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Graders, and
College Freshmen: Does Rhetorical




This study analyzes the influence of rhetorical specification
in writing prompts on the writing quality of seventh-, ninth- ,
and eleventh-grade students, and college freshmen.
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Manipulating three composing variables—topic, purpose,
and audience—eight assignments were created and admin-
istered to college preparatory and college students at four
age levels. Trained raters scored 624 essays holistically on
a six-point scale. The main and interactive effects of topic,
purpose, and audience on writing quality were analyzed
using a three-way analysis of variance for all grades
together and for each grade separately. Results indicate
that students utilized different kinds of rhetorical information
at different stages. That is, while seventh graders tended to
respond to simpler topic specifications, ninth graders
reacted strongly to more elaborated topics. Eleventh
graders more frequently utilized rhetorical specification,
while college writers less frequently relied on it. Results
suggest that specific rhetorical information may be
important to students at certain ages for pedagogical
reasons as well as for assessment.
As the use of large-scale writing assessments has
increased over the last decade (Engelhard, Gordon, &
Gabrielson, 1992), researchers have likewise increased their
attention to the influence of the assignment on writing quality
(Black, 1989; Hoetker & Brossell, 1986, 1989; Huot, 1990;
Rafoth, 1989; Redd-Boyd & Slater, 1989; Witte, 1992). Most
researchers agree that poorly constructed prompts interfere
with writers’ rhetorical choices, thereby confounding the
problem of fair assessment (Keech, 1982; Murphy & Ruth,
1993; Ruth & Murphy, 1984). But what makes a good
assignment? How does an assignment affect a writer’s ability
to produce good prose in a particular writing episode? And, if
rhetorical specification does affect writing quality, when do we
implement various specifics in our instruction?
This study explores the effects of assignment variables in
order to determine the kind of writing tasks that help students
achieve at their highest levels. Further, this study examines
these effects for various age groups so that its findings may
help us determine the appropriate rhetorical balance for
different age groups.
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When I asked Eileen Oliver why she chose to conduct such a tradi-
tional study relying on numerical data and statistical analysis when
qualitative studies are currently more popular, her answer was
mixed—partly historical, partly practical, but entirely reasonable.
Oliver observed similar research questions and methods being
explored by other scholars and colleagues around her, determined a
purpose for her own study, and based some of her decisions on her
experience and intuition. Here, Oliver answers questions in at least
three cells in the Contextualist Research Paradigm Matrix (Researcher
x Purpose, Researcher x Question, and Audience x Method).
Oliver: When I collected this data (years ago), qualitative work was just
coming in to its own. At the time, the psychometricians were in vogue.
This data was collected for my dissertation which I published on only
using sample data. The co-chair of my committee (Steve Witte) and many
others were doing a lot of quantitative stuff with revision and assessment
research so everyone thought this was great. Actually, looking at the
results, I did, too.
Years later, when I got a bigger grant and could afford to have the
entire data set evaluated, I did. And the findings were pretty significant (at
least I and the editor of RTE thought so). So what the heck. I submitted
the results to RTE and they accepted it. Thus, we have a quantitative study
reported in the literature a little behind the times. However, I’m glad I did
it when I did it. A qualitative treatment would have been much easier,
especially with my experience and access to students. What this quantita-
tive study did for me was validate what I thought I already knew about
students, writing development, and instruction.
I should also say that this quantitative study was based on my tacit
understanding of composition pedagogy grounded in at least fifteen years
of experience as a writing teacher at several levels. So you might say that I
already had a lot of qualitative information and used this quantitative
approach for balance.
T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K
Rhetoricians have long recognized the importance of devel-
oping proficiency with discourse forms. For example,
Quintilian, the ancient practitioner and teacher of oratory,
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outlined various types of orations for his students to master
(Matsen, Rollinson, & Sousa, 1990). Aside from the requisite
good character, “exceptional gifts of speech,” and other
qualities, Quintilian identified certain conventions of
arrangement and style that must be followed by the narrator.
He developed graded compositions as little exercises to
prepare students to be adept users of language (Murphy,
1990). These progymnasmata were then used to perfect
rhetorical technique by others. Such strategies later became
the model in the Byzantine East and in schools in Western
Europe (Matsen, Rollinson, &Sousa, 1990).
Oliver explained the intuitive drive of this study when she outlined
more of her experience as a teacher. Notice that the following passage is
based entirely on experience and is composed of general “truths” Oliver
believes exist in different age groups. It is through this lens/context of
experience that she 1) read the related literature, 2) designed her study,
and 3) interpreted her results. Here, Oliver answers questions in at least
four cells in the Contextualist Research Paradigm Matrix: Researcher x
Question, Audience x Purpose, Evidence x Methods, and Researcher x
Methods.
Oliver: I have taught ninth and eleventh graders and college freshmen.
(No seventh grade.) I therefore have a pretty good idea of what these age
levels are capable of. To go into some of the more sophisticated stylistic
issues one does with freshmen (if you can call that sophisticated) is simply
over the heads of younger students who, albeit very bright, are not devel-
opmentally ready to take in certain information. . . . the seventh graders
are barely able to generate enough prose (e.g., telling a seventh grader to
“vary sentence structure” is less obvious or useful than [telling] a college
student).
Revision is another issue. A revision strategy must be very different for
9th graders than for college students in terms of motivation, attention
level, and so forth.
Today writing is often judged by one’s ability to respond to
any number of discourse tasks, and teachers of composition
try to attend to the development of many different skills. Yet, as
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the 1992 National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP)
Writing Report Card indicates, student’s writing quality is not
consistent over different discourse aims. Thus,
by grade 12, the majority of students have some under-
standing of informative and narrative writing, but continue 
to have considerable difficulty with persuasive writing.
(Applebee, Langer, Mullis, Latham, &Gentile, 1994, p. 3)
Whether or not students have received instruction in
composing, the quality of their writing is affected by the kinds
and amounts of rhetorical specification they are given in their
prompts.
Most studies indicate that assignment effects do exist, but in
what ways and to what extent remain to be learned. As several
studies suggest, determining the influence of prompts on
writing quality is extremely complex, (Greenberg, 1982;
Hoetker, 1982; Huot, 1990; Keech, 1982; Mellon, 1976; 1981;
Witte, 1992; Witte & Faigley). Yet it is important to do so
because
if assignments are composed carefully so as to assist
students . . . then their writing should be . . . much easier to
evaluate. (Farrell, 1976, p. 224)
According to Huot (1990), the research on rhetorical
specification has been “inconclusive” in establishing a
relationship between the prompt and writing quality.
Nevertheless, some studies suggest the importance of
structure. For example, Smith and his colleagues (1985, cited in
Huot, 1990) found that advanced writers did significantly better
than average and basic writers when writing on open-ended
topics. And Hoetker (1982) suggests that well-structured
assignments may be more important for students who are
“unable to intuit the unvoiced assumptions of the topic or to fill
in the gaps as expertly and accurately as the accomplished 
student can” (p. 387).
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Good writers can handle the demands of the rhetorical
situation. However, writers who do not clearly understand the
rhetorical question, or see only part of it within the assignment,
often cannot solve the rhetorical problem. In an attempt to
understand the nature of rhetorical choices in good and poor
writers, Flower and Hayes (1981) developed a cognitive
process theory of writing in which the “task environment” repre-
sented one of three major elements. Defined as “all . . . things
outside the writer’s skin,” the task environment begins with the
rhetorical problem or assignment which includes topic,
audience, and “exigency” (goals, purpose). We will examine
these in more detail.
Though Oliver presented a traditional literature review here, her
interview illustrates that her experience “brought” her to the literature
in a certain frame of mind, shaping how she interpreted that literature
and, later, added to it via this study. The available literature played a
large role in Oliver’s decisions. Below, Oliver answers questions from five
cells in the Contextualist Research Paradigm Matrix: Researcher x
Purpose, Audience x Purpose, Audience x Methods, Evidence x Methods,
and Audience x Publication.
Oliver: At the time I conducted this study, there were many discussions
regarding both writing prompts and assessment (still are). I agreed with a lot
of the literature that talked about how discourse purpose affected student
response. I also agreed with many who criticized the variety of discourse top-
ics that were used to assess student writing ability. For example, a national
assessment might use a narrative prompt one year, a persuasive prompt the
next. The results which were used to evaluate student writing ability were
disparate because the instrument (writing prompt) was unreliable.
Further, most of the literature targeted small age and ability groups.
There were very few which looked at writers at several levels (albeit
expert/novice studies are fairly common). Having had experience with
ninth- and eleventh-grade students as well as college freshmen, I believed
that a developmental component existed that few had addressed. I there-
fore decided to combine writing prompt variables with age variables with
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the intention of looking at how particular elements in a writing prompt
would influence writers at several levels.
Purpose
Researchers have long believed that different purposes
elicit different levels of writing quality and different syntactic
features (Moffett, 1968; Odell, 1981; Prater & Padia, 1983).
Purpose affects the relationship between speaker and
audience (Herrington, 1979). It can also influence syntax
(Maimon & Nodine, 1978). Although subsequent studies have
questioned the relationship between writing quality and syntac-
tic maturity (Huot, 1990), several earlier findings show that lan-
guage patterns are, at least, significantly different when
students, especially young writers, write with different aims
(Bortz, 1962). San Jose (1972) reported highly significant
syntactic differences among rhetorical purposes for fourth-
grade writing, citing persuasive pieces as the “most mature.”
Perron (1977) found longer T-units in persuasive pieces than in
essays exemplifying other discourse aims. Rosen (1969)
identified longer T-units and modifications in referential writing
than in expressive discourse. In an attempt to determine the
effect of audience specification and mode of discourse on the
syntactic complexity of sixth- and tenth-grade writers,
Crowhurst and Piche (1979) found “clear and unequivocal” evi-
dence that “mode was significant at both grade levels” (P. 107).
They recommended argument assignments (as opposed to
narratives) as especially applicable for measuring the develop-
ment of syntactic skills.
Topic
Looking at the effects of the information given in the assign-
ment topic, Braddock, Lloyd-Jones, and Schoer (1963)
recognized more than thirty years ago that the degree of topic
abstraction helps determine the caliber of students’ writing.
However, the small corpus of research on topic choice that
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does exist has been inconclusive. Interpreting reports of “no
effects” from such studies, Hoetker (1982) called them failures
by the investigators to utilize methods of analysis sensitive
enough to determine statistical and meaningful differences.
In one study to determine effects of information load,
Brossell (1983) constructed six topics, each with three levels of
“information load:” low, moderate, high. Essays resulting from
“high-information-load” topics were much shorter, earned the
lowest scores, and proved to be the most difficult for students to
begin. Essays produced from “moderate-information load”
topics were immediately limited and focused, and received the
highest holistic scores. Brossell’s research suggested that too
much or too little information weakens writing quality. While
positing that information load is more important than the topic
itself in producing written discourse, Brossell concluded that full
rhetorical specification may hinder rather than help the writer in
an examination setting and that wording can also affect writing
quality. However, Brossell overlooked the actual administration
of such assignments and neglected analysis from a writer’s
point of view. The following examples of Brossell’s topics reveal
a tremendous difference among the three levels:
Level One
Violence in the schools.
Level Two
According to recent reports in the news media, there has
been a marked increase in incidents of violence in public
schools. Why, in your view, does such violence occur?
Level Three
You are a member of a local school council made up of
teachers and citizens. A recent increase in incidents of vio-
lence in the schools has gotten widespread coverage in the
local news media. As a teacher, you are aware of the prob-
lem, though you have not been personally involved in an
incident. At its next meeting, the council elects to take some
action. It asks each member to draft a statement setting forth
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his or her views on why such violence occurs. The state-
ments will be published in the local newspaper. Write a
statement expressing your own personal views on the
causes of violence in the schools. (pp. 166-167)
Most experienced composition instructors would predict that
students writing in response to Level One would have difficulty
because of the scarcity of information, while those tackling
Level Three would suffer from the length and extent of
instructions, and from the remoteness of the audience (i.e., a
local school council). Thus, Brossell created prompts that as
instruments for his research would seem to have affected his
ability to address the question he proposes to answer. As
Keech (1982) stated:
the more text testers add to the writing assignment, the
less guarantee they have that students will read and cor-
rectly interpret all of the guide lines . . . in the extreme cases,
students may either ignore a lengthy set of instructions, or
may become so embroiled in working out exactly what the
tester wants that they are distracted from their central task of
trying to generate meaningful, coherent text. (p. 7)
Discussing “thoroughness” of rhetorical specification for
large-scale assessments, Hoetker and Brossell (1986; 1989)
argued for the “frame topic” as the most “content fair” prompt.
Using “a noun phrase consisting of a class name and two qual-
ifying attributes,” Hoetker and Brossell claimed that the frame
topic has several advantages: It allows students to control their
topics by “limiting the subject and finding a thesis;” it gives test
makers an enormous latitude in creating prompts; and it
provides raters with a larger variety of subjects and
approaches to read. Such topics look like these: “A character in
a book, film, or TV series who is a good role model for young
people. A book written since 1900 that has had important
effects on society” (p.414).
The researchers concluded that the frame topic-with little
rhetorical specification-does not adversely affect poorer writers,
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and thus is an effective writing prompt for large-scale
assessments.
Writing topics may also affect students in ways which are
often difficult to predict or control. For example, ethnic or racial
background may influence the writer’s perspective regarding
the writing task. However, how writing assessments affect
specific groups is not at all clear. For example, White (1985;
1994) found that writing scores for certain ethnic groups were
higher using essays than those they received using indirect
measures. He thus encouraged the use of essays for all
students. On the other hand, Breland and Griswold (1981)
found that some members of ethnic minorities “tended to write
less well” than an independent measure would predict in a com-
parison between indirect measures and essays (p. 21). These
conflicting findings underscore the need for more investigation
of what might be the fairest measures to use for all students.
Audience
Much of the research on audience is also inconclusive.
Indeed, even its definition is problematic. Do we mean
imagined audience? Real audience? Implied audience?
Absence of audience? Some studies show significant audience
effects relating to the degree of intimacy the writer had with the
audience. Crowhurst and Fiche (1979) found that designated
audience affected sixth and tenth graders whose writing was
more “syntactically complex” when they addressed teachers
than when they addressed friends. Similarly, fifth, eighth and
twelfth graders, and expert adult writers composed longer
clauses the lower their intimacy with their audience, and more
subordinations the higher their intimacy with their audience
(Rubin & Fiche, 1979). In another study, the degree of intimacy
between writers and their audiences altered the syntactic com-
plexity with which they wrote (Fiche, Michlin, Johnson, & 
Rubin, 1975).
Two other studies show effects relating to the status of the
audience. In examining the effect of audience on language
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functions (controlling, relational, informing and interpreting, the-
orizing and projecting) in sixth and eleventh graders writing to
two audiences, Craig (1988) found that essays written for
“high-status” readers (teachers) were more “objective and
impersonal” than were papers intended for best friends.
Analyzing the awareness of audience by fifth graders, Frank
(1992) examined their success with transactional writing tasks
revised for two audiences-third graders and adults. Though
writers successfully communicated to both audiences, they did
a better job for their younger readers. Frank identified the
importance of “the realistic quality of a transactional writing
task” as opposed to the “hypothetical . . . ‘pseudo-informative’
or ‘inauthentic’ task’ “ (pp. 286, 278).
Other studies show the effects of specificity. Investigating
the effects of two versions of a writing prompt, Leu, Keech,
Murphy, and Kinzer (1982) found no significant difference in
the performances of tenth-, eleventh-, and twelfth-grade
students. They did find that prompts with specified audience
produced 20 alternate mode papers (e.g., letters, journal
entries), while those writing with unspecified audience
produced only 7 alternate mode papers. Students in this study
also reported that they spent more time on prompt versions
with the less specified audience.
Analyzing the quality of college-level persuasive writing,
Black (1989) reported that writers of “varying abilities may ben-
efit from having pertinent information about their audience . . .”
(p. 248). Rafoth (1989), in evaluating college freshman writing,
agreed with Elbow (1987), noting that attention to audience
occurs more in the revision stages of drafting than in the begin-
ning writing stage. Roen and Willey (1988), investigating
audience awareness in drafting and revising of college
freshmen, concluded much the same. Although Redd-Boyd
and Slater (1989) did find students writing for a designated
audience scoring higher than those without such an audience,
their data did not reflect higher scores for real audiences than
for imaginary audiences.
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Another study shows the effects of the writer’s age on rewrit-
ing for a specific audience. Looking at the development of audi-
ence-adapted writing skills, Kroll (1985) found that, when given
the task of rewriting a linguistically complex story, older writers
were better able to simplify text for younger readers than were
younger writers. Working with fifth-, seventh-, ninth-, and
eleventh-grade students, and with college freshmen, he also
identified older writers’ ability to revise meaning more easily, not
staying exclusively with “word-oriented” strategies. Examining
“receding” procedures for adapting writing to a particular
(young) audience, Kroll chose a wide-ranging age group to
“chart developmental trends” of writers, and to “sketch out a
more adequate ‘map’ of audience-adapted writing skills
between the end of elementary school and the beginning of 
college” (pp. 124-125). In his study, older students tended not
only to change wording, but also “to retell parts of the story in
language more accessible to young readers. . .” (p. 133).
Cherry (1989) warned against unclear audience cues.
Describing a writing situation gone awry, he reported on the
effects of a writing prompt when the scenario failed to specify
audience, thus “placing students both inside and outside” of
the writing task. Apparently, in attempts to frame questions as
interesting, challenging, and meaningful prompts, teachers and
researchers sometimes create problems for writers.
So far, Oliver has articulated why she asked the research questions she
did, how her experience played a role in her decisions, and how other
colleagues and literature influenced a part of her work. I did not ask her
how she worded her questions (the Evidence x Question cell in the
matrix) because her study so clearly stated them, as shown below.
T H E  P R E S E N T S T U D Y
The present study examined the effects of varying topic,
purpose, and audience specification on the writing quality of
seventh-, ninth-, and eleventh-grade students, and college
freshmen. Specifically, I asked the following questions:
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What relationship exists between writing quality and varying
degrees of information about the writing prompt with respect to
topic, purpose, and audience?
What relationship exists between students’ age level, writing
quality, and amount of information in the prompt?
M E T H O D
Participants
A total of 624 essays were collected from advanced
students in seventh grade (127 essays), college preparatory
students in ninth grade (196 essays) and eleventh grade (180
essays), and university freshmen (121 essays). Many teachers
participating in the study had had previous experience with a
National Writing Project affiliate and were already providing
strong writing programs for their students. College freshmen
were completing the first of two required composition courses
at a large university. Thus, all student writers had had some
training and experience in composing.
Organizing the 624 essays in this study must have been a formidable
task. While Oliver did not detail how she coded her data, she pointed to
an important awareness: Know your weaknesses and ask for help when
you need it (Researcher x Method cell in the matrix).
Oliver: I coded the data by hand on sheets. It’s tedious but not so bad if
you’re listening to the radio anyway or “watching” the news on tv. I had a
small grant to pay someone for the “real” data entry. Then, after the
“runs,” my friend and I discussed the results. After this “pilot,” and several
years later, I secured another university grant and had the whole thing
entered by someone else. I was very glad for that because it would have
taken forever for me to do the whole set.
Assignment
Assignment variables were based on the example and
rationale offered by Freedman and Robinson (1982) in their
presentation of successful topic design. These researchers
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created an expository or “transactional” topic based on
students’ personal experience. To reduce assessment
complications while simultaneously increasing reliability, they
offered students only one choice. This study adapted the
following question from their study. (It was first administered
for a writing proficiency test given to juniors at California State
University at San Francisco and later used for several other
assessments.)
Everyone has a gripe about the community in which he or
she lives. Whether that problem be major or minor, a matter
of rising neighborhood burglaries or of inadequate parking
facilities on campus, most of us feel that some community
need is being ignored by local officials. What’s your gripe?
How does it affect your everyday life, and how would you
suggest correcting it?
Changes were made to make the information less abstract
for younger students. In addition, information about audience
was added.
Eight combinations were created to include more or less
information in the assignment. Assignment #1 (T+P+A+)
contains the most specific information about all three variables-
topic, purpose and audience- while assignment #8 (T-P-A- )
contains the least specific information about all three variables.
(See Appendix A.)
Although many researchers agree that a fair test of writing
skills demands at least two writing samples for each discourse
purpose (Braddock, Lloyd-Jones, & Scheer, 1963; Kincaid,
1970; Odell, 1981), the focus of this study was not to diagnose
writing problems of individual students but, rather, to provide a
basis for studying the effects of assignment variables on writing
quality. Thus, participating students were given one
assignment to complete in one class period. Moreover, more
teachers were willing to allow their classes to write one essay
during one class period than were willing to spend several 
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sessions collecting multiple writing samples unrelated to
regular curricula.
Procedure
Sample and Setting. The sample for this study consisted of
seventh-, ninth-, and eleventh-grade students enrolled in
“advanced” English classes in an affluent community in Central
Texas. These students were considered “higher-ability” within
their age groups. The choice of “higher-ability” students was
based on several factors. First, at this level, students had had
at least some opportunity to practice their writing skills prior to
completing the writing assignment for the present study.
Second, we believed that such common problems as anxiety,
inability to generate prose, and the creation of mechanical
errors were minimal because each of the participating
departments’ curricula call for positive writing environments.
The target schools are located near a large university, and
many of the teachers participating in this research have also
been part of other projects reflecting recent trends in
composition pedagogy. Because the purpose of this study was
to look at the effects of rhetorical specification in prompts on
writing quality of students at various age levels, every attempt
was made to make the population as homogeneous as
possible.
Likewise, the college level students in this study attended the
flagship campus of the state’s university system, having
graduated from high schools comparable to that of the high
school students in the study. Each of the eight assignments was
given to “advanced English” seventh grade classes, “college
prep” ninth- and eleventh-grade English classes, and college
freshmen. High school students were asked to consider this writ-
ing exercise as an example of a large-scale writing assessment
which they would experience in the near future. With no prior
knowledge of the assignment, students were given forty-five
minutes to complete their essays. Test packets included a cover
sheet with the assignment at the top and several lined sheets for
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writing. Students were allowed to make notes on the first sheet if
they wished but were instructed not to write their names
anywhere. The tests were coded so that individual teachers
could use copies of the tests later for instruction if they wished.
For further motivation, instructors told students that their task
was adapted from a writing sample used in an actual
assessment test and that such practice was important.
Students were assigned to each of the “treatments” by
class. That is, each of eight classrooms for each grade
received one of the assignment variations. Though random
assignment of prompts throughout all eight classes at each
grade level was requested, many teachers preferred to give
each class a particular question, a process which they
perceived would make their task simpler. Because students
had already been assigned to their classes randomly, I agreed
to this procedure.
Raters. Four high school teachers were selected as raters,
none of whom taught in the schools where writing samples
were collected. However, each had had experience teaching
composition and assessing student writing. These teachers
were trained in holistic scoring techniques. The scoring criteria
were modeled after general guidelines used by Educational
Testing Services (1987). Training sessions began with a
description of holistic scoring (see Appendix B), a presentation
of Assignment #8 (prompt with least rhetorical information), dis-
cussion materials, and the rubric for scoring. The raters
completed five sessions lasting about four hours each.
Each essay received two readings using a rating scale of 6
to 1. If an essay received a discrepant score of more than one
numerical difference between two raters (e.g., a score of 6 and
a score of 4), a third teacher rated the essay. All rater
reliabilities were computed using Cronbach’s (1970) alpha
coefficient. The inter-rater reliability was .82. The main and
interactive effects of topic, purpose, and audience on writing
quality were analyzed using a 2X2X2 analysis of variance for
all grades together and for each grade separately.
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I asked Eileen Oliver if she sought help for her analyses of data.
Though she felt she might have been able to handle the data analysis on
her own, she sought the help of a friend who is an expert, illustrating her
own assessment of her strengths and weaknesses in this project (the
Researcher x Method cell in the matrix) and demonstrating how a con-
ceptual knowledge of statistics can help us work with research consultants
and statisticians more effectively. Further, Oliver illustrates that although
this study does not appear to be collaborative, it had collaborative
moments, and, as all researchers, she kept learning more about research
through the experience.
Oliver: I worked with someone who helped me run the data. I could have
done it myself and would have, but we had a friend who did that kind of
work all the time. It was great working with him because, as he did it, he
explained it so that I’d be able to do it on my own. He was also very valu-
able to run things by as I looked at my data to try to figure out what I was
getting.
I think a lot of people paid graduate students to help them with analy-
ses of various sorts. It depends on the person whether or not it goes well.
In subsequent work I’ve done, I’ve had some people help with various
data analysis. However, if they’re not in touch with what you’re doing,
they’re just number crunchers and often crunch the wrong numbers. For
example, about three years ago I was looking at the difference that certain
variables had on different racial groups. The “consultant” who was sup-
posed to assist me in my analysis suggested that, since my “n” for Native
Americans was not very large, I should combine it with another racial
group. So you see that if you do not understand what you’re looking for,
an “analyst” may not be any use to you at all.
Results
Significant main effects and interactions were obtained for
seventh-grade essays for topic [F = 12.46, p>.0006] and
purpose [F = 6.49, p>.01]; for ninth-grade essays for topic [F =
28.46, p>.000]; for eleventh-grade essays for purpose [F=
29.22, p>.0000] and the interaction between topic and
audience [F = 4.55, p>.03]; for college freshman essays for
interactions between topic and audience [F = 13.70, p>.0003];
and for all grades together with topic [F = 5.65, p>.021,
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purpose [F = 14.02, p>.0002], and the interaction between
topic and audience [F = 9.57, p>.002] (see Tables 1-5
respectively).
Generally, the statistical results indicate that seventh
graders did better with simpler statements of topic and specific
direction in purpose. However, a look at Figures 1 and 2
confounds this evidence because Assignment #1 (T+P+A+)
has a high mean, as do Assignments #7and #8 (both with P- ).
A closer analysis shows that less elaborate topic is
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TABLE 1
Analysis of Variance for Assignment Variable at Grade 7
Number of obs = 127 R-square = 0.12
Root MSE = 1.02712 Adj R-square = 0.0912
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 17.55 4 4.39 4.16 0.01
Topics 13.14 1 13.14 12.46 0.00
Purpose 6.85 1 6.85 6.49 0.01
Audience 0.05 1 0.05 0.05 0.83
Topic*Audience 3.12 1 3.12 2.95 0.09
Residual 128.71 122 1.05
Total 146.26 126 1.16
TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance for Assignment Variable at Grade 9
Number of obs = 196 R-square = 0.1360
Root MSE = 1.03856 Adj R-square = 0.11179
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 32.42 4 8.11 7.51 0.00
Topics 30.70 1 30.70 28.46 0.00
Purpose 0.26 1 0.26 0.24 0.62
Audience 1.54 1 1.54 1.42 0.23
Topic*Audience 0.46 1 0.46 0.43 0.51
Residual 206.01 191 1.08
Total 238.43 195 1.22
still the major indication of higher scores, while the interaction of
T+ and A+, a significant effect at other levels, may account for
the higher score of Assignment #1. (A discussion of this interac-
tion between topic and audience follows in the next section.)
On the other hand, there is clear evidence that ninth-grade
writers utilized specific information about topic (Table 6 &
Figure 2). Specific information about purpose gave eleventh-
grade students an advantage in their writing tasks (Table 6 &
Figure 3). The interaction between topic and audience for all
grades together (Figure 4), for eleventh graders (Figure 5),
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TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance for Assignment Variable at Grade 11
Number of obs = 180 R-square = 0.1852
Root MSE = 1.11223 Adj R-square = 0.1665
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 49.20 4 12.30 9.94 0.00
Topics 4.35 1 4.35 3.52 0.06
Purpose 36.15 1 36.15 29.22 0.00
Audience 2.19 1 2.19 1.77 0.19
Topic*Audience 5.62 1 5.62 4.55 0.03
Residual 216.49 175 1.24
Total 265.68 179 1.48
TABLE 4
Analysis of Variance for Assignment Variable for College Freshmen
Number of obs = 121 R-square = 0.1305
Root MSE = 0.995986 Adj R-square = 0.0927
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 17.12 5 3.42 3.45 0.01
Topics 0.01 1 0.01 0.00 0.95
Purpose 0.98 1 0.98 0.99 0.32
Audience 1.04 2 0.52 0.52 0.59
Topic*Audience 13.59 1 13.59 13.70 0.00
Residual 114.08 115 0.99
Total 131.20 120 1.09
and four college freshmen (Figure 6) raises interesting
questions regarding the relationship between these two
variables.
Topic and Audience Interaction
The question of topic and audience interaction is a difficult
one. Yet its significance for college freshmen and eleventh
graders (and thus for overall significance) makes it worthy of
investigation. It appears from these data that assignments
which provide complementarity between topic and audience—
that is, more specific information about both topic
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TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance for Assignment Variable for All Grades
Number of obs = 624 R-square = 0.0489
Root MSE = 1.13232 Adj R-square = 0.0412
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 40.71 5 8.14 6.35 0.00
Topics 7.24 1 7.24 5.65 0.02
Purpose 17.98 1 17.98 14.02 0.00
Audience 3.19 2 1.60 1.25 0.29
Topic*Audience 12.26 1 12.26 9.57 0.01
Residual 792.37 618 1.28
Total 833.08 623 1.34
TABLE 6
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for All Assignments
Assignment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
T+P+A+ T+P+A- T+P-A- T+P-A+ T-P+A+ T-P+A- T-P-A+ T-P-A-
Grade 7 X 3.50 2.93 2.60 2.54 3.50 3.60 3.57 3.60
S.D. 0.94 1.02 0.82 1.03 0.79 1.78 1.14 0.96
Grade 9 X 3.76 3.71 3.63 4.14 3.00 3.02 2.95 3.13
S.D. 0.95 1.20 0.97 1.18 0.87 1.06 1.12 0.92
Grade 11 X 4.63 4.27 3.02 3.80 3.75 4.15 3.21 3.29
S.D. 1.07 0.94 1.14 1.00 1.14 1.17 1.14 1.31
Grade 13 X 4.58 3.58 3.50 4.04 4.00 4.03 4.68 3.33
S.D. 0.84 1.04 0.81 1.15 1.20 0.95 0.75 0.98
All X 3.89 4.07 4.80 3.80 4.08 4.50 4.60 4.13
S.D. 1.80 1.50 0.57 0.83 1.20 0.41 0.65 0.85
and audience (T+A+) or less specific information for both (T-A)—
yielded higher scores than those with differing levels of
specificity (Figure 5). Statistical significance was also found for
eleventh-grade writers (See Figure 6) and for college freshmen
(Figure 7). This interaction is difficult to explain because
audience itself was not significant at any level. Perhaps in these
higher grades, because students have received more instruction
and have matured as writers, they attempted to utilize the rhetor-
ical specifications available to them and found conflicting
amounts of information confusing (i.e., T+A- or T-A+ ).
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Figure 1
Topic, Purpose, and Audience for Seventh Graders
The varied findings regarding audience effect discussed
earlier suggest that we must be careful to craft prompts which
do, indeed, define audience. These results indicate that
students’ perception of audience real, imagined, or contrived-
has an effect on their ability to address readers. Perhaps, at
the college level, writers do look for and attempt to address the
demands of the writing task. Results here indicate that a
specific topic with a believable audience, or a very general
topic without audience specification, provided students who
have more experience and who pay more attention to
rhetorical cues with a less confusing writing task.
The question remains, however, whether or not the audience
variables in this study presented prompts with a clear sense of
audience or no audience, or whether, as in some earlier work,
the question of authenticity confounded the results.
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Figure 2
Topic, Purpose, and Audience for Ninth Graders
Figure 3
Topic, Purpose, and Audience for Eleventh Graders
Seventh-Grade Writers
Seventh graders seemed to do better with less information
about topic (Table 6 & Figure 1). Perhaps at this level, students
found the task of analyzing a complete prompt cumbersome,
even distracting. Similar to
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Figure 4
Topic and Audience for All Grades
Figure 5
Topic and Audience for EleventhGraders
the problem which arises with “high information load topics”
(Brossell, 1983), these young writers were not able to make
use of so much information. Teachers at this level remarked
that though their students had had “lots of writing experience,”
they were not used to writing in a testing situation such as this
one. In fact, some of the teachers said that questions arose
from some students regarding their task. I speculate that these
questions came from those who were given the more
extensive topic assignments. Although assignments with more
specific information about purpose were scored significantly
higher, Figure 1 shows that only those with more topic and
audience information were above the grade level mean
(T+P+A+). Although not statistically significant at the .05 level
(F=2.95, p .08), this circumstance may be related to the
relationship between topic and audience. It may be that at this
grade level, students should be given simpler writing tasks for
two reasons: they lack exposure to much rhetorical
manipulation, and they are not developmentally ready to utilize
this information.
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Figure 6
Topic and Audience for College Freshmen
These students did not generate long pieces, but their
writing was lively and interesting. Results from this study
suggest that teachers might want to give students prompts
which are more quickly grasped. This may be the level at which
the simple “frame topic” (Hoetker & Brossell, 1986; 1989) is
useful.
Ninth Grade Writers
More specific information about topic made the most
difference with ninth graders (Figure 2). This finding is compati-
ble with what Scardamalia and Bereiter (1986) stated about
early adolescents’ ability to discuss substantive issues. Also at
this age, students have received some formal instruction in
writing. They are beginning to organize ideas, elaborate, add,
and combine. Operating on a “knowledge-telling” level, they
are still able to generate prose from a background awareness
that facilitates their work.
Ninth-grade writers were motivated primarily by topic. Unlike
the seventh graders, the ninth graders, when given a topic
which allowed them to state their complaints, responded
emotionally to the topic itself, regardless of other rhetorical
components. These characteristics were not only mentioned by
their teachers in comments like, “They really loved this topic,”
and “They ‘went to town’ on this assignment,” but also by the
raters who stopped time and again to mention the humor,
ethos, and candor of these “adolescents speaking.” Perhaps at
this level, students take advantage of “voice” as they vent
about what for them are emotional issues regarding rules and
regulations. Essay #1 (see Appendix C), written in response to
assignment #4 (T+P-A+) by a ninth grader, reflects his strong
feelings about his school’s closed-campus policy.
Eleventh Grade Writers
By the eleventh grade, students seemed to make the best
use of rhetorical specification (Figure 3). Not only did
complementarity of topic and audience affect their results, so
146 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
too did specificity of purpose. This evidence makes sense to
high school teachers who see their eleventh graders emerging
from early adolescence into more serious writers. In these later
adolescent years, college prep students are beginning to look
more closely at college requirements, they have taken the
PSAT, they are starting to research colleges and make applica-
tions. As one teacher told me, “By this time, they are beginning
to believe what we’ve been telling them. They are starting to
see that writing counts. They are listening.” Perhaps that is why
so much of a student’s rhetorical training in composition takes
place in eleventh grade. At any rate, writers from this
population took advantage of complementarity in topic and
audience interaction as well as specific purpose.
A look at the writing samples themselves illustrates the
importance of rhetorical specification. Essay #2 (see Appendix
C), for example, was written from Assignment #1 (T+P+A+)
which gives the most complete rhetorical information. The
writer states the problem clearly (the need for better physical
education classes), contrasts her subject with another grown
up, develops her thesis with rich detail, and finishes by
suggesting ways to improve existing courses.
Essay #3, on the other hand, is written in response to
Assignment #3 (T+P-A-). Not only does this essay reflect the
consequences for non-specified features, but essays with
specific topic and unspecified audiences combined yielded
lower scores according to interaction effects. Receiving lower
scores (3 & 3), Essay #3’s deficiencies become evident examin-
ing it from a holistic point of view. One could argue that logically
as well as syntactically, the first writer is more sophisticated.
However, the work of writer #3 is typical of those writing without
specified purpose. That is, instead of stating a problem,
showing how it affects his life, and suggesting a solution, this
writer flounders about and then states several problems with
few, if any, suggestions for improving the situations. Also typical
of these unfocused papers, it begins with an introductory
paragraph which does little to propel the argument. The writer
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then launches into a discussion of the price of yearbooks,
moving illogically to what the yearbook staff must do with the
money. Next he talks about too many clubs, suggesting that
admission standards should be raised and the number of mem-
bers should be limited. He has then, essentially, two topics, not
one, a typical modus operandi for eleventh-grade students
writing from limited rhetorical specification.
Although Oliver presented her data in a detailed manner, there was
more to this study than what we see here. In a part of her interview,
Oliver illustrated a researcher’s sensitivity to context, especially when
trying to decide about the applicability of research results presented in
the final report (cells in the matrix: Audience x Publication, Evidence x
Publication, Audience x Purpose, and Evidence x Purpose). Further, she
illustrated a distinction that all researchers should be aware of—the 
difference between statistical significance and practical significance (or
importance).
Oliver: [T]he other piece of this study had to do with lexical cohesion
which was a much more atomistic analysis than even what you see here.
The cohesion part is not very useful (or at least I didn’t think so)—though
it yielded significant results, as well. But this part was so esoteric that I
didn’t see that it would help the field of composition pedagogy so I didn’t
pursue it any further.
D I S C U S S I O N
This study investigated whether or not varying degrees of
information about topic, purpose, or audience affect the writing
quality of students at four grade levels, and if so, in what ways
and at what ages? It appears from this research that
specification in writing prompts does indeed affect essay
quality at certain levels. Thus we should assure that the
assignments we give students are carefully designed to
promote students production of their best work. Evidence here
reflects the important use high school students make of topic,
purpose, and the interaction between topic and audience at
certain levels. At least in this research, high school students
148 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
who were given clear rhetorical tasks wrote better essays than
did students given less clear rhetorical tasks.
Seventh graders, on the other hand, may also need encour-
agement for writing. These findings suggest that while the
purpose of their tasks should be clear, the prompt might well
be simpler. Apparently, these students applied classroom
instruction directly in their work. For example, many of their
essays had “MAP” written at the top. I asked one of the
teachers what this symbol meant. Her response was that she
and a colleague had taught students to write this label to
remind themselves that they should address “message” (M),
“audience” (A), and “purpose” (P) each time they wrote.
Although audience was the only element that did not prove
significant by itself, its interaction with topic also raises some
concerns. At the very least, we should prevent confusion in
audience specification, or we will end up with what Cherry
(1989) warned will create problems for writers. And while Redd-
Boyd and Slater (1989) did not find a significant difference
between a real and imaginary audience, still their results tell us
that a target audience is better than no audience at all. 
“Inauthenticity,” I believe, is the major problem with the
variable audience in the present study. That is, those students
who were told, “Your essay will be forwarded to a parents’
group interested in the welfare of its students,” had also been
“asked to consider this writing exercise as an example.” Thus
writers saw from the beginning that their audience was not
authentic, a rhetorical element Frank (1992) identified as very
important.
Perhaps, too, as Elbow (1987) suggested, utilizing rhetorical
information about audience occurs more in the revision stages
of writing and would appear in a writing exercise that required
more than just one sitting. In any case, the issue of audience
relevance has been cloudy and remains so. Continued
research in this area should identify real audiences for writers
or at least ensure that writers are not encumbered by
confusing audience demands.
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The importance of providing guidance to writers at certain
levels is clarified somewhat in this study. It appears that
seventh graders did not utilize information as well as did the
more mature writers. They adapted better with simpler topics.
These writers (considered high achievers) generated much
less prose than did older students. Yet they were still able to
come up with lively, interesting pieces. Simple prompts like the
frame topic (Hoetker & Brossell, 1986; 1989) might work best.
As discussed, however, ninth graders seemed to respond to
strong topic cues; their motivation for writing seemed clear in
the voices they projected.
Ability of students to write for different purposes is reflected
in the results of the NAEP study by Applebee and his
colleagues (1994). The most proficient eighth-grade writers in
the NAEP study (those judged to be at or above the 90th
percentile) responded to narrative and informative tasks.
However, while they “seem[ed] to have a growing command of
the structural features and rhetorical devices appropriate to
narrative and informative writing,” they were less successful in
developing persuasive essays (p. 94). Though they showed an
awareness of how to proceed, their essays were not as well
developed. That research, along with the work of Scardamalia
and Bereiter (1986), underscores the findings of the present
study-younger students were less able than older students to
grasp more difficult purpose cues and utilize them. Because in
the NAEP study both eighth- and twelfth-grade students wrote
better responses when discussing a school problem, it seems
reasonable that topic and audience make a difference in
student prose.
These findings argue for continued experience with well-
crafted prompts, allowing writers to improve with both good
instruction and maturation. Though audience was not
statistically significant in this study, its significance when
interacting with topic in the later grades was important. This
research concurs with previous studies that show more mature
writers as better able to accomplish the needs of readers both
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in terms of word-oriented strategies as well as their ability to
revise meaning (Kroll, 1985), a phenomenon which “seemed 
to occur in the junior high school years, roughly between
grades 7 and 9” (p. 137). Knowledge of audience did improve
the work of college-level writers (Black, 1989; Elbow, 1987;
Rafoth, 1989).
Certainly an important area for future research is how
“degree of intimacy” influences writing quality (Craig, 1988;
Crowhurst & Piche, 1979; Piche, Michlin, Johnson, & Rubin,
1975; Rubin & Piche, 1979). Further examination of “audience”
in writing prompts for both junior and senior high school
students is needed.
Statistical results as well as comments by teachers and
raters of ninth-grade essays indicate that these early
adolescents respond positively to topics that engage them.
Clearly, this group showed the importance of choosing topics
that are relevant to their lives. As their teachers pointed out,
these writers were sensitive to issues in their environment, and
they loved speaking their minds. Pedagogical implications are
obvious: more practice writing about relevant topics.
Eleventh-grade writers took advantage of rhetorical cues
and produced high quality pieces when given clear purpose.
When topic and audience were in complementarity, they wrote
without confusion. Results of this study show that high ability
high school juniors are able to produce good persuasive
discourse. Testimony to the capability of these high school
juniors came often from raters’ comments. In fact, there were
many times that one or the other remarked that these essays
were, on the whole, as good as some of the college students’
work. From a pedagogical standpoint, eleventh graders may be
best able to take advantage of rhetorical specification. This
result underscores the importance of composing experiences
for students at this age.
According to the NAEP results, the top twelfth-grade writers
are more limited when writing persuasively than for either of
the other rhetorical categories used in the study: 
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Their persuasive writing similarly revealed a clear under-
standing of the basic rhetorical features of persuasion, but
continuing difficulty in the use of evidence in support of
effective arguments. (p. 98)
Along with the NAEP findings, this study argues for
continued practice with sound writing tasks.
Finally and happily, we see that college freshmen are
affected less by rhetorical specification than are other groups
(Table 6 & Figure 6); they can usually “make something out of
nothing.” The writers in this study had experience and
instruction composing, having just completed one semester of
entry-level composition (in addition to other past writing experi-
ences). At this level, students have not only matured as writers,
but also, and perhaps more importantly, have benefitted from
their experiences composing.
I asked Eileen Oliver how she felt about her findings. Again, she
referred to knowledge gained through her experience as a teacher but
illustrated an important teacher-researcher connection in this quantita-
tive study. She also shared an interesting anecdote as an “aside.” Though
this portion of the interview does not directly relate to any particular cell
in the matrix, Oliver expressed her excitement here, a voice she chose to
keep out of her report.
Oliver: I was pretty excited [about the results] because it’s always nice
to know you’re on the right track. What I found was that writing
prompts do make a difference and they make “different differences”
depending upon the age group. I sensed that as a teacher, and was
encouraged to see this validated as a researcher. I was puzzled by the
data that said “audience” (whether there was one stated or not) did not
make a significant difference. During my dissertation defense it was
none other than James Kinneavy who explained this phenomenon, say-
ing that he, too, had had such an outcome. His explanation was that
students don’t really “buy it” when the prompt says, “Pretend you’re
writing to . . .” They know they’re still just writing to a teacher. That
made sense to me.
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This kind of analysis is very informative. No, it doesn’t tell the whole
story. But, coming from someone in the humanities (readin’ and writin’
and talking about books), it was very exciting to see that something one
has a tacit awareness of as a teacher can really be proved through sys-
tematic analysis.
P E D A G O G I C A L I M P L I C AT I O N S
The purpose of this study was to examine what kinds of
effects (if any) varying degrees of topic, purpose, and audience
specifications have on the writing quality of seventh-, ninth-,
and eleventh-grade students and college freshmen. The results
of this study may have several implications for pedagogy:
Assessment
• Although this study does not specifically look at reading
skills, the earlier discussion regarding confusing and
poorly written writing prompts necessitates considering
this issue. When creating a writing prompt, assessors
must distinguish between reading ability and writing skills.
If the reading task is confusing or difficult, the writer’s
poor performance may be due to poor reading rather than
poor writing skills.
• The purpose of the assessment should determine the
nature of the prompt. That is, the goal of providing the best
writing prompt from which all students can write is different
from a goal of “separating the good writers from the poor
writers” through prompts designed for that purpose.
• If audience information is provided, it should be realistic;
an inauthentic or conflicting audience may create prob-
lems for writers.
Instruction
• Experience generating prose is crucial for all writers. As
Shaughnessy (1977) still reminds us, basic writers are
writers with no experience. Further, young writers need
the freedom, practice, and guidance to develop into good
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writers. Looking at the writing samples from this study the
developmental factor is clear.
• Seventh graders differ from college freshmen in the most
obvious ways. They do not write as extensively or as
clearly as their older counterparts. They are young ado-
lescents, and their interests and concerns are also ego-
centric and adolescent. They need short, relevant topics
which engage them and make them want to write. For
them, not getting to eat lunch on “the bench” like the
eighth graders is a great problem. They write passion-
ately about such things. On the other hand, eleventh
graders are beginning to make decisions that will affect
their future lives. Their writing reflects this change. They
write intense essays about “Who Am I?” and “Where Will I
Be Next?” They are engaged in writing that requires them
to be introspective. The subject matter chosen by these
various age levels reflects the developmental interests of
adolescents in making choices about what they want to
read, and their tastes change as they mature.
• The elaborated topics the ninth graders responded to in
this study indicate that at this age we can begin to manip-
ulate topics and provide writers with more information
and suggestions.
• As writers enter their later teens, they are better able to
write for different, more difficult rhetorical purposes. By
this time, they should be comfortable (and have had prac-
tice) using many modes of discourse.
• Audience adaptation should increase in level of difficulty
as the writer develops. Teachers should encourage stu-
dents to observe the ways in which their writing changes
according to audience specification. Attention to differ-
ence in language register, syntax, and vocabulary all fig-
ure in the response to changing rhetorical demands.
Conversation about audience helps students to watch for
and create more realistic writing situations. junior and
senior high school students should be accomplished in
revising essays to accommodate audience.
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Effective and rigorous composition instruction pays off. As
writers mature, they build on their prior experience to produce
better quality prose. The findings here indicate that rhetorical
specification in writing prompts does make a difference. Good
topics and clear purposes assist students in developing higher
quality work than when these elements are either not clear or
are lacking. We see that complementarity in topic and
audience also facilitates good writing. Further, the value of vari-
ous aspects of writing prompts is different across age levels.
However, the issue of audience is still unresolved. Though
complementarity of topic and audience was significant, the lack
of significance for audience as a main effect calls for more
work in this specific area.
The findings in the present study are suggestive only; they
provide some evidence that various rhetorical elements could
be explicitly introduced to students at certain ages. However,
the design and statistical results of this research are far from
conclusive. Additional research is needed to learn more about
the interaction of topic, purpose, and audience, together with
an analysis of samples of successful student writing to find out
how these students have used the elements in the assignment
prompts.
I asked Oliver how this research had changed her teaching. In her
answer, she articulated responses to two cells in the matrix (Audience x
Question and Audience x Purpose). She also hints at an interesting look
at voice (the Researcher x Publication cell). While Oliver produced a 
traditional report here, she shares her research in other ways: she applies
it herself to her work with her own students and she uses it to train future
teachers. Such “publication” in these other forms suggests that the 
traditional researcher’s voice (often criticized for being impersonal and
disinterested) can lead to other kinds of voices when research findings are
applied to other contexts.
Oliver: I certainly have used this research (why else do we do it?). And I
think it’s very important for people to conduct research that matters.
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The best part of all this is that I am an “English teacher educator” and
thus have had many classes of students who are going out into the junior
and senior high schools, community colleges, and colleges and will teach
writing. This information has been really useful to share with them as
well. It’s one thing to have anecdotal evidence. It’s much better to support
that with “hard data.”
A P P E N D I X  A
Combinations of More and Less Information 
About Topic, Purpose, Audience
More Information About Topic (T+): Everyone has a
complaint about his or her school. The problem may be, for
example, too much homework, not enough dances or sports
activities, or too few clubs. In any case, most of us feel that
some educational need is being ignored by teachers,
administrators and parents.
Less Information About Topic (T- ) Everyone has a
complaint about his or her school. Most of us feel that some
need is being ignored.
More Information About Purpose (P+) What is your
complaint? Write an essay telling how this problem affects your
everyday life and how you would suggest correcting it.
Less Information About Purpose (P-) What is your
complaint? Discuss.
More Information About Audience (A+) Your essay will be
forwarded to a parents’ group interested in the welfare of its
students.
Less Information About Audience (A-) 
Assignment #1 T+P+A+: Everyone has a complaint about
his or her school. The problem may be, for example, too much
homework, not enough dances or sports activities, or too few
clubs. In any case, most of us feel that some educational need
is being ignored by teachers, administrators and parents.
What is your complaint? Write an essay telling how this
problem affects your everyday life and how you would suggest
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correcting it. Your essay will be forwarded to a parents’ group
interested in the welfare of its students.
Assignment #2 T+P+A-: Everyone has a complaint about
his or her school. The problem may be, for example, too
much homework, not enough dances or sports activities, or
too few clubs. In any case, most of us feel that some
educational need is being ignored by teachers, administrators
and parents.
What is your complaint? Write an essay telling how this
problem affects your everyday life and how you would suggest
correcting it.
Assignment #3 T+P-A-: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. The problem may be, for example, too much
homework, not enough dances or sports activities, or too few
clubs. In any case, most of us feel that some educational need
is being ignored by teachers, administrators and parents.
What is your complaint? Discuss.
Assignment #4 T+P-A+: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. The problem may be, for example, too much
homework, not enough dances or sports activities, or too few
clubs. In any case, most of us feel that some educational need
is being ignored by teachers, administrators and parents.
What is your complaint? Discuss. Your essay will be
forwarded to a parents’ group interested in the welfare of its
students.
Assignment #5 T-P+A+: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. Most of us feel that some need is being ignored.
What is your complaint? Write an essay telling how this
problem affects your everyday life and how you would suggest
correcting it. Your essay will be forwarded to a parents’ group
interested in the welfare of its students.
Assignment #6 T-P+A-: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. Most of us feel that some need is being ignored.
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What is your complaint? Write an essay telling how this
problem affects your everyday life and how you would suggest
correcting it.
Assignment #7 T-P-A+: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. Most of us feel that some need is being ignored.
What is your complaint? Discuss. Your essay will be
forwarded to a parents’ group interested in the welfare of its
students.
Assignment #8 T-P-A-: Everyone has a complaint about his
or her school. Most of us feel that some need is being ignored.
What is your complaint? Discuss.
A P P E N D I X  B  
Holistic Scoring Guide
Holistic scoring is defined as any procedure which stops
short of enumerating linguistic, rhetorical, or informational
features. The ranking procedure used in this study was
adapted from that used by the Educational Testing Service
(see References). For information regarding that adaptation
please contact the author.
A P P E N D I X  C
Examples of Students’ Compositions
Essay #1-Assignment #4 (T+P-A+) Ninth-Grade Writer
Everyone going to school, especially high school, has at
least one or two complaints about their school. My main
complaint is the present policy of a closed campus at lunch for
the freshmen and sophomores. 
At the moment, juniors and seniors are permitted to leave
campus for lunch; freshmen and sophomores are not. The pun-
ishment for breaking this policy is two hours D-hall for the
underclassman who left the campus, and four hours D-hall for
the upperclassman who took him or her out to lunch. 
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Presently, this policy is not one hundred percent
enforceable. I, myself, and I know many others too, go out to
lunch on a regular basis. Some freshmen and sophomores
look like a junior or senior, and pass right by the teacher on
duty. For both first and second lunch, there is a teacher,
standing by the doors, watching for freshmen and sophomores
leaving campus. They can’t possibly stop them all, and many
walk by casually with no problem at all. This problem came up
before the school board, but was presently turned down. They
said that there were not enough strong reasons to completely
open up the campus. This was a disappointment for students
and many teachers. Here at _____________ High School, this
is a very popular issue. Many students are hoping for an all-
open campus but many feel it’s a lost cause.
Essay #2-Assignment #1 (T+P +A+) Eleventh grade writer 
In our era of fitness and well-being for everyone, it surprises
and disappoints me to find that____________________High
School has very few true exercise classes for those who need
the conditioning but don’t have the time or inclination to join a
sports team. Never before has America been so concerned
with the physical condition of the business person as well as
the athlete, but _____________ High School is slow to reflect
these healthy attitudes. We need to glance away from our star
athletes long enough to give our less-active students some
better P.E. classes. 
This is the age in which jogging, swimming, and sit-ups are at
the peak of popularity but there are many students who don’t get
a chance to exercise simply because they don’t have the time.
____________________High School offers many sports
activities which provide a good workout-but only if the
participants stay after school or come early each day, sacrifice
weekends and evenings, and miss school-sometimes quite
often. This schedule becomes a strain when one also has home-
work to do and other activities, such as music, art, and of
course, a social life. There are those who thrive on it, but for 
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others, the peaceful, easy life is a hundred times better. Or
perhaps sports takes a back seat to those other activities. There
is also the chance that those who would like to participate don’t
have the skills needed and don’t make the team. Without school
sports, the only alternative is to join a health spa or work out
alone-the first too expensive, the second not much fun, and both
hard to keep up on one’s own. Besides, neither are much help if
you don’t have enough time in the first place. 
The answer to this problem is simple. There are many slow-
moving P.E. classes taken by those who need their 1 fi years of
credit. Nothing would be easier, or more fun, than to add or
change those classes and provide fun, physically demanding
classes ones which require that hour of hard exercise but don’t
demand after-school work. There is already one physical
conditioning class with running and weight lifting more of these
could be added, as well as swimming, aerobic dancing, and
others-perhaps even bicycling or walking! The variety would
attract more people, and more of our generation could join the
healthy crowd live longer, feel better, lose weight, tone
muscles-before long we could all look like Jane Fonda or
Arnold Schwartzeneger! The exercise craze is a good one; so
why not expand it to today’s young people? Everyone needs
the chance to lead the healthiest life possible from the football
team captain to the valedictorian, and everyone in between.
Essay #3-Assignment #3 (T+P-A -) Eleventh-grade Writer 
School is an institution that will never die. This institution
should be made easier to handle for the student though. It
should be made so the student will be able to endure it. There
are not many problems in our school though. Our school is one
of the best schools that I have attended. Our school’s problems
are minor problems compared to most schools. It is nice looking
and well kept as well. School should be a fun time of life used in
preparation for the entrance into the real world where you have
to make your own living and support yourself. School will live on
as long as there are students to attend them. 
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This school’s major problem is the price of yearbooks. I
could not see myself laying out twenty-five dollars for
something that I might not receive. The books are not worth the
price that they are charging for it. The yearbook staff is raking
in the money and the journalism teacher probably pockets the
profit for his own. I bet they make over five dollars a book
which is not that much until you consider them selling about a
thousand books. Then they make about five-thousand dollars.
What does a journalism class do with five-thousand dollars?
They could buy anything they needed and still have money left.
Yearbook at this school are a major rip-off.
Another problem at this school that needs to be solved is
the problem of having too many clubs. There should be fewer
clubs and more membership in the clubs. This would bring
about more pride in the clubs that there are. To solve this prob-
lem, the requirements to get a grant to have a club need to be
stricter. To many clubs come about that have no real purpose
but to meet, eat, and drink. What do not just call this a party
instead o a club? The requirements to get into the club should
be stricter also. Clubs here are too easy to get into. You need
to have a C average for one qualification that most clubs have
here. Clubs are problems but could be solved using the
outlines above. Our problems are not as bad and numerous as
the problems in the other schools. Our problems can be solved
easily also.
__________ High School already has a good tradition in the
two year’s that it has existed. Problem-solving brings about
school pride. Here at ___________ High School everyone has
pride in their school.
S U M M A RY  
Oliver’s answers to all of these questions articulate the processes
and decisions made in the context of both rhetorical and research
issues. Further, Dr. Oliver pointed to the usefulness of numerical data
in our teaching and how naturally such data grows from questions
related to our experience, instinct, and curiosity.
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While such researchers are often criticized for “confirming the
obvious,” Oliver argued, throughout her interview, for what she
instead called “balance” and “validation.” The interplay between the
subjective and objective, between rhetoric and dialectic, between nar-
ratives and numbers, and between a teacher and a researcher are well-
illustrated here—all within the rich context of the desire to know, to
confirm, to test one’s beliefs for the purpose of practical application
later while enriching the scholarship of our field at the same time.
Upon reviewing Oliver’s interview, I noticed that I asked questions
related to all cells in the Contextualist Research Paradigm Matrix but
one: the “Researcher x Publication” cell, which asks, “How do I want
to be perceived as a researcher in the final presentation? What voice
would best enhance what I’m trying to say?” Oliver’s interview, how-
ever, gave her an opportunity to construct a second voice—one that
did not appear in her actual report. Surely, the amount of compli-
cated data she had, the importance of her literature review, and the
length of the study limited the space available for an additional per-
sonal voice in the report. The voice that Oliver chose for her study,
then, is a most sensible one in the context of her work. In her inter-
view, Oliver demonstrated a clear sense for the role and value of tra-
ditional research reports in our field, especially related to her own
teaching.
In the context of other studies, however, such a report can be con-
structed with a personal voice as well. Chapter six will present my
own pilot study on the differences in students’ responses to red and
blue ink in basic writing classrooms. For my report, I chose several
voices, but the context in which I conducted this pilot differs greatly
from Oliver’s. My purposes for conducting the study were to examine
our lore about red ink in the classroom and to test (or in Oliver’s
words, to validate, to provide balance for) that belief in our scholar-
ship. Another purpose for sharing this pilot study along with Oliver’s
study is to demonstrate another form for research that relies on
numerical data—one that does not refute or reject the form chosen
by Oliver, but one that provides an alternative well-suited to some
research contexts in which we find ourselves asking and exploring
questions.
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N O T E S  
1. When I began to look for a traditional study for this chapter, I
decided to review the last two years of RTE: First, RTE has become a
symbol of quantitative research in our field and has, at times, been
criticized for it. Second, I focused on the last two years in order to
find recent works. Therefore, I reviewed nine issues of RTE: May
1995 through May 1997. In those nine issues were forty-four articles
(excluding notes from editors and announcements). I first elimi-
nated twenty-two unrelated articles (four studies in teaching litera-
ture, five annotated bibliographies, two letters from readers, a
memorial to Alan C. Purves, eight essays, and two “Viewpoints”). I
then eliminated nine studies that used no numerical data and eight
studies that gathered numerical data but did not share full analyses
of data or converted the data to a qualitative report. Of the five arti-
cles remaining that presented full analyses of data, one was Eileen
Oliver’s. Since Eileen Oliver had been one of my undergraduate
professors when we were both at St. Cloud State University (and
since I had no further criteria for choosing one of the five over the
others), I asked her first, simply because I knew her.
When I first contacted Dr. Oliver, I did not reveal to her why I
was interviewing her, except to say that I wanted to ask her ques-
tions about her study and that my use of her article and interview
would be positive. Her answers, then, were not unfairly con-
structed for the purpose of helping me make my point.
2. “The Writing Quality of Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Graders,
and College Freshmen” is copyright 1995, National Council of
Teachers of English. Reprinted here by permission of the publisher.
3. Email discussions with Oliver occurred from October 26, 1997 to
June 17, 1998. She has approved final printing of this chapter, my
use and interpretation of her comments here, and the reprinting of
her text. I’d again like to thank Eileen for her generous and patient
assistance with this chapter.
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PA R A D I G M
A Demonstration
In the most traditional form, research reports often exclude personal
experience or even the use of first person, resulting in texts that
sometimes sound awkward (“the authors conclude . . .”) or imper-
sonal and a-contextual (“the literature has failed to show . . .”). Our
own sensitivity to context in composition studies has guided the per-
ception that such traditional reports are, therefore, insensitive to con-
text. As shown in chapter five, this is not the case, as Oliver articulated
answers to most of the questions in the Contextualist Research
Paradigm Matrix. However, the appearance of the traditional report
is a part of the perceived problem. While I contend that numerical
evidence is never stripped of the context of personal observations,
intuition, and experience, the concise manner in which numerical
evidence is often presented in traditional reports often creates, for
readers unfamiliar with or lacking training in traditional reports, the
illusion that it is.
Choosing such a traditional form (and the voice that accompanies
it) is understandable and appropriate in several contexts. In the con-
text of Oliver’s study, for example, she needed to share a lengthy liter-
ature review, articulate complicated data and data analyses, and
discuss practical applications of the study—elements necessary for a
persuasive and informative piece given the nature of her study. To add
more personal anecdotes or to construct a personal voice would have
taken too much space and would have distracted readers’ attention
from other, more important issues at that moment, in that context.
Regardless of the reasons for Oliver’s rhetorical decisions, however,
she made each decision appropriately in the context of her work.
In other contexts, however, a blend of styles would be appropriate,
too. In this chapter, I will present another study, but this pilot study
will blend a “narrative” with the traditional-looking text, creating an
alternative form for reporting research that composition scholars
might find more attractive and readable if they decide the context
warrants such a blended form. This blended form makes the context
for the project more visible and more readily perceived by its very
appearance and its use of personal voice, experience, and anecdotes—
a context more visible to the untrained eye, in contrast to the need for
training to understand the full context of a more traditional report.
The numerical data presented in this pilot study, then, is more obvi-
ously “contextualized” within the narration of the process and anec-
dotes that express the curiosity that guided the study. At the same
time, I do not intend to recommend this form as the best alternative
for all studies, for to do so would, once again, ignore context.
While this blend of styles is one of the purposes of the following
study, it meets a second purpose as well: the following study tests one
small piece of our commonly accepted lore by asking, “Is red ink all
that bad?” What would happen if we experimented by using red ink
with some students and another color with other students? What
would students then say about that ink color when we ask them how
it makes them feel? How true is our lore? Driven by my own memory
of red ink on my own papers as a student (and the encouragement I
felt from my teachers), I conducted an experiment that tried to assess
students’ feelings about red ink. For me, there was a discrepancy
between my own memories, experiences, and intuition and the oral
and written lore that criticizes the use of red ink in our field. Thus, in
Annis’s terms, my own “believer’s level of understanding” conflicted
with the beliefs about an “issue” held by the “appropriate objector
group.”
The Contextualist Research Paradigm presented in chapter four is
at work here. For example, readers will notice that the dominant voice
is, first, a personal one, as I recall experiences that have framed my
view of red ink. Then, the voice becomes a critical one, questioning
and commenting on some available literature. As I reveal my methods
and data, my voice continues to narrate and describe events, but it
treats the data accurately in traditional ways when needed. Finally, my
tone turns argumentative in the discussion section but returns to the
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I imagine readers who either
believe red ink lore or have
questioned it themselves;
teachers, tutors, myself, the
field
I’m curious because
avoidance of red ink doesn’t
address larger issues. As a
student, I didn’t perceive red
as negative. My studies in
cognition suggest that red
might be effective for
attracting students’
attention.
Question should be worded
for hypothesis testing to
guide the experiment.
Ethical issues? I’m confident
students will not be pained
by the red pen.
My research will benefit
mostly teachers, by 
examining lore. It will help
students if we think about
our commenting styles
differently.
This study might be the first
of its kind. Other literature
refers to red ink casually—
assumptions, not “tests” or
full examination.
I need evidence that is both
numerical and anecdotal—
to measure the anecdotal
against the numerical.
To question lore, the final
report should include lore,
but go beyond that. Start
with lore, then numerical
data.
I want to be perceived as






Conclusion: return to 
questioning calm.
My data is interesting: few
significant differences, but
red received higher average
for all but one item. In this
context, it’s enough
evidence to rethink lore but
not enough to claim that
students prefer red.
Most others, in print and in
conversation seem to accept
the lore of red ink as a 
punishing element in a
teacher’s comments 
or discuss red ink as
something from our past.
I can use my own classes
and find another teacher
willing to participate. I can
design my own instrument
and analyze my own data.
Weaknesses: what if the
other teacher is too
different? I won’t have a
large group of subjects.
Data readily available: my
experience and
observations.
Data to be gathered:
Students’ response to
survey. Available literature
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personal inquisitive voice with which I started. Therefore, I decided to
adopt not just one voice, but several, as needed for the larger context
of this study and in the smaller and different sections of the report.
Figure 6.1 shows the Contextualist Research Paradigm matrix with
my answers to each set of questions proposed in the original matrix
(see chapter four).
Certainly, I made more decisions than I can possibly show in this
space, but I hope that readers will see the intersection of the rhetori-
cal and research issues that formed the context in which I conducted
and shared the study and how these decisions appear in the final
product of the study below. Further, I did not keep track of the order
in which I encountered these decisions. The process of making these
decisions was much messier than the matrix might suggest, and read-
ers should be aware that the matrix simply shows which decisions I
made, not at what time or in what order.
Undoubtedly, critics of traditional research models have argued
that such research serves the trivial or obvious; here, a study about red
ink might seem, at first, trivial. Yet this study is designed as a demon-
stration beginners might find instructive, and it attempts to answer a
question that pervades our lore and sometimes our literature. Why do
we subscribe to the notion that red ink is always negative? Could data
gathered from classroom research help us rethink that lore?
R E D  I N K  /  B L U E  I N K :  D O E S  I T R E A L LY M AT T E R  
W H AT W R I T I N G  T E A C H E R S  U S E ? 1
When I think of red, I think of many things: the red
oversized sweater that draws compliments from friends and
students every time I wear it; that very special Valentine I hope
to get one day; the funny family story about my police-officer
grandfather not allowing my mother to own red shoes because
“every prostitute on Washington Street” did, too; a man I once
dated who looked especially handsome in red and less so in
other colors; the single red rose I carried in my youngest
sister’s wedding; the comments and encouragement (in red
ink) from several wonderful teachers who made me, too, want
to be a teacher someday.
Red comments on my papers and tests did, in fact,
“scream” as we think they do. They yelled, “this is important!”
and “here’s an error to correct in the future”—screaming and
yelling that drew my attention, that motivated me, that focused
my energy on working harder, becoming stronger. But teachers
also had positive things to say, and I don’t recall any of them
switching ink color to do so. Still in red, their positive comments
would shout: “You’re terrific!” and “I like your writing!” and, on
occasion, a “Hallelujah!” or two.
Later, when my training in composition began in a writing
center, I learned more narrow meanings for red ink. Typical of
lore, my indoctrination into the dangers of red ink was mostly
oral—listening to professors, attending conferences, and
reinforcing the notion in hallway chatter. Soon, I, too,
associated red ink with “old-fashioned” pedagogies, the kind
that writing centers and new-paradigm teachers would stay far
away from. Teachers who bled all over student papers were a
part of the problem that writing tutors were there to correct, to
provide salvation for the victims—the students. Numerous
Tutors’ Columns in the Writing Lab Newsletter reinforced the
horrors of red ink.
In one Tutors’ Column, “Leggo My Ego,” Babcock (1995)
related the euphoric rush of power he felt when he was first
hired as a tutor, including lofty images/fantasies of power and
glory: “I, cackling my rapture, pinned endless stacks of bad
term papers to dart boards with flying red pencils” (10). In the
end, Babcock relinquished such notions of power in favor of
“tutor speak.”
In the Spring of 1997, one day I had a short break from my
duties as a faculty tutor in a writing center, so I took the opportu-
nity to grade a couple of last-minute papers for a class I would
teach that afternoon. Much to the horror of two tutors on duty at
the time, I used the only pen I had in my purse: red. Their ques-
tions, in short, were filled with dismay and centered on the
notion that someone like me (i.e., someone in a doctoral
program in composition at the time, someone in writing centers,
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someone who should be well-versed in composition theory)
would use, of all things, a red pen. They asked me everything
but “Where have you been?!?”
We cannot deny that red ink is still a part of our educational
framework, our image. Even in a search for the phrase “red
pen(s)” on the World Wide Web via AltaVista, dozens of
websites (too many to count, really) provide lists of school 
supplies for elementary and middle school children—including
the red pens necessary for peer review of written texts. Indeed,
red is still frequently used by editors, even though our negative
image of red evolved to the point that writing teachers now
avoid it.
Red ink with all its ills has become such a standard part of
our lore, that when it is mentioned in our scholarship, these ref-
erences are often casual references in nature, as if readers will
automatically know what we mean. Harkin (1991), in fact, used
red ink as a descriptive element of what lore is in the first
place:
Lore comprises the rituals of our profession, like teaching
the modes, sitting in a circle, assigning double-entry note-
books, using a red pen, forming peer-group workshops. (125)
In Furnish’s (1995) plea for writing teachers to examine their
hatred of grading writing, one of Furnish’s assumptions is that
writing teachers’ frustrations are related to their writing too
much—”they use more red ink than they should if both teacher
and student are to keep things in perspective” (493) (see also
Sommers, 1982)—but the red pen results also in the scarlet-
letter shame that students must wear:
Most teachers mark the writing they grade by using the
proverbial red ink to show students that writing is fraught
with the peril of costly or shameful error. (493)
The association we have with error (and, therefore, with
shame) is commonly seen. Hawisher and Selfe (1991), in a
review of technology in the composition classroom, warned us
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against using technology to move us forward only in the same
old, bad ways of the old paradigm:
We need to talk about the dangers of instructors who use
computers to deliver drill-and-practice exercises to students
or of instructors who promote the use of style analyzers to
underscore student errors more effectively than they did five
years ago with red pens. (61)
For Gage (1986), red ink was also associated with error,
especially in creating students’ superstitions that good writing
means good grammar:
For such students, grammar is a gigantic, invisible mine
field through which they must navigate or be destroyed—
when they least expect it—by red ink. They have often suf-
fered this sort of injury . . . (16)
Gage was not alone in constructing a violent image for red ink
in the composition classroom. For others, the red pen is not only
associated with grammar or error, but is also an eerie symptom
of teachers’ undemocratic power and authority in the
classroom—an authority that is, academically speaking, violent.
For Briggs and Pailliotet (1997), such violence comes from the
authority asserted by “those uninformed and dangerous teachers
who churned out bloodied texts, who scorned their students, who
abused the power vested in them by the institution” (57). 
This is war, it seems. Mine fields, blood, destruction, and
casualties—all brought on by the only pen that is truly mightier
than the sword: that red one. For Briggs and Pailliotet,
however, teachers generally seem to be losing the war, and
since we are already dubbed “dangerous,” it seems natural to
become “armed” as well:
In a system that doesn’t allow high school teachers the
same opportunities to use the bathroom as students, who can
fault teachers for asserting their power with the red pen? (57)
Power, glory, shame, and violence: Can one ink color really
do all that? As our understanding of assessment improves, do
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our students feel more shame with one color than with
another? The oral and written lore of red ink—pervasive in our
field—is clear. Given my own experiences, however, I have to
question: Is it accurate?
T H E  S T U D Y
The following pilot study sought to determine the effects of
red ink on students’ perceptions of teacher comments. In short,
I was curious: do students respond negatively to red ink if
teachers use red ink? The following study compares blue and
red ink in basic writing courses in hopes of confirming or
contesting the lore of red ink in our profession. 
If our lore “holds true,” the students subjected to the pain of
red ink in this study should have felt that teachers who used
red ink were unfair, harsh, negative, authoritative. I would
expect students to perhaps become fearful of those comments
and, by extension, of the teacher. But at the same time, I
intuitively hypothesized that red ink wouldn’t matter. If the lore
indeed remained true, students should prefer blue ink over red,
but I instead predicted no difference between students’
responses to red vs. blue ink. 
What I learned, however, surprised me.
M E T H O D
Subjects
In the Fall of 1997, I asked my friend and colleague, Greg
Siering, to participate in this study with me. First, I knew that
Greg was teaching two sections of basic writing at the same
times my two sections of basic writing were held. Second, I
wanted the other teacher to be male, to counterbalance for
gender effects. Further, Greg and I are approximately the same
age, were ABD in Ball State’s doctoral program in composition,
and were teaching the 50-minute courses not only at the same
time (1:00 and 3:00, MWF) but in the same building. As a
general rule, neither of us used red ink in our comments on
student papers, and throughout our friendship, we have often
agreed on composition theory, politics, and pedagogies.2
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Our four sections of basic writing had a total of 57 students
completing a survey at the end of the course. The fall semester
course (ENG 101) is the first half of a year-long sequence for
basic writers (ENG 101/102) at Ball State University. At Ball
State, students are placed in basic writing based on high
school rank and Verbal SAT scores. Exceptions can be made
for small high schools and for students successfully testing into
another course.
Procedure
For this study, I chose to compare red ink with only blue ink
in order to gain a simple comparison at this time. First, blue is
a common ink color that should draw no response from
students based on merely color. Second, blue should stand
out (as red does) from students’ texts, which are often printed
in black ink. I chose not to involve pencil, which would
introduce the variable of a different writing utensil rather than a
different ink color. Future studies could compare red ink to
more unusual ink colors that might be similar to red, such as
pink or purple—for a discussion of fuchsia, see Bartosenski
(1992)—or involve more neutral colors such as pencil or 
green ink. 
To counterbalance for the effects of class meeting times on
the outcome of this study, I used red ink in my 1:00 section and
blue in my 3:00, and Greg used red ink in his 3:00 section and
blue in his 1:00. The table below shows the design of the study
and the number of students participating:
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TABLE 6.1
Design of the Study and Number of Participants
Red Ink Blue Ink
Cindy 1:00 (N=15) 3:00 (N=14)
Greg 3:00 (N=12) 1:00 (N=16)
Total (N=57) 27 Students 30 Students
Greg and I used red ink for one class and blue ink for the
other on all student writing: journals, rough drafts, exercises,
and final drafts. As Greg and I discussed how we comment on
students’ papers, we learned how similar we are: we both
concentrate on global concerns, such as organization, develop-
ment, and focus; we both avoid thorough editing of texts and
instead find error patterns, marking the first few to show the stu-
dent the pattern, and then encouraging the student to find the
rest on his/her own (or with help in a conference); we both give
summary comments at the end with a mix of positive comments
and suggestions for improvement; we both ask questions about
content if we’re confused, offer praise for good ideas, or offer
comments about how we might personally relate to what a
student is saying. Given the idiosyncratic nature of teacher
comments, I was glad to find another teacher so similar to my
own commenting style in the context of teaching basic writing
courses.
Instrument
On the last day of class, students evaluated Greg and me
for the English Department, a standard procedure every term.
In addition to the standard evaluation that the Department
gives Writing Program students, we asked our students in this
study to complete a survey (see Appendix). I made four
packets of the survey and coded them for the four groups (cr,
cb, gr, gb), using the teacher’s first initial to separate packets
by teacher (c or g), then using the first initials of red and blue to
separate packets by color (r or b).
Limitations
Because my primary concern here was to assess the effect
of red vs. blue ink, I did not gather demographic data at this
time, although such inquiry could be done in the future,
assessing, for instance, differences in gender or age in
response to ink color. One of my classes that participated in
this study was nearly all-male; therefore, a split balance
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between men and women in this study could be found only if I
sought other courses. For now, because the subject group was
already small, and because I saw this study as a pilot, I
decided not to “make the group smaller” by dividing it further
into subgroups (by gender, for example).
R E S U LT S  
First, Question 7 on the survey was designed to test students’
memories of their teachers’ choice of ink colors. Students were
asked, “What ink color did your teacher use when making
comments on your papers?” and were given choices of a) blue,
b) red, c) green, d) pencil, and e) I don’t remember. Most
students (46 out of 57, or 80%) correctly remembered the ink
color used on their papers. Interestingly, however, more students
whose papers were marked in red remembered the color
accurately: only 2 out of 27 students (or 7%) in the red group
remembered incorrectly, while 9 out of 30 in the blue group (or
30%) remembered the ink color incorrectly. I performed a 2 X 2
chi square analysis and found a significant difference between
the two groups for correctly remembering ink color (X2(1) = 4.657,
p <.05), suggesting that students whose papers were marked in
red remembered the ink color better. Although a chi square
revealed a significance difference, a phi coefficient revealed that
the relationship (.286) between ink color and memory may be
somewhat weak, possibly due to the small number of students in
this pilot. Therefore, although students in this study tended to
remember red better than blue, there are likely to be too many
exceptions to a firm conclusion on this point.
But overall, and surprisingly, red ink seemed to be slightly
favored on average by students in this study. As Table 6.2
shows, students whose papers were marked with red ink
thought their teachers’ comments were more fair (Question 1),
encouraging (Question 2), and constructive (Question 3), based
on the mean scores given to the first three questions. Table 6.2
shows the mean scores and standard deviations for student
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responses on the first three questions. Those who saw only red
ink judged their teachers’ comments more favorably on
average, though no differences were statistically significant.3
Notice that of these three items, the blue group had higher
standard deviations in two of the items—teachers’ fairness and
encouragement—indicating that students in the red group
agreed more consistently in their responses to these items.
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TABLE 6.2
Student Judgments of Teacher Comments
(5 = strongly agree; 3 = Neutral; 1 = strongly disagree) 
Red N = 30; Blue N = 27
Red Blue
1. I feel my teacher made very M 4.67 4.33
fair comments on my papers. SD 0.595 0.796
(F1,53 = 2.95, p>.05)
2. My teacher gave me adequate M 4.57 4.37
encouragement in his/her SD 0.575 0.755
comments. (F1,53 = 1.00, p>.05)
3. My teacher used constructive M 4.48 4.37
criticism rather than negative. SD 0.775 0.727
(F1,53 = 2.95, p>.05)
TABLE 6.3
Emotion toward Teacher Comments
(5 = strongly agree; 3 = Neutral; 1 = strongly disagree) 
Red N = 30; Blue N = 27
Red Blue
4. I looked forward to reading my M 4.59 4.40
teacher’s comments. SD 0.596 0.68
5. I like that my teacher writes on M 4.74 4.80
my papers. SD 0.453 0.41
(F1,53 = 1.00, p>.05)
Because the issue here centers on students’ emotional
responses to red ink, I was sure to ask about their feelings,
such as looking forward to reading teacher comments and
simply “liking” the fact that the teacher commented at all. Table
6.3 shows the average score given to Questions 4 and 5 on the
survey, items that I hoped would illustrate students’ emotional
responses to teacher comments. As Table 6.3 shows, students
whose papers were marked in red ink responded more
favorably to one item, but less favorably to another.
Though there was no significant difference between red and
blue ink on Question 4 (F1,53=.87, p>.05), it’s surprising that
students in the red ink group rated this item more favorably at
all. Differences in responses to Question 5, however, showed
that students whose papers were marked in blue “liked” that
their teachers wrote on their papers, an item I had hoped would
determine if red vs. blue ink had an effect on students’ sensitivity
to their papers being marked in the first place. This difference,
too, was not significant (F1,53=.38, p>.05), though this item was
the only one in which blue had a higher mean than red.
Table 6.4 shows students’ responses to Question 6, which
tried to determine how students reacted to the amount of
comments teachers provided. The question asked if teachers,
in the students’ opinions, wrote “an adequate amount” on their
papers, but it did not seek to determine if students felt teachers
wrote too little or too much. For the purposes of this study, “too
little or too much” is another issue: students’ negative or
positive response to the item, regardless of the reason, is all I
sought here. One student, in a written comment on the survey,
however, indicated that the teacher did not write enough; other-
wise, no data to that effect was gathered.
Note that the standard deviation for the blue group is more
than four times higher than the red group’s variability,
suggesting a much higher consistency with which the students
in the red group responded to this item. There was also a
significance difference (F1,53=8.48, p < .01) in students’
responses to the amount of comments Greg and I made on
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their papers. Students in the blue ink group were significantly
more dissatisfied than the red ink group, but there were no sig-
nificant differences between Greg’s group and mine, as Table
6.5 shows.
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TABLE 6.4
Amount of Teacher Comments
(5 = strongly agree; 3 = Neutral; 1 = strongly disagree) 
Red N = 30; Blue N = 27
Red Blue
I feel my teacher wrote an M 4.59 4.40
adequate amount: not too much, SD 0.596 0.68
not too little.
TABLE 6.5
Analysis of Variance for Question 6:
Students’ Satisfaction with Amount of Comment
Source df Mean Sq F Sig
Teacher 1 0.37201 0.65 0.4242
Ink Color 1 4.86258 8.48 .0053*
Teacher X Ink 1 0.63616 4.11 0.2971
Residual 53 0.57358
*p<.01
In spite of all of the questions on this survey, I was most
interested in students’ responses to Question 9, which asked
them to comment on the nature of red ink. While I expected no
significant difference among students’ responses to this
question, I was surprised that of 27 students whose papers
were marked in red ink, none of them described red as having
a “harsh, negative” tone. In contrast, 40% of the students
whose papers were marked in blue ink suggested that a
“harsh, negative tone” is associated with red ink. More
surprisingly, 19% of the students in the red ink group indicated
A 2 x 3 chi square analysis showed a significant difference
in how students perceived red ink (X2(2)= 15.71, p < .001), and
a phi coefficient of .53 indicates a fairly strong relationship
between the ink color actually used with students and their per-
ceptions of that ink color. Further, the fact that the majority of
students (78%) in the red ink group thought that red ink is easy
to see fits well with the higher accuracy with which students in
the red ink group recalled the color used on their papers
(Question 7, discussed earlier). 
Question 8 asked students to recommend an ink color for
their teachers to use in the future. They were given options of
a) blue, b) red, c) green, d) pencil, e) it really doesn’t matter to
me, and f) other (with a note for them to specify). I wasn’t
surprised to see that the majority of students (52.5%) noted
that it didn’t matter to them. However, the second-highest
recommendation (overall) was for red ink, with 37% of the red
ink group recommending red and even 17% of the blue ink
group recommending that red be used in the future. Table 6.7
that red is “bright and cheerful,” while only 4% of the blue ink
group suggested the same. 
In other words, the only students in this study who
responded negatively to red ink were students whose papers
were not marked in red. Table 6.6 shows the percentage of
responses to each choice given in Question 9:
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TABLE 6.6
Students’ Descriptions of Red Ink
(percentages will not add to 100%. Two students did not 
answer this question.)
Descriptions of Red Ink Red Blue
Red ink has a harsh, negative tone. 0% 40%
Red ink is easy to see. 78% 50%
Red ink is bright and cheerful. 19% 3%
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shows the percentages of students’ future recommendations,
divided by which ink color their teacher had used. Only one
student marked “other,” recommending purple.
To conduct a chi square analysis, I deleted the categories
not under consideration here—green, pencil, and other—and
kept only red, blue, and “it doesn’t matter.” In a 2 x 3 chi
square, then, I found a significant difference among students’
TABLE 6.7
Student Recommendations for Future Ink Color 
(Percentages are rounded.)
Recommendation Red Blue Total
Blue 4% 27% 16.0%
Red 37% 17% 26.0%
Green 0% 0% 0.0%
Pencil 4% 3% 3.5%
Doesn’t Matter 55% 50% 52.5%
Other 0% 3% 3.0%
recommendations for future ink color (X2(2) = 6.77, p <.05) (phi
coefficient = .35), suggesting that most students in this study
really don’t care what ink color we use. The second most popu-
lar recommendation, however, was for the ink color with which
students were already familiar: for students in the red group,
red was the second-highest recommendation; for students in
the blue group, blue was the second-highest recommendation.
We could explore this issue in future research: if students had
not been given “it really doesn’t matter” as an option, would we
see the “familiar” color chosen most frequently?
I ended the study at the end of Fall 1997 when these
students completed ENG 101, the first half of the basic writing
sequence (ENG 101/102). When the same students came
back for ENG 102 in Spring 1998, I did not ask Greg to
continue the red/blue study, and I decided to end my part of the
study in the second semester by switching to a third ink color—
black, which I felt was more “neutral.” 
180 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
One day during ENG 102, however, some students began
to discuss their talents as creative writers. Without any prompt-
ing from me, though we were about to do a creative writing
assignment, my students began to wonder: were they better
creative writers or academic writers? As the discussion
continued, I commented on what I felt were my own
strengths—academic writing—and noted that I’m probably a
better critic than a creative writer. One student laughed, “Yeah!
I can tell! All those red marks on my papers!” Other students
laughed good-naturedly, but one student turned to face the
first: “You still get RED? I only get BLACK!” Looking at me, he
moaned and accused, “That’s just so unfair!” Interestingly, the
first student remembered red comments, even though I had
switched to black ink. Another noticed the switch in color but
felt he was somehow getting “less.”
D I S C U S S I O N
These surprising results, which showed either no difference
in students’ reactions to red vs. blue ink or showed that red ink
was slightly preferred to blue should cause our field to rethink
the lore of red ink that it has created. Most results here were
not statistically significant, so I cannot make a claim as strong
as “students prefer red ink.” At the same time, I was surprised
to see any preference for red ink at all, especially in the context
of our commonly-held belief that red ink is negative. If the lore
remained “true,” we should have seen a much greater
preference for blue ink. I believe that these results were due to
two factors in particular. 
First, the context in which the red ink lore began has
changed. Surprisingly, the lore has not. In early research on
teachers’ comments, much discussion focused on “negative”
vs. “positive” commentary (Schaub, 1997). Other research
showed the ineffectiveness of some kinds of comments, such
as thorough editing of the text, cryptic remarks in the margin
(such as “awk”), or simple grades with no explanation.
Applebee (1981) and Anson (1989) reported that the amount of
teacher comments on merely surface errors was as high as
71% and 75%, respectively.
In that context, the lore of red ink began: the accepted prac-
tice of more negative comments than positive ones, and the
frequent attention to error. Since then, teachers are more
informed about the effects of their comments, and several texts
have been devoted solely to the art of teacher commentary.4
Given changes in the way our field treats assessment, this pilot
study suggests the need to rethink the lore that accompanies
assessment as well.
In spite of changes in our profession, the lore that has
defined that profession remains unchanged, and North’s (1987)
prophetic statement—that once something has been added to
lore, it cannot be removed from it—has proven not only to be
true, but unfortunate as well, especially in the evolving contexts
in which we work.
Second, our own construction of the red ink lore has been
based, in part, on our own literary training. “Red,” after all, is
never “missed” by the literary critic or the English teacher as a
significant choice of color by a writer. For us, red means death,
blood, war, lust, or danger—because we have been trained to
see it as such. How else has a simple ink color so easily
conjured so many violent images in our scholarship? 
Blue, too, is quite symbolic—of sadness, water, air, tranquil-
ity—yet, we do not give much attention to that. Nor do we give
attention to the white paper and black ink our students use,
though such colors are as equally traditional for students as
red pens are for teachers. 
If we were to supplement our literary interpretations with
cognitive interpretations, we would come to understand that
red ink does not deserve this attention. It simply grabs our
attention: a color as bright and as bold as red, meaningful in lit-
erary circles, is simply, in cognitive terms, salient, especially on
student papers produced on traditional white paper with black
ink. Perhaps our students have not been victimized by the red
pen so much as we have been victimized by our lack of
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understanding of such cognitive principles as “perception” and
“human memory.”
And what about our students? For most of our freshmen,
such literary training has not been so deeply ingrained. How
can we assume that their reaction to red ink will be as literary
as ours and, therefore, as negative? Students in this study
suggested the most practical reason for using red: it’s easy to
see. And don’t we want them to do just that? See—not “see as
we see,” but, simply, “see.”
C O N C L U S I O N
In our quest to embrace democratic pedagogies, red ink has
become a symbol of all that we hope to avoid. From political,
literary, and emotional standpoints, then, we have constructed
the belief that red ink in our communication with students via
our comments on their papers is negative, violent, and hurtful.
Research that validates or refutes such beliefs must, in
contrast, examine as objectively as possible such “truths.”
While this pilot study (or others like it) cannot examine deeply
an individual’s response to ink color, it does suggest the power
of such research to examine broadly the equally broad belief
we hold regarding ink color.
Do we really want to maintain such a deeply held belief
about something as silly as ink color? Do we really believe that
students are more affected by the color of our comments than
by the content or tone? And in our quest to examine authority
and power in the classroom (and our own paradoxical
willingness to embrace authority and power in order to “give”
some to our students), shouldn’t we admit that removing red
ink from the situation is merely a bandage and not a cure?
Such passionate attention to ink color diverts our attention
from other, more important, issues—as unpleasant as some of
those issues might be (even more unpleasant than the odious
red pen). For instance, when an undergraduate peer tutor from
our writing center began her first high school teaching job after
graduation, she called me one night, appalled to learn her
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school’s policy that all teachers must use red ink on students’
work. Although, as writing center director at the time, I didn’t
recall talking about red ink in particular, our tutor training
program did include numerous readings in which red ink was
portrayed as the enemy, and this was one tutor in particular
who attended as many professional conferences as she could,
where she was undoubtedly exposed to the lore. Now an
English teacher herself, this former tutor, because of her
training, couldn’t escape the lore of red ink and, more
importantly, couldn’t escape the passion surrounding such lore.
Because I felt partly responsible for her distress, I spent
several minutes encouraging her to calmly ask her principal for
the origin of the policy, and I pointed out a possible and
unfortunate cause: if her school had trouble with students falsify-
ing records, changing grades, or forging teachers’ signatures, a
standardized ink color might be a part of their solution to
preventing such problems. I told her a story of a high school
classmate of my own, who once erased and then changed some
of his grades written in pencil in our senior English teacher’s
gradebook when she left her gradebook unattended one day. 
Although I became a teacher one day myself, my own
adolescent past included a talent for forging teachers’
signatures on hall passes—a harmless prank, or so I thought,
until I grew up and learned more about schools and their legal
responsibilities. Fortunately, no one for whom I had written a hall
pass had been injured or had caused harm to someone else. 
This former tutor had been so fortunate to have worked
mostly with highly motivated, sincere, honest college students
in our writing center. Unfortunately, we teachers also know that
not all students are the same, and especially in the context of
working with teenagers, we know their desire to test the limits
sometimes—an unfortunate impetus for much classroom
policy/policing.
But on the brighter side, colors—even red—are useful in
many ways. For instance, my own students recently reminded
me of the importance of color-coding their papers—or what
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Bartosenski (1992) called “painting a paper”—something I often
encourage my students to do. Two of my most motivated
students in a basic writing course in the Spring of 1998 (the red
ink group in this very study) were often models of collaboration—
Ryan and Chad shared their papers with each other in and out of
class, energetically discussed the points they were trying to
make, made helpful suggestions that they accepted or rejected,
asked critical questions, called me in to settle several disputes,
but refused to “do the work” for each other. 
One day, during a peer review session, Ryan brought my
purse from the front desk to where I was sitting with another
group of students in the back of the room. “Do you have a red
pen?” Ryan asked, handing me my purse. “Chad needs to
color-code his paper. It’s all messed up.” From across the
room, Chad laughed at himself, yelling, “Yeah! It’s a mess! But
we just figured it out!”
Could such excellent collaboration among students even
occur in a classroom in which the teacher used the threatening
red ink? Could such rapport develop in this classroom (with
authoritative red ink) to the point that a student feels
comfortable bringing me my purse from across the room?
Could such excellent skills at self-assessment and peer review
emerge in a classroom bloodied by a red pen? Of course.
Because there’s so much more to my teaching and yours than
the color of an ink.
Studies such as this one provide a deeper look into our
beliefs—what they are, where they come from, and whom or
what they are for. As teachers frequently grapple with how to
comment on student papers, the avoidance of red ink should
not provide a superficial kind of relief. Just as we ask ourselves
hard questions about how to word those comments or how
much to comment (and where), we should examine more fully
the effects of what those comments look like—not assuming,
uncritically, that one color is “off limits” and the others are all
somehow (equally) acceptable. Further, research such as this
will not only test those beliefs, but could also place our beliefs in
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the larger context of student-teacher rapport, assignment
making, cognition, and individual conferences. As our field
rapidly changes, so must our lore—especially when that lore
doesn’t make sense to the people who matter the most—our
students.
What’s next for my classroom, my students, and the pens in
my purse? To be honest, I’m not sure. Should I continue using
red ink? I discovered during this study a strange outcome of
limiting ourselves to only one color. One night I discovered that
I had no red pens at home, but I had to grade papers from the
“red ink group.” I ran to a nearby 24-hour supermarket to
purchase more. It would have ruined my study if I had used
another color, but my office was farther away than the
supermarket. I laughed all the way there, “Oh, I see. This is
why we shouldn’t use red ink!”
In the semester following this study, I first started using
black ink consistently, but later I randomly used whatever
writing utensil I first grabbed out of my well-used purse
whenever I graded papers: pencils, blue pens, red pens. It did-
n’t matter, I thought, but in the back of my mind the question
remained, “doesn’t it?” These students remembered red,
responded somewhat more favorably to red, and, on one day,
even asked for red. 
Next, then, will be more experimentation because I can’t
quite decide what to do. I started this study thinking that ink
color didn’t matter at all. Now I suspect that it does, but not in
the way our lore has taught us. I would first like to continue
gathering data in the same manner from more students,
perhaps adding interviews that will give fuller descriptions of
students’ reactions to our red ink lore. A different study could
compare (instead of ink color) consistency of ink color: some
classes would get a systematic rotation of varied colors, and
others would get a steady use of one color. If we keep
switching colors, will students’ attention be drawn instead to
the content of our comments? Will it matter at all? Only future
experimentation will reveal that. 
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S U M M A RY  
Similar to the interview with Eileen Oliver, this study demon-
strates the potential collapse of the qualitative/quantitative
dichotomy. The red ink/blue ink pilot study presented here shares, on
the one hand, features of both anecdotal and numerical evidence; on
the other hand and more accurately, it presents, on the whole, neither.
It is instead a study that explores a question in the context of the
researcher’s curiosity, experience, and available resources—a study
that demonstrates a Contextualist Research Paradigm that encour-
ages us to explore our research not simply as “qualitative” or “quanti-
tative,” but—simply, and more broadly defined—as research: research
conducted in contexts that may produce varied processes/decisions
and products/forms.
If we paid attention to only form here, a traditional report would
not have the personal voice, narrative threads, anecdotes, or “asides”
that I shared for the purpose of illustrating my point of view and
examining all kinds of evidence available to me in the context of this
study. Similarly, a purely “qualitative” study would not have focused on
numerical data and conducted such descriptive and inferential statisti-
cal analyses. Attending instead to context, I presented this study in the
form most appropriate for what I wanted to know—a decision I made
in the process of research that resulted in a product that shares a blend
of voices, styles, and forms—all dictated by context.
Applying a Contextualist Research Paradigm has great potential
for reconstructing our field—our teachers, researchers, and scholar-
ship. Especially as we conduct and read research, attending to contex-
tualist principles will allow us to examine and accept our research for
what it is in its moment—understanding strengths and limitations,
knowing that one study never pretends to answer everything about
the nature of our work. All research methods have limits—and all
research methods have potential—depending on the contexts in
which we ask and explore our research questions.
Chapter five, through an illustration, examined the potential of a
Contextualist Research Paradigm and its accompanying matrix—to
see the breadth of this concept called “research.” Chapter six, through
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a demonstration, explored its potential further. Chapter seven will
outline other specific needs our field must meet in order to fully
embrace a new contextualist paradigm and chapter eight will specu-
late on the future of composition research.
N O T E S  
1. Ball State University approval for this study is filed under IRB pro-
tocol ID #98-48.
2. I’d like to thank my friend and colleague Greg Siering for partici-
pating in this study, even though he normally does not use red ink
(though not out of concern for students’ reactions, but his own
distaste for how the color looks on the page—in his own words,
“it’s an aesthetic thing”).
3. Statistical significance in this study was determined through stepwise
regression analysis through which all variables (teachers, class times,
and ink color) were factored in separately to ensure that no differ-
ences existed because of differences in teacher, differences in class
times, or differences in group sizes per ink color (Greg, for example,
had more students in the blue ink group, and I had more students in
the red ink group). Computer analysis determined that these differ-
ences in group sizes and some other variables produced no signifi-
cant differences. While the F-values reported here look much like a
standard ANOVA, conducting a stepwise regression analysis is a
more “sophisticated” way of conducted an ANOVA in some contexts.
4. See, for example, White, Lutz, & Kamusikiri (1996) Assessment of
Writing: Politics, Policies, Practices; White (1994) Teaching and
Assessing Writing; Anson (1989) Writing and Response; Straub &
Lunsford (1995) Twelve Readers Reading: Responding to College
Student Writing; and Zak & Weaver (1998) The Theory and Practice
of Grading Writing: Problems and Possibilities.
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A P P E N D I X
Response to Teacher Comments
* please do not put your name on this form *
Please rank the following (5 = strongly agree; 3 = neutral; 
1 = strongly disagree)
1. I feel my teacher made very fair 5 4 3 2 1
comments on my papers
2. My teacher gave me adequate 5 4 3 2 1
encouragement in his/her comments
3. My teacher used constructive 5 4 3 2 1
criticism rather than negative 
4. I looked forward to reading my 5 4 3 2 1
teacher’s comments
5. I like that my teacher writes on 5 4 3 2 1
my papers
6. I feel my teacher wrote an 5 4 3 2 1
adequate amount: not too much, not too little
Please circle the answers that apply to you:
7. What ink color did your teacher use when making





e. I don’t remember
8. I’d like to recommend the following ink color to my
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e. it really doesn’t matter to me
f. Other: _________________
9. Please circle the statement that is most fitting to you
(please circle only ONE):
a. Red ink has a harsh, negative tone
b. Red ink is easy to see
c. Red ink is bright and cheerful
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7 P R E D I C T O R  VA R I A B L E S  
The Future of Composition Research
Rhetoric has as its domain all aspects of the argumentative
mode of discourse including logic, dialectic, and the
methodology of science.
Walter Weimer, 1979
To fully embrace the Contextualist Research Paradigm, we must take
other steps that will enable us to do so. This chapter will focus on spe-
cific recommendations for changing the direction of our research
trends: reconsidering MLA as a style manual, understanding the exclu-
sionary voices of our storytellers, incorporating our research in our
teaching, training our researchers more completely in a wider range of
research methods and statistics, and embracing numbers as natural phe-
nomena. All of these specific recommendations are made with an eye
toward the overall context of our field’s quest to define itself and con-
struct its boundaries in an accurate, respectable, and flexible manner.
M L A  VO I C E , M Y  VO I C E  
When I began this project, I was writing in MLA style. I later
changed to APA, but I couldn’t explain why—something about MLA
style bothered me in this work. I thought perhaps APA would make
more sense if only because of my interest in science and psychology
and in numerical evidence. And, personally, I’ve always preferred APA
to MLA anyway. But, still, I couldn’t figure out why.
MLA treats text as a “living” object of study, always in front of us,
always available to us. Therefore, if I were to write about Milton’s
Paradise Lost or Morrison’s Paradise, I would use present tense for
both, regardless of how old or how new those texts are, or how many
centuries separate the two. That is the convention of literature and of
literary criticism—and justifiably so. The novel, the poem, the short
story—works of literature—can always be interpreted, reinterpreted,
criticized, but the work itself will not change. Once it is published, it’s
published. It’s “there.” Forever. Thus, present tense treats the text ade-
quately—the work “is.”
In composition, however, in spite of numerous publications that
will also be there “forever,” our texts serve a different purpose: con-
structing theory, presenting research, and discussing pedagogy are
acts that focus not on the product of the text that resulted from such
inquiry, but on the process of thinking that was used to arrive at that
text in the first place and the later application of those ideas to our
work. Yet, because of our ties to literature, we continue to use MLA
style in our own publications1—as if the scholarship we are reviewing
is “present” in text form rather than “past” in thought form. And
because our texts are based on theory, research, and pedagogy (rather
than fiction), our use of MLA ties the theories, research, and pedago-
gies to their authors in the present tense as if those authors still
believe—still currently “live” in—that theory, research, or pedagogy.
In other words, the present tense that MLA requires for treatment of
text, is transferred instead, in composition, to treatment of authors. As
a result, our criticism, citations, and use of composition scholarship
locks the author—rather than the text—in present tense.
Consider, for example, Bushman’s (1998) use of Flower’s (1979)
cognitive description of writer-based and reader-based prose:
Linda Flower explains this phenomenon in cognitive terms and, like
Vygotsky, believes that a writer must “transform” one’s “writer-based
prose” into “reader-based prose.” (10, emphasis mine)
Citing a theory that is almost 20 years old in a manner that makes
Flower (and, worse, Vygotsky) “still believe”—always—something she
published in 1979 de-contextualizes our work. To write about com-
position publications in the present tense creates the illusion that our
authors, regardless of the amount of time that has passed, still believe
their theories of twenty years before.
Because the constraints of MLA documentation demand present
tense, composition publications that require MLA style limit our
authors and decontextualize our work in four ways: 1) the authors
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currently writing and publishing must use present tense advocated by
the MLA regardless of what is best in the context of their work, 2)
present tense for both our discussion/analysis/commentary and our
source citations makes it more difficult for readers to distinguish
between the author’s own voice and the voices of other texts to which
the author refers, 3) present tense does not allow authors who are
being cited to have their own works viewed in the context in which
they were originally published, and 4) authors cited in present tense
are locked into what they believed (in 1979, in Flower’s case) as if
those works will always represent what those authors are thinking
now (i.e., Flower can’t learn anything more after 1979 that would
change her mind).
Present tense, as required by MLA when reviewing scholarship, has
a certain “indefinite” tone to it, suggesting “always, forever,” while at
the same time a certain “definitiveness” to it, suggesting a “rigid,
locked” status of our scholarship and our scholars. In reality, our past
publications are so often revisited, revised, and extended beyond
themselves, and, certainly, the authors themselves continue to grow,
change, and refine their beliefs. Frequent interchanges of ideas
through our scholarship create new theories, new research, new peda-
gogies, even from the authors who once proposed the “old.” This
scholarship, in other words, is not literary and will, therefore, be
“changed.” While Toni Morrison, for example, might write differently
in her next novel, or might write even better than she already does, no
amount of criticism or questions or reviews will make Morrison
change Paradise or change the “idea” that produced it—because no
one would ever expect her to. It’s literature. And that’s what literature
is, and that’s what the MLA is historically about.
In contrast to MLA, the APA recommends past tense. Research was
completed in the past, after all, and theories proposed are published
in the past as well. For APA, the context of time is important, which is
why the year is placed near the authors’ names in APA citations.2 To
show the difference that using APA can make in composition scholar-
ship, consider the following paragraph, a combination of reference
and commentary, printed earlier in this work. The passage is in APA
style, with the verb phrases highlighted:
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But such a study takes time and, worse, requires quantifying and ana-
lyzing data (numbers, in other words), and Elbow warned us in the same
book that any reduction of anything to a single number is “untrustwor-
thy” (251). Never mind that Elbow warned us also in the beginning of the
same book that his reflections were biased and that he, like Gulliver, was a
less-than-reliable narrator (vi). The current climate of our field (one of
new favoritism toward qualitative forms of research) has produced a battle
for trustworthiness between a number and a narrative. And the narrative
clearly wins—not because it necessarily offers more (or more accurate)
information than the other, but because the narrative offers one kind of
information that we clearly value more.
The past tense in reference to Elbow helps separate his voice
(established by past tense) from my own voice and commentary
(established by present tense). Past tense here also ties what Elbow
said only to the specific work being cited, not to “Elbow’s thoughts
generally and for all time,” keeping his words tied closely to the spe-
cific context in which they were written—the most honest and fair
look at any author in the first place.
Further, in my own classrooms, I am reminded of my students’
needs to learn APA documentation for their own fields. On the first day
of class in Composition II (which has a focus on research), I give stu-
dents a survey, asking about their familiarity with MLA documenta-
tion, their comfort with computers and the library, and other
questions, including “What is your major?” Most students are majoring
in fields that require APA: education, social work, psychology, and so
on. Other students are undecided. As a writing teacher, it is my duty to
discuss not only MLA, but APA also, and, more importantly, to allow
students to choose one or the other for their research projects, as they
decide which is more appropriate in the context of their research and
their futures. Several students opt for MLA because they’ve been taught
MLA in Composition I and ultimately choose the familiar (and, of
course, some decide that MLA is more appropriate for their tasks).
Most students, however, are grateful for the chance to learn APA, and,
similar to my own experience as a psychology major (in which only one
professor figured out that no one else was teaching APA documentation
and format), they feared no one was ever going to help them learn it.
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I propose that composition scholars abandon MLA as a style man-
ual. Using other styles such as APA will help us establish our voices
more clearly, will help us understand our scholarship and our schol-
ars in their contexts more strongly, and will more accurately reflect
the notion that our authors frequently refine their ideas and beliefs.
VO I C E S , S T O RY T E L L E R S , P OW E R , A N D  T E N U R E  
Researchers have many voices. Even the so-called impersonal voice
of traditional research—the voice that is seen as voiceless because it is
drowned by a system of other researchers, other theories, data, and a
traditional format for a report—is, in itself, a voice nonetheless: a
voice chosen by the researcher at that moment, in that context of
his/her research shared in the most appropriate forum, a voice that
chooses at the moment to focus readers’ attention on issues other
than itself. A researcher’s voice in the most traditional-looking
research report isn’t as “drowned” as we might think: adhering to
styles such as APA helps distinguish researchers’ voices (using present
tense for discussions, conclusions, experience, commentary, analyses)
from the voices of others (using past tense for literature reviews and
for descriptions of methods). Such clarification, in fact, helps reveal
the full context in which a researcher is operating by clearly outlining
the sources—such as “formal” publication and “informal” interaction
with others—of a researcher’s thoughts (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).
Adopting any voice—as varied as those voices might be—is a
rhetorical act, a rhetorical decision, made by a writer in a particular
context. Unfortunately, several composition scholars now advocate a
“personal voice” through storytelling as the only necessary voice in
our scholarship, regardless of other necessities, regardless of the
writer’s own personal decision to do otherwise, and regardless of the
context in which the researcher is writing.
And who are the storytellers in composition today? For the most
part, we have two groups of scholars in composition from whom we
readily accept the story. First, the “big names.” Peter Elbow, Louise
Phelps, Teresa Enos, Joe Trimmer, Donald Graves, the presidents of our
organizations—these names have earned the right to tell stories
194 C O M P O S I N G  R E S E A R C H
because they paid their dues earlier with traditional scholarship. (How
else does someone become a keynote speaker? We all have stories, of
course, but not everyone is allowed to tell one at a convention in front
of everybody.) Spack (1997) commented on the unwillingness of main-
stream journals to publish “the personal,” citing Gebhardt’s (1992)
admission that during his tenure as editor of CCC (1987-1993), “per-
sonal perspective essays” were reserved for “leaders” of our field (20). In
other words, once a scholar has established a reputation via other, more
traditional forms of scholarship—including a doctoral dissertation—
the rules that govern their scholarship lighten up. Storytellers emerge
when our field has granted them the privilege to do so.
In Trimmer’s Narration as Knowledge (1997), for example, who
were the storytellers? Lad Tobin, Toby Fulwiler, Wendy Bishop, James
Clifford, Chris Anson, Sondra Perl, Lillian Bridwell-Bowles . . . There
were only a few “names” I didn’t recognize at first—names I felt I
probably should know but didn’t (in the neverending remnants of
graduate-student guilt that comes from not studying absolutely
everything). But most of the names I had studied. I had to study them
in order to earn my degree, write my exams, and earn the privilege of
writing a dissertation. What’s next for me? That depends. If I earn a
“name,” can I, too, tell stories? For now, my stories had better be
embedded in the larger context of scholarship, research, and disserta-
tion-like citations to everybody else’s name but my own.
For those who argue that stories are somehow automatically
“inclusive”—that they allow everyone to have a voice and do not sys-
tematically marginalize anyone—consider Gunner and McNenny’s
(1997) description of how they invited speakers to the Conference on
Basic Writing, held at CCCC 1997 in Phoenix:
In inviting the workshop speakers, we were quite aware of the political
truism that the voices heard are the voices that validate. To have our issues
“spoken into existence,” in a sense, we looked in some cases to have speak-
ers who themselves wield some professional and institutional power.
Victor Villanueva, Gary Tate, Jacqueline Jones Royster, Ira Shor: were they
themselves not so committed to inclusiveness, our invitations to them
would really have been a kind of exploitation, of their names, status, and
labor. (3-4)
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Invited to ride the coat-tails of this inclusiveness, paradoxically
validated by the institutional and professional power granted to the
few, were newcomers, new storytellers: with Gary Tate, John
McMillan and Elizabeth Woodworth; with Jacqueline Jones Royster,
Rebecca Greenberg Taylor. Indeed, storytellers at this conference were
ones with names and power, who invited and mentored a few fortu-
nate graduate students and junior faculty to become storytellers and
temporarily attach their otherwise powerless names to ones with
power—the leaders of our field whose personal perspectives we value.
Undergraduates form the second group of composition scholars
we readily allow to tell stories: the peer tutor. Especially in venues like
the “Tutors’ Column” of the Writing Lab Newsletter, undergraduate
peer tutors are encouraged to share their experiences and tell their
stories. That’s OK. Because they’re still undergraduates, we don’t
expect extensive knowledge of the scholarship in our field. And
because the work of the peer tutor is commonly described as begin-
ning primarily in “practice” rather than in “theory,” we value their
experiences and stories before they become tainted, while they’re still
honest, and while they present and publish—not for tenure, but for
knowledge, for learning, for the challenge of it all, and sometimes just
for fun or, especially, for that good feeling we all get afterwards.
In other words, the two groups in composition most likely to be
storytellers (and be readily accepted as such) are those who have
achieved status (“big names”) and those who couldn’t care less about
status yet (undergraduate peer tutors). In the meantime, those who
are somewhere in the gray middle of the spectrum (graduate stu-
dents, new Ph.D’s, non-tenured professors, adjunct faculty) have not
yet earned the privilege of just telling stories (as if everyone would lis-
ten) but have moved beyond the undergraduate years when that’s
almost all we had to share.3
While systems for achieving tenure are being questioned currently,
we are still tenure-seeking professionals who understand the value of
institutional power and are, therefore, still bound by older rules gov-
erning the granting of tenure at most universities. Can telling stories
alone earn us tenure? Probably not. But theorizing the role of story-
telling in our scholarship, epistemizing storytelling, surely can. Spurred
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on, perhaps, by contentions such as Boyer’s (1990) that “a new vision
of scholarship is required . . . to clarify campus missions and relate the
work of the academy more directly to the realities of contemporary
life” (13)—to reward faculty time spent teaching and mentoring stu-
dents, not just time spent as researchers—we have inferred license for
the personal, anecdotal research that we now prefer.
But Boyer also reminded us that when current tenure systems were
formulated, “research per se was not the problem. The problem was
that the research mission, which was appropriate for some institu-
tions, created a shadow over the entire higher learning enterprise”
(12). To help rewrite those missions in a way that would help us value
both research and teaching, Boyer identified four kinds of scholarship
in a model that does not suggest we stop doing traditional research,
but that places our research in the larger cycle, the larger context, of
our scholarly work (17-25):
1. The Scholarship of Discovery
• knowledge for its own sake
• traditional definition of “research”
• asks, “what is there to know?”
2. The Scholarship of Integration
• dependent on and related to the scholarship of discovery
• connects knowledge to larger contexts, ideas, other disciplines 
• asks, “what does this knowledge mean?”
3. The Scholarship of Application
• dependent on and related to the scholarship of discovery and inte-
gration
• applies knowledge to useful contexts
• asks, “who or what can this knowledge help?”
4. The Scholarship of Teaching
• transmitting, transforming, and extending the discovery, integra-
tion, and application of knowledge
• makes others aware of the application of integrated discoveries
• asks, “what more do we need to know?” (return to discovery)
In casual conversations with others in my field, I’ve often heard
Boyer’s name mentioned in support of the “scholarship of teaching,”
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as if he separated teaching from this model, elevating it above the
larger context of discovery, integration, and application of knowl-
edge. Instead, Boyer argued, “What we urgently need today is a more
inclusive view of what it means to be a scholar—a recognition that
knowledge is acquired through research, through synthesis, through
practice, and through teaching” (24). For Boyer, “inspired teaching
keeps the flame of scholarship alive” (24)—all scholarship. And
though it appears in varied forms, such scholarship must not be so
separate from our teaching.
T E A C H I N G  O U R  R E S E A R C H  
One argument frequently put forth in defense of experience-based
narratives is that such narratives create closer ties between our
research and our teaching. We are quite good at sharing stories and
research about our teaching, but we so seldom do the reverse: teach
our research. Some scholars have asked this question before: “Why
don’t we teach our research or our theory to our students?” Troyka
(1984), for instance, proposed that basic writers read texts from the
classical rhetoric that first shaped our field. Schilb (1991) argued that
composition students should be “coinquirers into the ramifications of
cultural studies and postmodernism” as students “may hunger for
genuine intellectual substance” (187). Harkin (1991) contrasted our
field to chemistry, where research will ultimately be taught in chem-
istry courses. Research in chemistry is an integral, necessary part of
learning chemistry. We would be hard-pressed to assert that we, too,
pass on our research to our students in a manner that will help them
engage fully in the study of writing. Frequent use of texts like readers
and handbooks indicates that we still prefer, in spite of a so-called
new paradigm, to rely on examples/models, study questions, and
rules.
Unless we share our research with our students, we won’t like the
answer to a most difficult question: “Whose knowledge do we
advance when we conduct research and publish our inquiry?” For
now, the answer is “ours,” not our students’. And whose knowledge
should we serve in the end? A text such as Elbow and Belanoff ’s
Community of Writers, for instance, offers clear case studies of writers
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in action, including the authors. What would happen if we provided
students with excellent case studies such as those with other research:
Brand’s (1989) research on affective responses to writing, Jensen and
DiTiberio’s (1989) research on the MBTI, Straub’s (1997) research on
teachers’ comments, Oliver’s (1995) research on writing prompts,
Johnson’s (1991) review of the history of writing in the last century? 
Incorporating more of our research into our composition text-
books, of course, places greater demands on our field. First, it requires
that we stop arguing about research so much and start doing some
(see Charney, 1996; Barton, 1997). Second, it requires that our
research be useful not only to teachers, editors, and tenure commit-
tees, but also, and more importantly, to the students who need it.
Teaching our research will make us more accountable for that
research, will open a different and necessary dialogue about research
with students (and, by extension, ourselves), will present our disci-
pline to our students in the full, rich context of its long history and
varied inquiry, and will invite students to conduct their own inquiry
into the nature of composing—outcomes that will bridge more
solidly the gap we have created between our teaching and our
scholarship and research.
But are we prepared to do so?
T R A I N I N G  O U R  R E S E A R C H E R S  
Numerous scholars have pointed to the lack of training in research
and statistics by composition graduate programs designed to produce
“humanists.” Lauer and Asher (1988), Hayes and Young, et al. (1992),
North (1985), and Ede (1992), to name only a few, have all com-
mented in some way on our limited training. We can still find com-
position programs that require more literature than composition or
that require at least some literature training instead of training in
research design and statistics.
In an online survey of eight doctoral programs in composition
(March 1998, consortium-l@mtu.edu), none of the eight respondents
indicated that their programs require a course in statistics, and only
one-half, or four, of those programs provided training in “quantita-
tive” research methods, though three of those four blended these
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methods in the same course as “qualitative.” All eight respondents
indicated that research and research designs relying on numerical evi-
dence are not highly valued in their programs. Further, four of the
eight respondents indicated that scores on the Quantitative section of
the GRE are less important than Verbal and Analytical scores, and two
indicated that Quantitative and Analytical scores are less important
than Verbal scores when admitting doctoral students to their pro-
grams. Only one respondent indicated that all three sections are
treated equally, and one chose not to answer the question. Thus, in
addition to not consistently providing training for our doctoral stu-
dents, we do not highly value potential and important indicators of
their math training, ability, or anxiety. While these eight programs
might not be representative of the broader field and of all doctoral
programs, the eight programs in this survey represent the training
currently provided to 182 doctoral students.
Add to this inadequate textbooks designed to train the composi-
tion researcher (as reviewed in chapter two), and the result is that our
training (if we receive any at all) is, at best, potentially misguided.
Our strongest and most comprehensive text yet is Hayes and Young,
et al. (1992), Reading Empirical Research Studies: The Rhetoric of
Research. As the title suggests, the editors focused on the rhetoric of
research: “the scientist is to be seen as a practicing rhetorician” (8).
The collection of eighteen studies, with comments on strengths and
weaknesses by the editors and reflections by the original authors, is an
excellent text for any course on research. A special chapter is devoted
to how to read traditional research reports, all couched in an argu-
ment similar to the one I am making here: “By and large, those
responsible for maintaining and improving writing instruction in
this country cannot, without further training, access the work that
could help them carry out their responsibilities better” (6). Still, edi-
tors of this text, as others have done, refer readers elsewhere for the
most difficult part of the research process—statistical analysis.
At the same time, graduate students are under more pressure than
ever to publish their work while still in graduate school. The job market
is such that the standard “publish or perish” pressure often reserved for
the tenure line has trickled down to the graduate student—not in the
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same way, of course (one wouldn’t be kicked out of graduate school for
not publishing), but in a way that may block our full entrance to the
field in the first place—perishing before they even start. In the October
1997 MLA Job Listing, for instance, numerous composition positions
required “substantial” publication experiences, and one posting even
noted “preferably a book.”
In other words, graduate students are pushed to publish before they
are fully trained researchers. And, certainly, they are capable of pub-
lishing the kinds of work they are trained to do: textual analysis/criti-
cism, theoretical explorations, political debates, stories. Therefore, the
trend of criticizing research, arguing about research, defending pre-
ferred methods more often than actually exploring all kinds of
research will likely continue unless our training programs change.
Anderson (1998) speculated on the ethics of our research, a com-
ponent of research we also omit if our programs neglect full training.
Anderson questioned the ethics of sharing unpublished student
essays or quoting their spoken words (64) in much of our research—
most quoting and sharing we see in our qualitative research—and
hoped to make readers aware of the NCTE and CCCC guidelines for
securing students’ permission to do so. For Anderson, our field, in
contrast to the social sciences, lacks training in research ethics.
the social sciences’ extensive discourse on research ethics is so deeply
embedded in those fields that it constitutes a form of tacit knowledge. . . .
For example, knowledge of the APA Ethics Code is so pervasive in psychol-
ogy that most books on psychology research methods don’t even mention
it. Composition’s pioneering introductions to social science research
methods (Kirsch and Sullivan; Lauer and Asher) resemble similar books
written by social scientists because they discuss techniques only—but dif-
fer because they are not set in a context that includes a rich, disciplinary
discussion of the techniques’ ethical dimensions. (65)
Anderson included sample permission forms as appendices to his
article and questioned our use of them in most research thus far.
Indeed, our training in research methods is so limited that we should be
concerned about the ethics of the research we publish. No graduate
course on research in composition should omit discussion of ethics and
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practice writing IRB proposals, for example, and no course that requires
graduate students to conduct an educational study should omit the IRB
proposal and approval as a required assignment. Writing such propos-
als demands that the writer be clear, convincing, and knowledgeable of
the methods employed—all in the context of why the research question
is important and how the research findings will be used.
Composition scholars need training in a wide range of research
methods—and in statistics—but one course alone won’t do the job.
Ideally, courses would be offered concurrently with other content-
driven courses and in a manner that fits well with the overall context
of the program, allowing students the opportunity to design studies
on issues of interest to them. A small, manageable study such as the
red ink/blue ink study presented in chapter six offers a model of the
kinds of designs and statistical analyses students could learn in the
context of their own questions, becoming more sophisticated in
design as they move on. Graduate students should never be pressured
to produce publishable manuscripts of those fledgling studies—they
must first learn, make those false starts, discover those mistakes, and,
by the end of their programs, be stronger for it. Does “just practicing”
research methods in a classroom make them less “real”? No. Like
practicing medicine or writing student papers, we recognize that such
practice always feeds long-term goals.
To help train researchers, our field needs a text that explains statis-
tics in contexts that composition researchers will understand. The
bowling alley study throughout chapters two, three, and four in this
work provided, I hope, a beginning. Though a bowling alley study
might seem silly, humor is a useful step toward dissolving the tension
that surrounds quantitative research in our field. In plain language, in
simple contexts (at first), research design and statistics can be
explained as a means of making decisions, as a process for finding out
something interesting, and as procedures that can actually be enjoy-
able and playful.
N U M B E R S  I N  C O N T E X T  
Finally, let’s return to that primary “culprit” in the qualitative-quan-
titative rift: the number. That untrustworthy, reductive, impersonal
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number. And let’s admit that, sometimes, in some contexts, numbers
might not be important, or they might not be the only way to look at
something. But then let’s try to understand when they are important
and when they do, in fact, mean something, depending on context.
Numbers naturally appear frequently and, certainly, in varied contexts:
in our personal lives and our teaching lives.
For instance, the next time you’re at the supermarket, notice how
often you compare prices, compare labels for fat grams, compare
packages for quantity. Remember when you started thinking about
retirement? Understanding interest rates, investment options—dol-
lars—suddenly became important, just as balancing a checkbook
once did. When you get your blood pressure checked, you don’t
accept a vague “it’s fine” or “it’s a tad high” from a medical profes-
sional, do you? No, give me the numbers, doc. And if a loved one,
diagnosed with diabetes, tells you that her blood sugars are better or
worse or the same, you take the time to learn what those numbers
mean, right? If you’ve ever found pleasure in winning a card game, in
your favorite team winning an important playoff game, in your
teenager passing the written test to get a driver’s license, you’ve
learned that numbers can be fun—and fun to think about. If you’ve
ever argued with a loved one, unable to explain why you’re angry
except that the other person did such-and-such a number of times or
said such-and-such once too often, then you know the power of
quantifying behavior in a personal argument.
If numbers can teach us something about our very livelihood in
these personal situations, what else could they possibly help us learn?
In our daily lives, depending on contexts, numbers inform our health,
share our love, express our anger, plan for our futures, and give us
pleasure. And, sure, come tax time, they might give us ulcers, but
that’s not because they’re numbers—it’s the context in which we’re
using them that we loathe.
In the context of our teaching, numbers affect us every day. For
those who teach freshman composition, yearly increases or decreases
in enrollment might affect our jobs. Retention efforts across the
nation focus on increasing the numbers of students who persist to
graduation, efforts that affect the students in our classrooms. Those
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who serve on committees that attend to issues such as starting
salaries, merit pay, graduate admissions, stipends, and hiring deci-
sions need to be sensitive to the numbers involved in those particular
contexts. When we talk to students in conferences about how many
times they missed a Friday, or how often a certain kind of error
appears, or how many journal entries they have yet to do, we use
numerical patterns to help us communicate with students, help us
understand what to focus on next, and help us determine whose
problems are purely academic and whose might be more personal. In
peer review sessions, when students notice that a classmate used a
certain word six times in one short paragraph, they point it out and
quantify it in order to help that student reduce wordiness or redun-
dancy, an important insight in the context of reader response.
If numbers, frequencies, and patterns that can be quantified give
us insight on our students’ problems, or their written work, or on our
professional concerns, what else could they help us learn? Certainly,
not all student behaviors can or should be quantified, but we natu-
rally quantify the ones we can as a necessary step toward teaching,
toward helping.
We know that those numbers reveal something to us—possibly
revealing a story somewhere.
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8 C O N C LU S I O N S  ( A N D
B E G I N N I N G S )
What will composition look like in the future if we abandon numeri-
cal evidence entirely and tell stories instead? How would we tie all of
those stories together, and how, exactly, would we find them useful to
our teaching? We might learn one day that our postmodern critique
of scientism has resulted not in a new understanding of the role sci-
ence plays in our culture, but in a chaotic individualism through
which we amass a body of scholarship we are ultimately unable to
contain, describe, or, in the end, use. How will our field be portrayed
to others if constructed of a mass of stories one must be an insider to
understand or appreciate—stories we are unable to debate, falsify, or
evaluate?1 And if it takes only one liar to destroy the credibility of us
all, how will we continue to believe the stories we hear? And to what
will we turn when we lose trust—again?
As with most trends in composition, a new one will most likely be
just around the corner. Then we will realize that the story can exclude
and marginalize some voices, that there are other voices just as valid
as the personal, that we need new research to examine broader issues
and to put our stories to the test, and that in order to do all of this, we
need to be better trained as researchers, armed with a wide range of
methods available to us—methods able to answer the wide range of
questions we will so naturally raise within so many varied contexts.
Storytelling can enhance any kind of inquiry, certainly, but diverse
inquiry can aid the power of those stories at the same time, if we do
not limit the forms of evidence we seek, the political ideologies we
seek to uphold, and the written forms we favor and find pleasing.
As reviewed in chapter one, the new storytelling trend has gained a
strong hold on our scholarship, our beliefs, and, most importantly,
our means of justifying those beliefs. However, the current value of
storytelling in our field has been enhanced, in part, by arguments that
simply devalue the research that relies on numerical evidence.
Further, our own history (and desire to escape the remnants of 19th
century thought in particular) has added to our quest for something
new, something different, as shown in chapter two. Math avoidance
and anxiety, the fight against male-dominated science, and a prefer-
ence for works that are more literary than traditional reports, as illus-
trated in chapter three, have added fuel to the qualitative/quantitative
dichotomy (and dichotomous language) we currently face in our
field.
While a theory such as a Contextualist Theory of Epistemic
Justification, presented in chapter four, may provide us a lens through
which to see our research and our research contexts differently—and
to recontextualize a most harmful division among competing theo-
ries of epistemology—we must take other active steps in order for our
field to fully realize, in practical terms, the value of such a changed
vision. After all, our field is currently divided in such a way that an
inclusive theory such as a Contextualist Theory of Epistemic
Justification cannot be embraced at all unless we first understand
how best to open the doors necessary for it to work. Otherwise, such a
theory will remain only that—a theory, one that makes sense in our
scholarship only.
To apply a Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification in a
useful, practical manner, the Contextualist Research Paradigm Matrix
in chapter four focuses on questions that researchers must ask in the
contexts formed by simultaneous and intersecting research issues and
rhetorical issues. Such questions, asked honestly from the desire to
learn and to share, will help us focus on available means for learning
in that context, rather than relying on trends that are merely popular
or writing styles that we prefer. The questions in the matrix point to
larger issues, such as conducting research that is useful not only to us,
but also to our students, and maintaining ethical standards while
exploring a research question. Further, the questions in the matrix are
deliberately general—to start the process of later, more specific ques-
tions that will vary due to context.
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The reprint in chapter five of Oliver’s (1995) study on rhetorical
specification in writing prompts, together with an interview in which
she articulated several decisions she made during the process, pro-
vides an example of a researcher (and a study) at work within the
matrix. Oliver made decisions based on a combination of factors:
usefulness to her readers (other teachers), benefits to students in our
classrooms, fairness in relation to her data, validation of her own
experience. Similarly, chapter six presents the red ink/blue ink study
to demonstrate the matrix—the research process—at work as well,
though my own decisions in that study, because of a different context,
resulted in a product that differs from Oliver’s but is no less accurate.
Both chapters five and six reveal the complicated processes that guide
researchers in the construction of their final products—complicated,
varied processes that may result in varied products. Indeed, the final
product of any researcher’s endeavors, regardless of kind, can ulti-
mately share, in the limited space of a final product, only parts of
those processes—processes that a Contextualist Research Paradigm
helps reveal.
A contextualist paradigm enables us to systemize that inquiry
while still maintaining the flexibility of our multidisciplinary field. In
a Contextualist Research Paradigm, one kind of research is not auto-
matically more valuable than another, and one kind of evidence does
not guide our quests. Instead, full attention to the rhetorical tradition
that has guided our field from the start and full understanding of the
processes of research that guide our inquiry converge to provide a
new foundation upon which our scholars can see our own research
and research questions differently—a vision that can provide stability
and growth at the same time.
For Phelps (1988), our field had been engaged in the quest for a
new genre that would adequately express what we believe about “the
personal nature of knowledge,” but in the “meantime, we are seeing
hybrid, tortured, mixed, and often unsuccessful discourse forms”
(vii). While Phelps did not specify what she meant here, or to what
kinds of texts she referred, I recognize my own text as deliberately
hybrid and mixed. In my own quest to search not for a new genre, but
for a new lens through which to see the eclectic forms of knowledge
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that inform our work in varied contexts, I could not—as Phelps
did—narrow such a quest to a path of theory only. To do so would
demand that genre dictate inquiry, not the reverse.
In the context of this inquiry, then—a quest for an inclusive
Contextualist Research Paradigm for Rhetoric and Composition—
this work produced not one genre of text, but six: 1) I told several sto-
ries, of course, as my own personal experiences and conviction
guided this quest; 2) I referred to and analyzed theory and research in
a traditional, academic manner because theory and research, too,
informed the quest; 3) I constructed a mock study for the purposes of
demonstrating decision-making and research procedures in a
research context; 4) I reprinted Oliver’s (1995) study for readers’
scrutiny and 5) conducted an interview with Dr. Oliver that also illus-
trated decision-making in context; and 6) conducted a new pilot
study to illustrate the value of research for testing our lore.
Such a hybrid text is not tortured, but is necessary for exploring
and conveying a new understanding of the eclectic epistemic founda-
tions of our work—as teachers and as researchers. The mix of texts
presented here aids our understanding of the context in which our
current, too narrow preference for research methods has grown and
furthers our understanding by examining reasons for that trend.
Composition’s quest to define itself as a discipline has recently
resulted in our gravitation toward the narrow path of storytelling in a
misguided and unsuccessful attempt to define the field via genre, per-
sonal anecdotes, and politics rather than the contexts in which we
find ourselves teaching, researching, and asking questions. Our
attempt to become a respected academic discipline by simultaneously
countering academic tradition has focused our attention on the polit-
ical, rather than the epistemic, goals of our publications. At the same
time, our quest to shed our own history of constructing a mechanical,
drill-oriented paradigm that ignored students’ voices has led us to an
equally limited paradigm focused on our own voices rather than on
research that will benefit our students.
Should we stop telling our stories? Absolutely not. We must, in
fact, keep telling them in order to create the fullest interplay among
various kinds of evidence, but then we must seek that variety, too.
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Numbers alone won’t reveal everything we need to know. Stories
alone can’t do it, either. But when researchers stop defining their work
by method only—and focus more on the research question in a
research context, applying a new contextualist paradigm, understand-
ing that all research methods are, indeed, epistemic—then the full
power of any data, be it story or number, will truly blossom into the
knowledge our field seeks and the discipline we hope to become.
N O T E S  
1. For a recent review of the potential for theory to silence debate
(and, therefore, silence voices), see Porter (1998), “Methods, Truth,
Reasons,” College English, April 1998.
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